State of Iowa v. Benjamin G. Trane

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: January 6, 2023
• Docket: 21-1211
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 21–1211

Submitted October 12, 2022—Filed January 6, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

BENJAMIN G. TRANE,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Mark Kruse,

Judge.

The defendant appeals the district court’s conclusion on remand that he

failed to show that an alleged victim had made false accusations of sexual abuse

against the victim’s adoptive or foster parents. AFFIRMED.

May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

Alfredo Parrish (argued) of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Gentry Brown

Bergmann & Messamer L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller (argued) (until

withdrawal) and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 2

MAY, Justice.

The State charged Benjamin Trane with crimes toward certain minors,

including sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of a female victim, K.S. A jury

found Trane guilty of three crimes, including assault with intent to commit

sexual abuse toward K.S. The district court sentenced Trane to prison. Trane

appealed. This court remanded with instructions for the district court to hold a

“rule 5.412 hearing to determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence,”

K.S. made certain “false allegations of sexual abuse.” State v. Trane (Trane I), 934

N.W.2d 447, 466 (Iowa 2019). If so, Trane would be entitled to a new trial.

Following a hearing, the district court concluded Trane had not carried his

burden and, therefore, Trane was not entitled to a new trial. Now Trane appeals

again. He argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion

for recusal, by considering certain evidence, and by concluding that Trane failed

to prove K.S. made false allegations of sexual abuse.

Following our review, we conclude that Trane has failed to show any abuse

of discretion by the district court. So we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History.

In our prior opinion, Trane I, we described the facts and history of this

case. See id. at 450–55. We decline to repeat all of it here. But the following facts

are relevant for this appeal.

In 2003, Trane and his wife started a school for troubled youth in Keokuk,

Iowa. In 2015, there were allegations of sexual abuse toward a female, K.S., as

well as physical abuse toward two males. The State charged Trane with (1) sexual 3

abuse in the third degree, (2) sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist, and

(3) child endangerment. A jury found Trane guilty of three charges: (1) assault

with intent to commit sexual abuse; (2) pattern, practice, or scheme to engage in

sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist; and (3) child endangerment.

Trane moved for a new trial. Among other things, Trane argued the district court

should have allowed evidence that K.S. had previously made false allegations of

sexual abuse against her adoptive and foster parents.

On May 10, 2018, the court heard evidence and argument on Trane’s

motion for a new trial. Ultimately, the court denied the motion. The same day,

the court sentenced Trane to prison.

Trane appealed. Among other things, Trane argued that the district court

should have conducted a rule 5.412 hearing before deciding whether to exclude

evidence that K.S. had previously made false allegations of sexual abuse. We

agreed and remanded with these directions:

For the foregoing reasons, we conditionally remand. The district court should conduct an in camera rule 5.412 hearing to determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, K.S. made false allegations of sexual abuse against her adoptive or foster parents. If false allegations were made, then Trane is entitled to a new trial. The new trial would extend to all counts, including the child endangerment count, because of the risk that all three verdicts could have been affected by the limits on Trane’s ability to present a defense on the sex-related counts. If Trane does not make this showing, then his convictions and sentence should be affirmed.

Id. at 466; see generally Iowa R. Evid. 5.412(c) (establishing procedure to

determine admissibility of other sexual behavior in criminal proceedings

involving alleged sexual abuse). 4

Consistent with our remand instructions, the district court scheduled a

rule 5.412 hearing. Prior to that hearing, Trane filed a motion for recusal of the

judge who was scheduled to preside. As the motion noted, that same judge had

presided over Trane’s May 2018 new trial hearing and sentencing. And,

according to Trane, “[a] fair and even reading of the transcript from [that] hearing

makes it apparent that serious issues exist that [would] challenge [the judge’s]

ability to serve as an impartial and neutral arbiter.” Trane claimed the judge

engaged in combative dialogue towards his counsel, assumed the role of

prosecutor, threatened to eject attendees supporting him, made impermissible

statements during sentencing, and more. The State resisted. Following a hearing,

the court denied the motion.

Soon after, the district court held the mandated rule 5.412 hearing. K.S.’s

adoptive parents both testified. Both denied any physical or sexual abuse. K.S.

also testified. She described physical and sexual abuse by her adoptive father.

Also, Trane offered a transcript of K.S.’s deposition. In it, K.S. described physical

abuse by both adoptive parents as well as sexual abuse by her adoptive father.

In a written ruling, the court concluded that “[b]ased on the totality of the

evidence, the court d[id] not find that, by a preponderance of the evidence, K.S.

made false allegations of sexual abuse against her adoptive parents or the foster

parents.” So the court declined to grant a new trial. Trane filed a notice of appeal.

We retained the case.1

1The State argues that we lack jurisdiction because the order following remand was not a final judgment of sentence. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1) (2015). But the State does not deny that a final judgment of sentence was entered prior to Trane’s first appeal, Trane I. And the State 5

II. Analysis.

A. Recusal Motion. Trane claims that the court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to recuse. We disagree.

“We review a judge’s decision on a motion to recuse for abuse of

discretion.” Carter v. Carter, 957 N.W.2d 623, 631 (Iowa 2021). “The court abuses

its discretion when its decision is based on untenable grounds or it has acted

unreasonably.” State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Iowa 2005). In applying

this standard, we bear in mind that “[t]here is as much obligation for a judge not

to recuse when there is no occasion for [the judge] to do so as there is for [the

judge] to do so when there is.” State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994)

(first alteration in original) (quoting Hinman v. Rodgers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th

Cir. 1987) (per curiam)).

A judge should recuse when the “judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(D)(1)). This is

acknowledges that—when we remanded in Trane I—we had authority to authorize a future appeal following remand. The State claims, though, that because our opinion in Trane I did not expressly mention the possibility of a future appeal, we must not have “intended to authorize an appeal” following remand. We disagree. As Trane correctly notes, we regularly remand criminal cases for specific proceedings. We do so with the understanding that a postremand appeal will be available if needed. See, e.g., State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 340 (Iowa 2019) (conditional affirmance and remand), aff’d, 972 N.W.2d 728, 737 (Iowa 2022) (appeal following remand ruling); State v. Williams, 929 N.W.2d 621, 638 (Iowa 2019) (conditional affirmance and remand), aff’d, 972 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2022) (appeal following remand ruling); State v. Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 293, 309 (Iowa 2019) (conditional affirmance and remand), aff’d, 969 N.W.2d 794, 800 (Iowa 2022) (appeal following remand ruling); State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 829 (Iowa 2017) (conditional affirmance and remand), aff’d, 969 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Iowa 2022) (appeal following remand ruling). In some opinions, we have expressly mentioned the defendant’s right to a postremand appeal. E.g. State v. Johnson, 272 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Iowa 1978); State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702, 731 (Iowa 1975) (en banc) (“Of course, defendant’s right to appeal from the trial court’s In camera determination is preserved.”). More often, though, authorization for a postremand appeal is implied by the fact that we are remanding for further proceedings—which, of course, may lead to new issues that require appellate review. That is what occurred in this case. 6

an objective test. Id. “Actual prejudice must be shown before recusal is

necessary, and speculation is not sufficient.” Carter, 957 N.W.2d at 644.

A judge’s impartiality might be questioned when the judge “has a personal

bias or prejudice concerning a party.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 602.1606(1)(a)).

But “[o]nly personal bias or prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source

constitutes a disqualifying factor.” Millsap, 704 N.W.2d at 432. “Judicial

predilection or an attitude of mind resulting from the facts learned by the judge

from the judge’s participation in the case is not a disqualifying factor.” Id.; see

also State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1976) (“[E]vidence presented in

the trial of a prior cause, or definite views on the law, create no personal bias

since they do not stem from an extrajudicial source.”).

Applying these principles here, we find no grounds for reversal. We have

considered all of Trane’s arguments, including his claims that the judge engaged

in combative dialogue towards Trane’s counsel, assumed the role of prosecutor,

threatened to eject attendees supporting Trane, and made impermissible

statements during sentencing. From our review of the record, however, we find

no statements or actions suggesting that the judge acted from “personal bias or

prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source.” Millsap, 704 N.W.2d at 432.

We note also that the judge issued a written order explaining his reasons for

declining to recuse. In that order, we find no reasons to think that the court’s

decision was “based on untenable grounds” or that the court “acted

unreasonably.” Id. Rather, the judge carefully considered Trane’s arguments— 7

and also “examine[d his] own conscience”—before concluding there was “no basis

for the recusal motion.”

“The burden of showing grounds for recusal is on the party seeking it.”

State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002). Trane has not shown that the

district court abused its “sound discretion” by denying his recusal motion.

State v. Kolbet, 638 N.W.2d 653, 664 (Iowa 2001) (“Disqualification is committed

to the sound discretion of the judge.”). So we decline to grant relief on this basis.

B. Evidence Considered. Trane also argues that the district court abused

its discretion by conducting the rule 5.412 hearing contrary to the Iowa Rules of

Evidence and the directions for remand in Trane I. Specifically, Trane argues that

the district court should not have considered (1) evidence about K.S.’s

allegations of physical abuse, (2) evidence that the adoptive mother lacked

knowledge of K.S.’s allegations against Trane, and (3) whether K.S.’s testimony

was consistent with her testimony in other proceedings.

Before we can reach the merits of these complaints, though, we must

consider the State’s concerns about error preservation. “It is a fundamental

doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and

decided by the district court before we decide them on appeal.” State v. Bynum,

937 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856,

862 (Iowa 2012)). We will not consider an evidentiary complaint unless the

complaining party made their “specific objection” to the evidence “known” in the

district court, and the court had the “opportunity to pass upon the objection and

correct any error.” State v. Brown, 656 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 2003). When an 8

evidentiary concern is “not adequately raised by proper specific objection” before

the district court, we consider it “waived.” State v. Ware, 338 N.W.2d 707, 712

(Iowa 1983). And even when an objection is properly raised, failure “to obtain a

ruling on the[] objection” generally “constitute[s] a waiver of any error.” Bahnsen

v. Rabe, 276 N.W.2d 413, 415–16 (Iowa 1979); see Linge v. Ralston Purina Co.,

293 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1980) (en banc) (“A trial court may not be put in error

unless the issue was presented for ruling, and the failure to obtain a ruling is

inexcusable unless the court refuses or fails to rule after a ruling is requested.”).

Applying these principles here, we conclude Trane waived any error as to

the court’s consideration of both physical and sexual abuse, as opposed to just

sexual abuse alone. In fact, during the 5.412 hearing, Trane was the first party

to introduce evidence about physical abuse. During Trane’s direct examination

of the adoptive father and mother, Trane asked them both whether K.S.’s

allegations of sexual or physical abuse were true. And Trane introduced the

transcript of K.S.’s deposition—in which she testified about physical abuse by

the adoptive parents. Also, during the State’s direct examination of K.S., the

State asked her about physical abuse by her adoptive parent—but Trane did not

object.

Likewise, Trane also waived any error in the introduction of evidence that

the adoptive mother lacked knowledge of K.S.’s allegations against Trane. Trane

never objected to this testimony.

Finally, Trane waived any error in the district court’s consideration of

K.S.’s testimony from before the 5.412 hearing itself. Trane did not raise this 9

objection below. Indeed, Trane introduced K.S.’s testimony from her deposition,

which occurred long before the 5.412 hearing.

But Trane asks us to take a different view of K.S.’s trial testimony. No

transcript of that testimony was introduced at the 5.412 hearing. So, Trane

claims, he had no reason to object to the district court’s possible consideration

of K.S.’s trial testimony.

We notice, though, that Trane brought up K.S.’s trial testimony during the

5.412 hearing. When Trane’s counsel began his cross-examination of K.S., he

put K.S. on notice that he had “read [her] trial transcript.” Later, counsel asked

K.S. whether a specific statement that she had made during her “testimony . . .

in the first trial” was true. Arguably, these references waived any objection to the

court’s consideration of K.S.’s trial testimony.

In any event, once the district court issued its written ruling, Trane

became aware that the court had indeed considered K.S.’s trial testimony. At

that point, Trane could have filed a motion to reconsider. By doing so, Trane

could have informed the district court of his objection and—crucially—given the

court an “opportunity to pass upon the objection and correct any error.” Brown,

656 N.W.2d at 361. But Trane did not. As a result, the district court never

learned of Trane’s objection and (of course) the court had no chance to rule on

it. Under these facts, we cannot find that Trane preserved error. See In re Det. of

Anderson, 895 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa 2017) (“In order for error to be preserved,

the issue must be both raised [below] and decided by the district court.”). 10

Because Trane’s evidentiary arguments were not preserved below, we

decline to consider them now. See State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 598 (Iowa

2021) (noting error preservation “is rooted in principles of fairness where neither

the state nor the defendant can raise a new claim or defense on appeal that could

have been, but failed to be, raised at trial”).

C. Substantial Evidence. Finally, Trane argues the district court abused

its discretion by concluding Trane failed to meet his burden of proving K.S. made

false accusations of sexual abuse. We disagree.

We review rule 5.412 determinations “for abuse of discretion. Reversal is

warranted only upon showing the ‘court exercise[d] its discretion on grounds or

for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’ ” State v.

Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 407–08 (Iowa 2006) (alteration in original) (citation

omitted) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 1997)). “A ground

or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence . . . .”

Fortune v. State, 957 N.W.2d 696, 703 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Gomez

Garcia, 904 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 2017)).

Here, Trane argues substantial evidence did not support the district

court’s conclusion that Trane failed to meet his burden of proving K.S. made

false accusations of sexual abuse against her adoptive parents. We disagree. At

the 5.412 hearing, K.S. testified that—indeed—she was sexually abused at the

hands of her adoptive father. Likewise, in her deposition, K.S. had also testified

to sexual abuse at the hands of her adoptive parents. And, as noted, Trane

offered the deposition transcript as an exhibit at the 5.412 hearing. 11

K.S.’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence that her allegations of

sexual abuse were not false. The district court was entitled to believe her.

Note also that the district court did not consider K.S.’s testimony in a

vacuum. Rather, as its order shows, the court carefully considered the testimony

of the adoptive parents, who denied K.S.’s allegations. Certainly the district court

could have found their denials were more persuasive. In that case, the court

could have concluded that Trane carried his burden. But the court was under

no obligation to reach that conclusion.

Trane responds that K.S.’s testimony was so “highly unreliable,

contradictory and inconsistent” that it could not be trusted. For instance, Trane

asks us to find that K.S. cannot be believed because she’s made very similar

claims of sexual abuse against multiple abusers. Trane compares this case to

State v. Smith, in which “the court of appeals found the testimony of a sexual

abuse victim was ‘inconsistent, self-contradictory, lacking in experiential detail,

and, at times, border[ed] on the absurd’ and held the testimony was insufficient

as a matter of law to support the conviction.” State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514,

518 (Iowa 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101,

103 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)). But in our recent State v. Mathis decision, we strongly

criticized Smith:

Smith is an outlier case. It has been criticized in the commentary, and it has not been followed in any sexual abuse case in Iowa since. The primary flaw in Smith is that it is inconsistent with the standard of appellate review of jury verdicts, which requires that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and which requires deference to the jury’s resolution of disputed factual issues.

Id. 12

Likewise, we believe Smith is inconsistent with our appellate standard in

this case, which permits reversal only if the district court has abused its

discretion, and which requires deference to the district court’s resolution of the

disputed factual issue. See State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Iowa

2021) (“We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence under the rape shield

law, Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412, for abuse of discretion.”); see also State v.

Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346, 356 (Iowa 2001) (en banc) (“[W]e defer to the fact finder’s

determinations concerning witness credibility.”); State v. Hickman, 576 N.W.2d

364, 367 (Iowa 1998) (citing United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 885 (8th Cir.

1996), noting that “district court’s findings regarding witness’ credibility are

virtually unreviewable on appeal”). In any event, as in Mathis, we find no fatal

deficiencies in K.S.’s testimony that would have required the district court to find

her unbelievable.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Trane

failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that K.S. had made prior false

claims of sexual abuse.

III. Disposition.

In Trane I we conditionally affirmed the defendant’s conviction and

remanded with directions to conduct a rule 5.412 hearing. We now conclude

Trane has shown no abuse of discretion by the district court in the rule 5.412

hearing or its subsequent ruling. So we grant Trane no relief.

AFFIRMED.