State of Iowa v. Anthony Hernandez

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 30, 2024
• Docket: 23-1462
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1462 Filed October 30, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ANTHONY HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cass County, Margaret Reyes,

Judge.

A defendant appeals following his guilty plea to possession of a controlled

substance, raising challenges to the plea and sentence. AFFIRMED.

Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

Anthony Hernandez appeals his judgment and sentence after he pleaded

guilty to possession of a controlled substance. He alleges seven errors by the

district court. We address the sentencing claims and find no error. But the other

allegations go to his guilty plea. Although we have jurisdiction to hear his appeal,

we lack authority to hear those claims because Hernandez did not move in arrest

of judgment. So we affirm the judgment and sentence.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In July 2023, the State charged Hernandez with one count of possession of

a controlled substance with intent to deliver, methamphetamine, and one count of

failure to affix a drug tax stamp, both felonies. That same month, Hernandez filed

a written waiver of rights and plea of guilty.

Under the plea agreement, Hernandez would be sentenced to an

indeterminate term of ten years for the possession count, and the State would

dismiss the tax stamp count. Within the agreement, Hernandez waived many of

his rights. Citing Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d), he agreed, “I hereby

waive my right of allocution.” The written plea also advised him of the need to

move in arrest of judgment and that by proceeding immediately to sentencing, he

agreed to waive any right to challenge defects in the plea or plea proceeding.

Hernandez filed no motion in arrest of judgment, and the court sentenced him as

provided in the plea agreement. Hernandez appeals.

II. Jurisdiction or Authority to Consider Guilty-Plea Claims

First, we address our jurisdiction and authority to hear Hernandez’s claims.

Since 2019, the Iowa Code has limited the right of appeal following guilty pleas, 3

requiring defendants to show good cause in all but limited circumstances. See

State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). Because Hernandez

challenges his sentence, he has good cause to appeal. Id. That good cause gives

us jurisdiction over the entire appeal. See State v. Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d 142,

146 (Iowa 2023). Still, five of Hernandez’s seven claims relate to defects in his

plea proceeding, not his sentencing.1 We lack authority to hear those challenges

because he did not move in arrest of judgment. Id. at 146–48 (holding Iowa Rule

of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(a) and Iowa Code section 814.7 bar challenges to

guilty pleas when the defendant fails to raise those claims in a motion in arrest of

judgment). So, we only address Hernandez’s sentencing claims.

III. Standard of Review

We review sentences for correction of legal error. Damme, 944 N.W.2d at

103. We reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or there was

some defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Grubbs, 3 N.W.3d 229, 230

(Iowa Ct. App. 2023). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court bases its

decision on untenable grounds or faulty reasoning. Id. at 230–31.

IV. Analysis

Hernandez contends the sentencing court erred when it failed to ask him if

there was any legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced (in violation of

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(b)) and failed to allow him the chance to

1 In those guilty-plea challenges, Hernandez criticizes the court’s failure to advise

him of five things: 1) the minimum and maximum penalties; 2) possible collateral consequences; 3) possible immigration consequences; 4) that he was waiving his right to a trial; and 5) the nonbinding nature of the plea agreement. 4

speak in mitigation of punishment, otherwise known as the right to allocution (in

violation of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(d)(3)).2

At sentencing, the court advised Hernandez of his trial rights, appeal rights,

and the opportunity to delay sentencing. Hernandez stated he wished to go ahead

with sentencing. The State argues that his decision invited any error in the

sentencing court’s colloquy and that Hernandez cannot complain about it on

appeal. Beyond waiver, the State contends that the sentencing court substantially

complied with the rules.

Here, before imposing sentence, the court asked defense counsel: “Any

statements that you wish to make on Mr. Hernandez’s behalf or that Mr. Hernandez

wishes to make?” Hernandez argues that rule 2.23(2)(b) requires the court to

address this question to the defendant personally, rather than speaking only to

counsel. When assessing this claim, we avoid a “hyperliteral reading of the rules

of procedure.” State v. Jackson-Douglass, 970 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2022).

“Substantial compliance is sufficient.” Id. In that case, the court asked Jackson-

Douglass if there was “anything he’d like to tell the Court,” and the supreme court

found that inquiry substantially complied with rule 2.23(2)(b). Id. (cleaned up).

Hernandez distinguishes his case from Jackson-Douglass because the

court did not address him directly. True, the court’s question was somewhat casual

and imprecise. Yet by asking his attorney whether Hernandez wanted to make

2 Although Hernandez asks the court to analyze his claims under both the state

and federal constitutions, he does not explain how the Iowa Constitution should be applied differently. When that happens, we apply federal precedent. See State v. White, 9 N.W.3d 1, 12 (Iowa 2024). 5

any statement, the court invited Hernandez to speak. We find this substantially

complied with the rule.3

As to the court’s failure to provide an opportunity for allocution under

rule 2.23(d)(3), Hernandez waived that right in his written guilty plea. And beyond

waiver, the sentencing court’s inquiry allowed Hernandez to make any statement

and achieved substantial compliance with rule 2.23(d)(3). Finding no error, we

affirm the judgment and sentence.

AFFIRMED.

3 When deciding substantial compliance, we also note the language used when

informing the defendant of the judgment under rule 2.23(2)(b) differs from opportunity to speak in mitigation of punishment under rule 2.23(2)(d)(3). Only the second provision mentions addressing “the defendant personally.” When drafters selectively place language in one section and avoid it in another, we presume the difference was intentional. See Myers v. City of Cedar Falls, 8 N.W.3d 171, 179 (Iowa 2024).