IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1824 Filed November 26, 2014
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BILLY TRUE BENEDICT, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Paul R. Huscher,
Judge.
A defendant asks to be resentenced on his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, second offense. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, and Julie Forsyth, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ. 2
TABOR, J.
Billy True Benedict claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
his sentencing hearing because his attorney did not object to the State’s alleged
breach of the plea agreement. Because the State honored the agreement
recited at the plea hearing, we affirm.
During the execution of a search warrant at a Winterset residence in
March 2013, police discovered Benedict in possession of a baggie containing
methamphetamine and a pipe used to smoke the controlled substance. In April
2013, the State charged Benedict by trial information with possession of
methamphetamine, second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of
Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2013).
The Madison County Attorney engaged in a series of plea negotiations
with Benedict. Benedict’s counsel made a record concerning the last two plea
offers rejected by his client; those offers included resolution of not just the current
drug charge, but other pending charges of theft and criminal mischief. Defense
counsel asked the prosecutor on September 10, 2013, the morning of trial, if the
earlier plea offers were still on the table. At that point, the prosecutor limited the
plea offer to the methamphetamine possession charge.
Off the record, Benedict and his counsel discussed the possibility of
accepting the State’s plea offer rather than going forward with the trial. After that
discussion, defense counsel stated on the record his client was willing to enter a
guilty plea to the charge of possession of methamphetamine, second offense,
“and then we would ask that a PSI [presentence investigation report] be done 3
and we be free to argue sentencing.” The county attorney told the court that
agreement was acceptable to the State.
The court then started to step through the plea colloquy with Benedict,
determining he was thirty-three years old and understood the charge against him.
Before Benedict entered his guilty plea, the county attorney expressed her desire
to clarify the terms of the plea agreement.
[The State]: Your Honor, I believe the State needs to set forth what the plea agreement is so that all parties understand. THE COURT: Very well. You may do so. [The State]: Your Honor, the offer that was made, and my understanding is that Mr. Benedict has accepted, is that he would plead guilty as charged in this Trial Information. There is no agreement as to sentencing. A Presentence Investigation will be ordered, and the parties are free to argue whatever sentence that they would like to have imposed. THE COURT: Is that agreeable? [Defense Counsel]: That is agreeable, and that is my understanding of the plea agreement. THE COURT: Is that agreeable with you? [Benedict]: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything, Mr. Benedict, you don’t understand about the plea agreement as it stands now? [Benedict]: Everything’s clear.
The court resumed the plea colloquy, during which Benedict admitted
possessing methamphetamine on March 21, 2013, and also admitted a previous
drug conviction. The court accepted his guilty plea.
Benedict appeared for sentencing on November 12, 2013. The State
asked the court to adopt the sentencing recommendation set forth in the PSI,
namely a two-year prison term. Defense counsel argued for one year of
probation, telling the court: “I think probation actually would be a greater
punishment for Mr. Benedict than prison. Mr. Benedict has been in prison 4
before. In fact, when he entered the plea to this, he had informed me that he
probably would prefer prison over probation.” Benedict personally spoke to the
court, confirming what his attorney had said: “[I]t’s probably going to be more of a
challenge on probation than just going and sitting in prison doing nothing.” But
Benedict explained because of his family situation, he was asking to be placed
on probation.
Citing Benedict’s criminal history and prior unsuccessful probationary
terms, the district court determined incarceration was the appropriate sentence.
The court sentenced Benedict to an indeterminate two-year prison term.
Benedict now argues his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the
sentencing hearing by failing to object to the State’s recommendation of a two-
year prison term instead of a two-year suspended sentence and one year of
probation.
Because they invoke constitutional rights, we review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo. See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa
2013). “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must prove that his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the
defendant suffered prejudice as a result of this failure.” State v. Horness, 600
N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1999).
The State must comply with both the letter and the spirit of a plea
agreement. Id. at 296. If the State breaches a plea agreement, counsel has a
duty to object because “only by objecting could counsel ensure that the
defendant received the benefit of the agreement.” Id. Defense counsel’s 5
objection would lead to a different outcome—sufficient to show prejudice—
because it would alert “the court to correct the taint by allowing the defendant to
withdraw the plea or by scheduling a new sentencing hearing with a prosecutor
who will make the promised recommendation.” State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d
211, 218 (Iowa 2008).
On appeal, Benedict argues the two discussions at the plea hearing must
be “read together” and, if we do so, we will find the State agreed to recommend a
two-year suspended sentence and one-year probation as part of the final plea
agreement. Benedict recognizes “there was talk that the parties would argue
sentencing and that there was no agreed upon sentence,” but he contends those
statements “most likely meant that the defense was going to request a lesser
sentence than the State.” Benedict claims he received little benefit from entering
a plea to “the maximum offense in return for the State’s recommendation of the
maximum sentence. He might as well have gone to trial and taken his chances.”
The State acknowledges “some confusing and possibly contradictory
statements” regarding the plea offer available to Benedict made during the
pretrial hearing which turned into a plea proceeding. But the State points out the
county attorney, “in an effort to make things abundantly clear,” took the
opportunity before Benedict entered his plea to articulate the express terms of
the offer. Specifically, the county attorney stated Benedict “would plead guilty as
charged in this Trial Information.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1824 Filed November 26, 2014
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BILLY TRUE BENEDICT, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Paul R. Huscher,
Judge.
A defendant asks to be resentenced on his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, second offense. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, and Julie Forsyth, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ. 2
TABOR, J.
Billy True Benedict claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
his sentencing hearing because his attorney did not object to the State’s alleged
breach of the plea agreement. Because the State honored the agreement
recited at the plea hearing, we affirm.
During the execution of a search warrant at a Winterset residence in
March 2013, police discovered Benedict in possession of a baggie containing
methamphetamine and a pipe used to smoke the controlled substance. In April
2013, the State charged Benedict by trial information with possession of
methamphetamine, second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of
Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2013).
The Madison County Attorney engaged in a series of plea negotiations
with Benedict. Benedict’s counsel made a record concerning the last two plea
offers rejected by his client; those offers included resolution of not just the current
drug charge, but other pending charges of theft and criminal mischief. Defense
counsel asked the prosecutor on September 10, 2013, the morning of trial, if the
earlier plea offers were still on the table. At that point, the prosecutor limited the
plea offer to the methamphetamine possession charge.
Off the record, Benedict and his counsel discussed the possibility of
accepting the State’s plea offer rather than going forward with the trial. After that
discussion, defense counsel stated on the record his client was willing to enter a
guilty plea to the charge of possession of methamphetamine, second offense,
“and then we would ask that a PSI [presentence investigation report] be done 3
and we be free to argue sentencing.” The county attorney told the court that
agreement was acceptable to the State.
The court then started to step through the plea colloquy with Benedict,
determining he was thirty-three years old and understood the charge against him.
Before Benedict entered his guilty plea, the county attorney expressed her desire
to clarify the terms of the plea agreement.
[The State]: Your Honor, I believe the State needs to set forth what the plea agreement is so that all parties understand. THE COURT: Very well. You may do so. [The State]: Your Honor, the offer that was made, and my understanding is that Mr. Benedict has accepted, is that he would plead guilty as charged in this Trial Information. There is no agreement as to sentencing. A Presentence Investigation will be ordered, and the parties are free to argue whatever sentence that they would like to have imposed. THE COURT: Is that agreeable? [Defense Counsel]: That is agreeable, and that is my understanding of the plea agreement. THE COURT: Is that agreeable with you? [Benedict]: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything, Mr. Benedict, you don’t understand about the plea agreement as it stands now? [Benedict]: Everything’s clear.
The court resumed the plea colloquy, during which Benedict admitted
possessing methamphetamine on March 21, 2013, and also admitted a previous
drug conviction. The court accepted his guilty plea.
Benedict appeared for sentencing on November 12, 2013. The State
asked the court to adopt the sentencing recommendation set forth in the PSI,
namely a two-year prison term. Defense counsel argued for one year of
probation, telling the court: “I think probation actually would be a greater
punishment for Mr. Benedict than prison. Mr. Benedict has been in prison 4
before. In fact, when he entered the plea to this, he had informed me that he
probably would prefer prison over probation.” Benedict personally spoke to the
court, confirming what his attorney had said: “[I]t’s probably going to be more of a
challenge on probation than just going and sitting in prison doing nothing.” But
Benedict explained because of his family situation, he was asking to be placed
on probation.
Citing Benedict’s criminal history and prior unsuccessful probationary
terms, the district court determined incarceration was the appropriate sentence.
The court sentenced Benedict to an indeterminate two-year prison term.
Benedict now argues his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the
sentencing hearing by failing to object to the State’s recommendation of a two-
year prison term instead of a two-year suspended sentence and one year of
probation.
Because they invoke constitutional rights, we review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo. See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa
2013). “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must prove that his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the
defendant suffered prejudice as a result of this failure.” State v. Horness, 600
N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1999).
The State must comply with both the letter and the spirit of a plea
agreement. Id. at 296. If the State breaches a plea agreement, counsel has a
duty to object because “only by objecting could counsel ensure that the
defendant received the benefit of the agreement.” Id. Defense counsel’s 5
objection would lead to a different outcome—sufficient to show prejudice—
because it would alert “the court to correct the taint by allowing the defendant to
withdraw the plea or by scheduling a new sentencing hearing with a prosecutor
who will make the promised recommendation.” State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d
211, 218 (Iowa 2008).
On appeal, Benedict argues the two discussions at the plea hearing must
be “read together” and, if we do so, we will find the State agreed to recommend a
two-year suspended sentence and one-year probation as part of the final plea
agreement. Benedict recognizes “there was talk that the parties would argue
sentencing and that there was no agreed upon sentence,” but he contends those
statements “most likely meant that the defense was going to request a lesser
sentence than the State.” Benedict claims he received little benefit from entering
a plea to “the maximum offense in return for the State’s recommendation of the
maximum sentence. He might as well have gone to trial and taken his chances.”
The State acknowledges “some confusing and possibly contradictory
statements” regarding the plea offer available to Benedict made during the
pretrial hearing which turned into a plea proceeding. But the State points out the
county attorney, “in an effort to make things abundantly clear,” took the
opportunity before Benedict entered his plea to articulate the express terms of
the offer. Specifically, the county attorney stated Benedict “would plead guilty as
charged in this Trial Information. There is no agreement as to sentencing. A
presentence investigation will be ordered, and the parties are free to argue
whatever sentence that they would like to have imposed.” 6
Both counsel and Benedict himself acknowledged the county attorney’s
recitation reflected their understanding of the plea agreement. When asked by
the district court if there was anything he did not understand about the plea
agreement “as it stands now,” Benedict responded: “Everything’s clear.” Having
said the final plea offer was clear to him, Benedict cannot now fault counsel for
not attempting to resurrect terms of a plea offer the State had taken off of the
table. The final plea agreement contemplated the parties were free to argue
whatever sentence they believed appropriate. Accordingly, the State’s
sentencing recommendation of a two-year prison sentence, in accord with the
PSI report, did not breach its agreement with Benedict. Benedict’s counsel had
no cause to object at sentencing and did not perform below constitutional
standards. See State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Iowa 2003) (holding
trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to raise meritless issue).
In response to Benedict’s argument that the final plea offer was of little
benefit, the State contends Benedict may have accepted it because he was
actually “anticipating requesting a term of incarceration over probation.” Benedict
and his counsel both told the sentencing court that probation could be viewed as
a more onerous punishment for him than prison. But whatever Benedict’s
motivation for accepting the plea offer; he fails to show his attorney breached an
essential duty by not objecting to the State’s sentencing recommendation.
AFFIRMED.