State of Iowa v. Alexander Isaiah Knight

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: May 22, 2024
• Docket: 23-1106
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1106 Filed May 22, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ALEXANDER ISAIAH KNIGHT, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Mark F. Schlenker,

Judge.

Alexander Knight appeals his sentences for assault causing bodily injury

and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. SENTENCES

VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024). 2

DANILSON, Senior Judge.

Alexander Knight appeals the sentences imposed after a jury found him

guilty of assault causing bodily injury and operating a motor vehicle without the

owner’s consent. We reverse and remand for resentencing before a different

I. Facts and Proceedings

The State charged Knight by trial information with assault causing bodily

injury and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. The charges

stemmed from an encounter Knight had with a woman he initially met through a

dating app. The two eventually met in person. They engaged in a sex act together.

The woman wanted to stop, which angered Knight. Knight began to punch the

woman, and then he stomped on her shoulder. Then Knight took her keys and left

with her vehicle without her permission.

The State offered Knight a plea offer that would require him to plead guilty

to “either a simple assault or disorderly conduct with a $105 fine,”1 which Knight

rejected. When asked, “And I believe that you’ve been pretty consistent that [you

do] not want to plead guilty to any charges at all in this case; is that correct?”,

Knight responded, “Correct.” The matter proceeded to trial, and the jury found

Knight guilty as charged.

At sentencing, the State referenced Knight’s rejection of the plea offer when

making its sentencing recommendation, though it ultimately recommended

1 This is how defense counsel summarized the plea offer to the court. From the record available to us, it is not clear whether the plea offer required Knight to plead guilty to simple assault or disorderly conduct. 3

suspended sentences. When making its sentencing determination, the court

explained in part:

I note the [presentence investigation report (PSI)] says he’s got pending cases going on in Polk County and one in Dallas County, but I don’t—I don't attribute anything to those cases. He’s not been convicted. So I understand he’s got pending cases and he wants to defend those as well. I’ve looked at the PSI and his history, his income history, his family history. A couple things stood out. One is, he’s repeatedly asserted his innocence, and his mother agrees that the victim’s not to be believed, and he’s never admitted responsibility for these charges, never admitted any guilt; to the contrary, wants to continue to contest them, which is his right.

The court then sentenced Knight to consecutive sentences amounting to an

indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed three years.

Knight appeals, contending the district court considered an impermissible

sentencing factor.

II. Standard of Review

“Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for correction of

errors at law.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “We will not

reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some

defect in the sentencing procedure.” Id. “A sentencing court’s decision to impose

a specific sentence that falls within the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong

presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or

the consideration of inappropriate matters.’” State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 73

(Iowa 2021) (citation omitted).

“Nevertheless, ‘[i]f a court in determining a sentence uses any improper

consideration, resentencing of the defendant is required . . . even if it was merely

a “secondary consideration.”’” Id. (alteration and omission in original) (citation 4

omitted). The defendant “must overcome the presumption in favor of the sentence

by affirmatively demonstrating the court relied on an improper factor.” State v.

Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020).

III. Discussion

Knight argues the district court considered an impermissible factor at

sentencing. He contends that the district court improperly considered his decision

to reject the plea offer, insist on going to trial, and insistence of his innocence when

reaching its sentencing determination. The State pushes back and contends that

when considering the court’s comments in context, it becomes apparent that the

court was merely considering Knight’s lack of remorse.

The purpose of sentencing is “to provide maximum opportunity to

rehabilitate the defendant and to protect the community.” Id. When fashioning an

individualized sentence to achieve that purpose, the sentencing court considers

several sentencing factors including: the nature of the offense; the attending

circumstances; the age, character, and propensity of the defendant; the

defendant’s employment status, family circumstances, potential for reform, and

prior record of convictions or deferred judgments; and any other relevant factors.

Id. Additionally, “[a] defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the offense, and

a sincere demonstration of remorse, are proper considerations in sentencing.”

State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). “While

lack of remorse is a valid consideration, a defendant’s invocation of [his] right to

put the state to its burden of proving the offense to a jury can be given no weight

in determining a proper sentence.” Id. “Additionally, the sentencing court ‘must

carefully avoid any suggestions in its comments at the sentencing stage that it was 5

taking into account the fact defendant had not ple[d] guilty but had put the

prosecution to its proof.’” Id. (citation omitted).

After reviewing the district court’s sentencing rationale in full, we agree with

Knight that the district court’s rationale for its sentencing determination included

the impermissible consideration of his insistence to take his case to trial by

maintaining his innocence and refusal to admit guilt. See id. When reaching this

conclusion, we focus on the court’s consideration that Knight “repeatedly asserted

his innocence . . . and he’s never admitted responsibility for these charges, never

admitted any guilt; to the contrary, wants to continue to contest them.” While the

court followed up these statements by noting that it “is his right” to contest the

charges, it did not disavow consideration of Knight’s insistence to take the case to

trial as a sentencing factor.

To the district court’s credit, it did disavow consideration of other pending

charges in other cases and Knight’s rejection of plea negotiations (other

impermissible sentencing factors). However, on this record we are unable to

conclude the district court filtered out the impermissible factor of consideration of

the defendant’s right to “put the prosecution to its proof,” a consideration that

should be given no weight. Id. (quoting State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 87

(Iowa 2005)).

The court provided a litany of other sentencing factors it also considered,

all of which were permissible sentencing factors. Nonetheless, consideration of

any impermissible factor, even “merely [as] a secondary consideration,” requires

resentencing because “we cannot speculate about the weight the sentencing court

gave to [the impermissible factor]. Since we cannot evaluate [its] influence, we 6

strike down the sentence.” See State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 2014)

(citation omitted). We vacate Knight’s sentences and remand for resentencing

before a different judge.

SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.