IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1861 Filed October 23, 2019
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONYO MARTIN MACHADO, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Emily Dean,
District Associate Judge.
Antonyo Machado appeals his plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, first offense. AFFIRMED.
William Monroe, Burlington, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and and Doyle, JJ. 2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Antonyo Machado appeals his plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2018).1 The
State contends we should not reach the merits of Machado’s claims because he
did not file a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve error as required. See Iowa
R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty
plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant’s
right to assert such challenge on appeal.”). Machado argues he has adequately
preserved error and the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence
rather than deferring judgment.
On September 11, 2018, Machado signed a written plea of guilty, containing
the following paragraphs:
....
1 The Iowa legislature amended Iowa Code sections 814.6 and 814.7, effective July 1, 2019, limiting direct appeals from guilty pleas and eliminating direct-appeal ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims. 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, §§ 28, 31 (to be codified at Iowa Code §§ 814.6–.7). The amendments “apply only prospectively and do not apply to cases pending on July 1, 2019,” and therefore do not apply in this case. State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Iowa 2019). 3
...
It is unclear whether the handwritten line is intended as a strike out of the
paragraph.
The district court entered an order accepting the plea that same date and
scheduled a sentencing hearing.
At the September 28 sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated:
The State would just make a brief argument, Your Honor. The State would be requesting—pursuant to the plea agreement from the State’s end—a jail sentence of thirty days in jail, all suspended except for five days, the minimum fine, two years of informal probation. The State would note that the substance in this matter was methamphetamine. It did return positive as methamphetamine from the state crime lab. Additionally, the State would note that the defendant does have a criminal record, albeit, it is fairly brief. It appears that he has a 2012 conviction for a theft fifth. But maybe the bigger one, at least in the State’s eyes, that it appears the defendant has already been granted the benefit of a deferred judgment. The State would note it appears that was a 2011 felony forgery case. So with that in mind, the State would be resisting the issuance of another deferred judgment in this case and would ask the court to accept the State’s recommendations. 4
Machado stated, “I’m willing to take the plea that the State gives me. I just
want my deferred judgment so that way I can complete this and it will be off my
record.” His counsel requested deferred judgment, noting Machado’s prior
deferred judgment was seven years ago “so he is eligible to get a chance for one
more.”
The court declined to defer judgment and sentenced Machado to thirty days
in jail, with all but five days suspended, two years of unsupervised probation, and
a fine.
Machado appeals, asserting the court abused its discretion in failing to allow
him to withdraw his plea when the court did not grant him a deferred judgment as
stated in paragraph “4” of the written plea agreement.
An appellate court generally reviews a challenge to a guilty plea for
corrections of errors at law. State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010).
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wickes,
910 N.W.2d 554, 564 (Iowa 2018).
We must ask ourselves the question, “So what were the terms of the parties’
plea agreement, if any, as to a sentencing recommendation?” Macke, 933 N.W.2d
at 236. Our supreme court states, “The controlling terms . . . are those described
on the record during the plea hearing[.]” Id. at 237.
We have no record of a plea hearing. However, at the sentencing hearing
the prosecutor recommended a jail sentence “pursuant to the plea agreement from
the State’s end.” Defense counsel did not disagree with that statement or assert
different terms. “If [the prosecutor] misstated the terms of the plea agreement,
[defense counsel] should have said so in open court.” Id. (noting the State did not 5
object to defense counsel’s description of the plea agreement or assert different
terms and therefore was held to the terms described in open court).
The record before us does not show Machado’s plea was conditioned upon
the court granting Machado a deferred judgment. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3),
(4) (providing that when the plea agreement is conditioned upon the court’s
concurrence and the court rejects the plea agreement, the court is to allow the
defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea). Rather, the prosecutor described
the plea agreement as allowing the State to make a sentencing recommendation,
which it did. Thus, we conclude the court was not required to allow Machado to
withdraw his plea.
As for the sentence imposed by the district court, we will reverse only “when
an abuse of discretion occurs.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa
2014). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court exercises its discretion on
grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable. Id.
Here, the district court explained why it was not inclined to defer judgment,2
and the reasons given were not untenable or unreasonable. Therefore, the district
court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Doyle, J., concurs specially; Vaitheswaran, J. dissents.
2 The court considered: “what’s going to provide the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation of Mr. Machado, but at the same time protect the Burlington community from further offenses”; the State’s recommendation; and Machado’s age, work history, and request for deferred judgment. Based on the “nature of the offense itself, as well as the fact that Mr. Machado has previously had the benefit of a deferred judgment” the court “opt[ed] to deny the defendant’s request for a second deferred judgment in this matter.” 6
DOYLE, J. (concurring specially).
This paper plea is not a model of clarity. Judge Bower accurately sets out
Machado’s written plea of guilty. The document was signed by Machado and his
counsel but lacked a signature line for the State and was not signed by the
prosecutor. The date the document was originally signed is illegible. The date “9-
11-18” appears next to Machado’s initials where he crossed out two waiver
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1861 Filed October 23, 2019
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONYO MARTIN MACHADO, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Emily Dean,
District Associate Judge.
Antonyo Machado appeals his plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, first offense. AFFIRMED.
William Monroe, Burlington, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and and Doyle, JJ. 2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Antonyo Machado appeals his plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2018).1 The
State contends we should not reach the merits of Machado’s claims because he
did not file a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve error as required. See Iowa
R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty
plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant’s
right to assert such challenge on appeal.”). Machado argues he has adequately
preserved error and the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence
rather than deferring judgment.
On September 11, 2018, Machado signed a written plea of guilty, containing
the following paragraphs:
....
1 The Iowa legislature amended Iowa Code sections 814.6 and 814.7, effective July 1, 2019, limiting direct appeals from guilty pleas and eliminating direct-appeal ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claims. 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, §§ 28, 31 (to be codified at Iowa Code §§ 814.6–.7). The amendments “apply only prospectively and do not apply to cases pending on July 1, 2019,” and therefore do not apply in this case. State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Iowa 2019). 3
...
It is unclear whether the handwritten line is intended as a strike out of the
paragraph.
The district court entered an order accepting the plea that same date and
scheduled a sentencing hearing.
At the September 28 sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated:
The State would just make a brief argument, Your Honor. The State would be requesting—pursuant to the plea agreement from the State’s end—a jail sentence of thirty days in jail, all suspended except for five days, the minimum fine, two years of informal probation. The State would note that the substance in this matter was methamphetamine. It did return positive as methamphetamine from the state crime lab. Additionally, the State would note that the defendant does have a criminal record, albeit, it is fairly brief. It appears that he has a 2012 conviction for a theft fifth. But maybe the bigger one, at least in the State’s eyes, that it appears the defendant has already been granted the benefit of a deferred judgment. The State would note it appears that was a 2011 felony forgery case. So with that in mind, the State would be resisting the issuance of another deferred judgment in this case and would ask the court to accept the State’s recommendations. 4
Machado stated, “I’m willing to take the plea that the State gives me. I just
want my deferred judgment so that way I can complete this and it will be off my
record.” His counsel requested deferred judgment, noting Machado’s prior
deferred judgment was seven years ago “so he is eligible to get a chance for one
more.”
The court declined to defer judgment and sentenced Machado to thirty days
in jail, with all but five days suspended, two years of unsupervised probation, and
a fine.
Machado appeals, asserting the court abused its discretion in failing to allow
him to withdraw his plea when the court did not grant him a deferred judgment as
stated in paragraph “4” of the written plea agreement.
An appellate court generally reviews a challenge to a guilty plea for
corrections of errors at law. State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010).
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wickes,
910 N.W.2d 554, 564 (Iowa 2018).
We must ask ourselves the question, “So what were the terms of the parties’
plea agreement, if any, as to a sentencing recommendation?” Macke, 933 N.W.2d
at 236. Our supreme court states, “The controlling terms . . . are those described
on the record during the plea hearing[.]” Id. at 237.
We have no record of a plea hearing. However, at the sentencing hearing
the prosecutor recommended a jail sentence “pursuant to the plea agreement from
the State’s end.” Defense counsel did not disagree with that statement or assert
different terms. “If [the prosecutor] misstated the terms of the plea agreement,
[defense counsel] should have said so in open court.” Id. (noting the State did not 5
object to defense counsel’s description of the plea agreement or assert different
terms and therefore was held to the terms described in open court).
The record before us does not show Machado’s plea was conditioned upon
the court granting Machado a deferred judgment. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3),
(4) (providing that when the plea agreement is conditioned upon the court’s
concurrence and the court rejects the plea agreement, the court is to allow the
defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea). Rather, the prosecutor described
the plea agreement as allowing the State to make a sentencing recommendation,
which it did. Thus, we conclude the court was not required to allow Machado to
withdraw his plea.
As for the sentence imposed by the district court, we will reverse only “when
an abuse of discretion occurs.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa
2014). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court exercises its discretion on
grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable. Id.
Here, the district court explained why it was not inclined to defer judgment,2
and the reasons given were not untenable or unreasonable. Therefore, the district
court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Doyle, J., concurs specially; Vaitheswaran, J. dissents.
2 The court considered: “what’s going to provide the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation of Mr. Machado, but at the same time protect the Burlington community from further offenses”; the State’s recommendation; and Machado’s age, work history, and request for deferred judgment. Based on the “nature of the offense itself, as well as the fact that Mr. Machado has previously had the benefit of a deferred judgment” the court “opt[ed] to deny the defendant’s request for a second deferred judgment in this matter.” 6
DOYLE, J. (concurring specially).
This paper plea is not a model of clarity. Judge Bower accurately sets out
Machado’s written plea of guilty. The document was signed by Machado and his
counsel but lacked a signature line for the State and was not signed by the
prosecutor. The date the document was originally signed is illegible. The date “9-
11-18” appears next to Machado’s initials where he crossed out two waiver
paragraphs. Apparently, he changed his mind about these paragraphs after
originally initialing them. The written plea of guilty was filed September 11, 2018.
Filed on the same date and at the same time (presumably attached to the written
plea—although it is impossible to tell with electronic filing) as a June 18, 2018 email
from the assistant county attorney to Machado’s counsel setting forth a plea offer.
The offer states, “The State would offer the following for Mr. Machado: Parties will
jointly recommend the following:”
“AM” are Machado’s initials, and “CS” are the assistant county attorney’s initials.
Machado signed his name at the end of the document and dated it “9-11-18.”
Seemingly, Machado changed his mind about conditioning his plea upon the grant
of a deferred judgment and by initialing and signing the State’s plea offer agreed
that at sentencing he could ask for a deferred judgment and that the State would 7
recommend jail time with two years’ probation.3 And that is precisely what took
place at the sentencing hearing—the prosecutor requested jail time and probation
and resisted deferred judgment, while Machado’s counsel argued for a deferred
judgment. So, based on the record before us, I agree with the majority that the
record does not show Machado’s plea was conditioned upon the court granting
him a deferred judgment. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Machado a deferred judgment and in not allowing Machado a chance to withdraw
his guilty plea. I therefore concur with Judge Bower.
3 The court accepted the paper plea without a hearing and set the matter for a sentencing hearing. 8
VAITHESWARAN, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe the plea was conditioned upon the court’s
concurrence and, when the district court declined to grant Machado a deferred
judgment as set forth in the written plea of guilty, the court was obligated to afford
Machado the opportunity to withdraw the plea. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3).