State of Iowa v. Alfred Ali Mohammad Younes

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 30, 2024
• Docket: 23-1950
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1950 Filed October 30, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ALFRED ALI MOHAMMAD YOUNES, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Jason A. Burns,

Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals the sentence imposed by the district court.

AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

Alfred Younes pleaded guilty to one count of escape from custody as an

aider and abettor, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.4(4)

(2023). He and his wife helped their son leave the country while the son was on

pretrial release to avoid trial on pending felony charges for attempted murder, first-

degree robbery, and first-degree theft. The district court sentenced Younes to a

term of imprisonment not exceeding five years and a fine. Younes appeals. He

challenges his sentence, arguing the district court erred by relying on community

deterrence as the only factor in determining his sentence.1

When, as here, the sentence imposed is within statutory limits, we review

for abuse of discretion. State v. McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 627 (Iowa 2024). The

decision to impose a sentence that falls within statutory limits has a strong

presumption in its favor and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or

the consideration of an improper factor. Id.

The goals of sentencing are to “provide maximum opportunity to rehabilitate

the defendant and to protect the community.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106.

Sentencing courts are to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense,

characteristics of the offender, prior criminal record, employment status, family

circumstances, and other relevant factors that would satisfy the goals of

1 Because Younes challenges his sentence rather than his guilty plea and the

sentence was neither mandatory nor agreed-upon, he has established good cause that permits us to hear his appeal despite his guilty plea. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100, 105 (Iowa 2020) (interpreting Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3)). 3

sentencing. Id. But the court is not permitted to consider only a single factor.

State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994).

The court fulfilled its obligation here. The court explicitly considered multiple

factors when determining the sentence by stating, “The reasons for this sentence

are the nature and circumstances of the offense; the personal characteristics of

yourself, Mr. Younes; the court believes that this sentence will hold you

accountable, but more than that, serve as a deterrent for future offenses by other

people in similar situations.” Younes argues the mention of the factors other than

community deterrence was merely cursory. He points to mitigating factors,

including his education, employment history, family responsibilities, and lack of

criminal history.

We are not persuaded by Younes’s argument. The court received the

presentence investigation report (PSI), to which Younes made no objection

relevant to this appeal. The PSI included details about all the mitigating details

Younes highlights. We view the court’s reference to Younes’s “personal

characteristics” as an acknowledgment of these details, even though terse. See

State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (finding a “terse and succinct”

statement sufficient “when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious

in light of the statement and the record before the court”).

Additionally, the court noted the “nature and circumstances of the offense.”

Younes’s written guilty plea acknowledged that the minutes of testimony were

substantially correct insofar as necessary to provide a factual basis for his guilty

plea. The minutes reveal that Younes’s son was charged with attempted murder

based on allegations that he tackled a woman, strangled her into 4

unconsciousness, and stole her earrings. While the son was on supervised pre-

trial release, Younes sold the family vehicle, rented a van, and drove the son to an

airport where the son boarded an international flight. When questioned, Younes

lied to the police and told them the son had been left at home and likely committed

suicide. Soon after, Younes booked his own one-way ticket out of the country

before being apprehended at the airport.

Younes emphasizes that his culpability was limited to that of an aider and

abettor in the crime of escape. While that is true, he still came up with a plan to

aid his son, lied to law enforcement, and attempted to leave the country before his

involvement was discovered. These were the nature and circumstances of the

offense the court cited as one factor in arriving at Younes’s sentence.

We understand Younes’s argument to be that the court considered

community deterrence as the only factor in arriving at the sentence, rather than

arguing that community deterrence was an improper factor.2 As discussed, the

court considered the mitigating factors Younes claims it ignored and considered

other factors in arriving at the sentence. Even though it emphasized the need for

community deterrence in its reasoning, the court made it clear the prison sentence

was based on the consideration of multiple sentencing factors.

Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

2 Nor could Younes persuasively argue that community deterrence is not a proper

sentencing factor. See State v. Jones-Baker, No. 22-0105, 2022 WL 3072056, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2022) (recognizing both general and specific deterrence as proper sentencing factors).