IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-2036 Filed March 5, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
AIDAN CHRISTOPHER RALPH, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Bethany Currie (trial)
and John J. Haney (sentencing), Judges.
A defendant appeals his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse.
AFFIRMED.
Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
A jury convicted Aidan Ralph of third-degree sexual abuse and assault
causing bodily injury for pushing his girlfriend, A.C., into a staircase—fracturing a
vertebra in her spine—then sexually assaulting her in his bedroom. In appealing
his sexual-abuse conviction, Ralph raises two evidentiary issues. First, he claims
the district court abused its discretion by allowing a police officer to testify that
other witnesses’ statements aligned with A.C.’s accusations. Second, he claims
the court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that he physically abused A.C.
on prior occasions to establish his motive for sexually abusing her. He requests
that we reverse his sexual-abuse conviction and remand for a new trial. Finding
the court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, we
affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Ralph and A.C. started dating in high school. After graduation, they both
attended Iowa State University, where they continued their romantic relationship.
On a December evening in 2022, they made plans to celebrate Ralph’s birthday.
They started by drinking at a “pregame” party. Afterward, A.C. returned to her
dorm with her roommates, and Ralph went out to a bar. A.C. planned to “meet up
with him there.” But instead, Ralph came to A.C.’s dorm, upset that he had lost
his ID cards. A.C. recalled that Ralph “started getting loud.” A.C. told Ralph to
leave. So he went back to his apartment. Meanwhile, A.C. and her roommates
went out to a bar without him.
But soon Ralph sent A.C. a barrage of text messages begging her to leave
her friends and come to his place. Acceding to his wishes, A.C. left the bar and 3
took an Uber to Ralph’s apartment. When she arrived, she went upstairs to Ralph’s
bedroom.1 Ralph was lying in his bed crying. He told A.C. that she embarrassed
him by going out without him. A.C. recalled that when she didn’t respond, “he
started getting really aggressive”—rising from his bed and yelling at her to leave.
Frightened, A.C. left the bedroom, grabbed her shoes, and ran downstairs to the
entryway. Ralph caught up to her there. He was “still continuously telling [her] to
leave” and started “shoving [her] around.” To stop her from leaving, Ralph took
A.C.’s shoes and “threw them across the street.” Then, as A.C. described it: “he
had pushed me really hard against the stairs where I hit my head really, really hard
and my back.” The impact fractured a vertebra in her spine.
A.C. “didn’t try leaving after that” because she was in “a lot of pain.” She
asked Ralph to help her, but he “didn’t care at all.” According to A.C., after he
pushed her into the stairs, Ralph “just continued yelling” at her and told her she
“deserved it.” A.C. then climbed the stairs to Ralph’s bedroom, “crying the whole
time.” Ralph followed her, telling her to “be quiet” because “his roommate was
there.” Once they were inside Ralph’s bedroom, A.C. took off the tight pants she’d
been wearing because they were “really painful” and got into Ralph’s bed. She
testified that she “wanted to make it seem like [she] was going to stay” so Ralph
wouldn’t be angry. Ralph continued yelling at her. A.C. asked him to call an
ambulance for her. He refused.
1 Ralph lived in a three-story apartment. The ground level was the entryway, the second floor was the living room and kitchen area, and the third floor was a hallway and two bedrooms. 4
According to A.C., Ralph “got quiet” after a while. Then, without saying
anything, he climbed onto the bed and “trie[d] having sex with [her].” A.C. told him
“no.” But Ralph didn’t stop. He pulled her underwear to the side and started having
vaginal intercourse with her. While Ralph was doing this, A.C. “said ‘no’ a few
times.” And she was “crying the whole time.” She didn’t physically resist him
because she “didn’t want to get more hurt.” Eventually, Ralph “flipped [her] over,”
then became “frustrated.” Then he stopped having intercourse with her and asked
her to “give him a blow job.” A.C. again said “no.” After that, Ralph “went right
back into just yelling” at her. Sometime later, A.C. fell asleep. A.C. testified that
she didn’t want to have sex with Ralph that night “at all.”
The next morning, Ralph called one of A.C.’s roommates to get her. He told
the roommate that A.C. “had a bad accident where [she] fell down the stairs getting
a glass of water” and that “she was really hurt.” A.C. told Ralph that she “was
going to go along” with that story because she “didn’t want to make him angry
anymore.” Two of A.C.’s roommates picked her up. One of them recalled that
when Ralph “brought [A.C.] out” of the apartment, “she was walking but very
poorly”; “she looked, like, miserable, disheveled, and [when] she got in the back
seat of my car, . . . she didn’t say a single word to us.” Ralph rode with A.C. and
her roommates back to their dorm. When they arrived, Ralph went with A.C.
“straight to her room.” About two weeks later, A.C. and Ralph broke up.
When she returned home to Illinois for winter break, A.C. told her mother
that Ralph physically and sexually assaulted her. A.C.’s uncle reported the
incident to the Ames Police Department. Officer Adam McPherson investigated.
McPherson interviewed A.C. over the phone. He also interviewed A.C.’s 5
roommates; Ralph’s roommate and his girlfriend, who were in the apartment on
the night of the incident; and Ralph. At first, Ralph told Officer McPherson that
A.C. “just showed up” at his apartment “uninvited,” and “he told her to leave.” He
first denied that he pushed A.C. or “that there was any sexual activity.” When
McPherson continued pressing him about what happened, Ralph admitted pushing
A.C. He also “admitted that they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.”
The State charged Ralph with sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C”
felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.4(1) (2022), and domestic
abuse assault causing bodily injury, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of
sections 708.1, 708.2A(1), and 708.2A(2)(b). The case went to jury trial five
months later.
The State filed a pretrial motion to introduce evidence that Ralph physically
assaulted A.C. on prior occasions. The district court reserved ruling on the
admissibility of those incidents until trial. The court cautioned: “[T]he State should
presume that none of its prior bad acts evidence will be admitted unless and until
the State can demonstrate during trial that it relates to a legitimate, disputed issue
other than character or propensity.” The court further instructed in its pretrial ruling:
“If Mr. Ralph does not dispute a particular issue for which the State seeks to proffer
bad acts evidence, the evidence will never come in.” The State renewed its motion
to introduce the evidence on the first day of trial. The court again denied the
motion, stating: “I think my ruling was pretty clear on the prior bad acts evidence.
It’s not coming in.” 6
A.C. was the State’s key witness. 2 A.C.’s two roommates; Ralph’s
roommate and his girlfriend; a physician who treated A.C.’s back injury; and Officer
McPherson also testified for the State.3 The State also presented expert testimony
on cycles of violence in abusive intimate relationships and how victims of domestic
and sexual abuse respond to trauma.
Ralph testified in his own defense. He admitted that he pushed A.C. one
time in the entryway of his apartment, and as he pushed her, “she fell
straight . . . into the stairs.” He testified that in that moment, he “couldn’t believe
that [he] did that.” Afterward, Ralph could see that A.C. was in pain, but she
managed to climb up the stairs on her own. According to Ralph, when they got
back upstairs, he told A.C. “to shut the fuck up, but it wasn’t . . . in a mean way.”
He acknowledged that A.C. asked him to call an ambulance but he refused
because he “didn’t believe it was that serious.” He also recalled that A.C. was
crying, “but she eventually, like, stopped.” Ralph claimed that they both calmed
down and talked for “two or three hours” after that. Then they went to bed.
According to Ralph, he and A.C. both got into his bed completely naked and
engaged in consensual sex. Ralph testified that at some point, he stopped
because A.C. “was in pain,” and he “suggested that she would flip around.” After
attempting to initiate sex again, Ralph stopped because A.C. was still in pain and
“it wasn’t joyful.” Ralph said that he then “asked for oral sex,” but A.C. refused, so
2 The State again renewed its motion to introduce the evidence of the prior assaults
during A.C.’s testimony. The court again denied the motion, stating: “the ruling stands that at this point in the trial there are no legitimate disputed issues for which relevant bad acts evidence may be offered.” 3 The State presented Officer McPherson’s body camera video of his interview with
Ralph during the officer’s testimony. 7
he didn’t “press it any f[u]rther.” According to Ralph, he didn’t get angry or yell at
A.C. after that—they “just went to bed.” Ralph admitted that he lied to Officer
McPherson about what happened that night because he was “very scared” and
“very emotional.” And he said that he first denied having sex with A.C. because
the officer’s questions made him “very uncomfortable.”
During cross-examination, the State once more sought to introduce
evidence that Ralph had physically assaulted A.C. on earlier occasions. Changing
course from its previous rulings, the court granted the motion, finding that
“Mr. Ralph opened the door for prior bad acts evidence, specifically by saying, ‘I
couldn’t believe I did that’ and ‘we talked about fighting all the time.’” The court
further found that “the evidence is relevant to Mr. Ralph’s motive to commit sex
abuse specifically against [A.C.] due to the nature of their relationship.” The State
then questioned Ralph about prior incidents when he was “physically assaultive”
towards A.C. and caused bruising to her eyes and arms.
After the defense rested, the court granted Ralph’s motion for judgment of
acquittal as to the relationship element of the domestic abuse count and amended
that charge to assault causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1
and 708.2(2). In his closing argument, Ralph’s counsel asked the jury to find him
guilty of assault causing bodily injury but not guilty of sexual abuse. The jury found
Ralph guilty of both counts. The court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms
not to exceed ten years, followed by a mandatory lifetime special sentence of
supervision under section 903B.1. Ralph appeals. 8
II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review most evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v.
Slaughter, 3 N.W.3d 540, 546 (Iowa 2024). “An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court exercises its discretion ‘on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable
or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’” State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 690 (Iowa
2017) (citation omitted). “A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported
by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law.”
Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000).
III. Analysis
A. Vouching
Ralph first argues that the district court abused its discretion by overruling
his objection to testimony from Officer McPherson that improperly vouched for
A.C.’s credibility. Vouching occurs when an expert witness testifies directly or
indirectly that a victim’s statements are credible, “thereby commenting on a
defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Jaquez, 856 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa
2014). Such testimony is inadmissible because “a witness’s credibility is not a fact
in issue subject to expert opinion.” State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 676 (Iowa
2014) (cleaned up); see Iowa R. Evid. 5.702. But an expert’s testimony that the
victim’s statements were consistent over time or consistent with statements from
other witnesses is admissible, and “[t]he jury is entitled to use this information to
determine the victim’s credibility.” Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 678 (finding expert did
not vouch by testifying that victim’s “statements were consistent throughout the
interview”); see State v. Brown, 856 N.W.2d 685, 688–89 (Iowa 2014) (finding 9
expert did not vouch by testifying that victim “has been consistent in what she has
reported to her mother and to this examiner”).
The prosecutor asked Officer McPherson about the interviews he
conducted with roommates of A.C. and Ralph. This exchange ensued:
STATE: And after interviewing them, was at least the information that they were able to provide consistent with what [A.C.] had reported to you? DEFENSE: Objection. Improper vouching. THE COURT: Response? STATE: Under Dudley, this is exactly what is permitted. He can indicate it’s consistent. He’s not vouching for any witness. He’s indicating that, amongst them all, . . . it was consistent. THE COURT: The objection is overruled and you can answer the question. OFFICER MCPHERSON: That’s—the people that I spoke with, the stories provided were consistent with one another.
Ralph argues that this testimony impermissibly vouched for A.C.’s credibility
because “[t]he clear implication from [the officer’s] answer was that [A.C.] told the
truth because her roommates’ stories were consistent with hers.” We have
rejected a similar challenge and explained why this type of testimony does not
cross the line into vouching:
An expert can report a single witness’s story did not change, i.e. remained consistent, just as the expert can report that the story of two separate witnesses matched. This factual testimony as to whether the two stories were the same does not comment on whether the witnesses were telling a true or false version of the alleged events; it just relays that they both reported the same thing.
Beek v. State, No. 20-0704, 2021 WL 5106445, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2021).
Ralph’s challenge fails for the same reason.
As the State contends, Officer McPherson did not vouch for the credibility
of a particular witness. He just reported a relevant fact: all the witnesses he
interviewed—except for Ralph—gave accounts of the “night in question” that 10
generally matched. The jurors still had to decide for themselves whether they
believed A.C. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer
McPherson’s testimony over Ralph’s objection.
B. Prior Bad Acts
Second, Ralph argues that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence that he physically abused A.C. on prior occasions to establish
his motive for sexually abusing her. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b) provides that
“[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(1). Even so, “[t]his
evidence may be admissible for another purpose such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(2).
Rule 5.404(b) is a rule of exclusion. State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611, 625
(Iowa 2022). For the State to introduce evidence of prior bad acts:
(1) “the evidence must be relevant and material to a legitimate issue in the case other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts”; (2) “there must be clear proof the individual against whom the evidence is offered committed the bad act or crime”; and (3) if the first two prongs are satisfied, “the court must then decide if [the evidence’s] probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”
State v. Richards, 879 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 2004)).
Our supreme court considered the admissibility of prior acts of domestic
violence in State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116 (Iowa 2004). In that case, the court
noted that domestic violence is unique because it “is a pattern of behavior, with 11
each episode connected to the others.” 689 N.W.2d at 128 n.6 (citation omitted).
“Thus, evidence of prior bad acts is especially relevant and probative in domestic
violence cases because of the cyclical nature of domestic violence.” Id. (cleaned
up). The court held that evidence of prior abusive conduct by the defendant
against the same victim as the alleged crime may be relevant to the defendant’s
motive and intent. Id. at 125 (“[T]he defendant’s prior conduct directed to the victim
of a crime, whether loving or violent, reveals the emotional relationship between
the defendant and the victim and is highly probative of the defendant’s probable
motivation and intent in subsequent situations.”).
Similarly, in State v. Rodriguez, the court concluded that evidence of prior
abuse by the defendant against the victim was admissible when the defendant was
charged with murder, kidnapping, and assault against his girlfriend (the victim of
the prior abuse) because “prior intentional, violent acts towards the
victim . . . [made] it more probable that [the defendant] intended to cause [the
victim] serious injury” on the day of the charged crimes. 636 N.W.2d 234, 242
(Iowa 2001).
In that vein, evidence of prior violence perpetrated by the defendant against
a romantic partner may be relevant and admissible to give context to that
relationship and to show whether sex between them on a specific occasion was
consensual.4 State v. Goodson, 958 N.W.2d 791, 801 (Iowa 2021) (the defendant
4 We recognize that the district court found that Ralph and A.C. did not have a domestic relationship as defined in Iowa Code section 236.2(2)(a) through (d). But Ralph did not dispute that they were intimate partners. And, as the State’s expert testified, intimate partners may experience the same kind of power-and-control dynamics as individuals who are cohabitating. 12
“claimed . . . that [he and the victim] engaged in consensual sex. [The victim] told
a much different story. Surely the evidence showing the contentious nature of the
relationship between [the victim] and [the defendant] was relevant on the question
of whose story to believe.”).
With this framework in mind, we turn to Ralph’s case. During cross-
examination, the State moved to admit evidence that Ralph physically abused and
injured A.C. on prior occasions, arguing:
[T]he State’s position on legitimate issues is that this goes to motive and knowledge in this case. [Ralph] is motivated by his anger and motivated to have control of [A.C.], both physically and sexually, and knowledge in that he’s aware that she doesn’t want to do it. . . . He testifies to her being in pain, and he knew in that moment that he didn’t have consent, and I think we’re talking about the nature of their relationship.
The prosecutor maintained that the jurors could not understand Ralph’s
motive or his awareness that there was no consent—the contested issue in the
case—if they only received his “one-sided version” of the events. And the
prosecutor contended that the jury was entitled to have “a full picture” of the
relationship, “just like in Taylor and in Rodriguez.”
Relying on Goodson, the district court ruled that “the evidence is relevant to
Mr. Ralph’s motive to commit sex abuse specifically against [A.C.] due to the
nature of their relationship,” but it was not relevant to Ralph’s “knowledge that on
this particular night [A.C.] did not consent to have sex.” See 958 N.W.2d at 801.
The court also ruled that there was clear proof that Ralph engaged in the prior acts,
and the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. The court thus concluded that the evidence was 13
admissible but the jury could consider it “only for the purpose of determining
Mr. Ralph’s motive to commit the sexual assault count.” 5
The prosecutor then questioned Ralph about the prior incidents:
STATE: Mr. Ralph, you had testified that you and [A.C.] have had fights before; is that correct? RALPH: Yes. Q: And those fights have been physical before, hadn’t they? A: Yes. Q: And physical in that you were physically assaultive towards her in those fights; correct? A: Yes. Q: And in some cases, [A.C.] had bruising after those altercations; correct? A: Yes. Q: And bruising to her eyes in September? A: Yes. Q: And there was an incident in November where you were fighting at her house and you grabbed her and she had a bruise on her arm after that; is that correct? A: Yes. Q: So this isn’t the first time. So when you say you couldn’t believe that you hurt her in this incident that you shoved her on the stairs, why was it surprising if you’ve hurt her in the past? A: Well, when I had said that, I didn’t mean, like, literally couldn’t believe it. I meant like, just in that moment, you know, emotions were high. And I was maintaining myself, you know, the whole time.
Ralph argues that the court should have excluded this testimony because it
was not relevant to any legitimate, disputed issue. According to Ralph, “there was
no dispute that [he] and [A.C.] had sex,” so the “only issue in dispute was whether
it was by force or against [A.C.]’s will.” He claims that the court abused its
discretion in admitting the testimony to prove his motive to commit sexual abuse
because “the fact that an assault occurred in September does not explain why
Ralph would have had a reason to sexually assault [A.C.] three months later.”6
5 The court instructed the jurors they could not use the evidence “to prove Mr. Ralph’s character”—they could only consider it “for the purpose of establishing motive to commit sex abuse against [A.C.].” 6 Ralph claims that our supreme court’s decision in State v. Putman “is controlling”
on the motive issue. See 848 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2014) (finding that Putman’s “motive for sexually abusing [a child victim] was not a legitimate or disputed issue”). And he claims our holding that the court improperly admitted evidence of prior 14
Emphasizing an excerpt of the State’s closing argument, Ralph contends: “The
relevance suggested in the prosecutor’s summation is that the jury should infer
Ralph sexually assaulted [A.C.] because he has a propensity for violence. Of
course, this is precisely why the evidence should have been inadmissible under
Rule 5.404(b).” Lastly, Ralph states that “[w]hatever probative value the evidence
had to the sex abuse allegation—if any—was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” But he doesn’t elaborate on that point.
To counter, the State first argues that the court should have permitted the
prosecution to offer the prior bad acts during its case-in-chief to show Ralph’s
motive, intent, and lack of accident as to the assault causing bodily injury count
because the “State had the burden of proof on every element of that charge.”7 The
State further contends that the “evidence was also relevant for another non-
propensity purpose: it helped explain why [A.C.] reacted in the way that she did,
both during the night of [the incident] and in the days that followed.” According to
the State, that “evidence was immensely probative, bearing directly on the
credibility of [A.C.]’s testimony—a central issue. And it (properly) undercut Ralph’s
arguments that jurors should not believe her testimony.” Thus, the State urges:
domestic abuse in State v. Little “is equally true in this case.” See No. 08-1125, 2010 WL 786011, at *10–13 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2010) (“We have difficulty accepting the prosecution’s theory that acts showing [the defendant’s] power and control over his ex-wife . . . can be admitted to prove he seriously injured and kidnapped [his second wife] years later. This seems to us a classic example of impermissible ‘propensity’ evidence.”). Putman and Little are distinguishable from Ralph’s case. See id. at *11 (“If the conduct had involved the same victim . . . this would of course be a different case.”) (emphasis added)); Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d at 242. 7 Ralph counters that he “admitted he was guilty of committing the assault causing
injury—so his specific intent was never in dispute at trial.” 15
Ralph was never entitled to exclusion of this prior-bad-act evidence, and it all should have been admitted from the get-go. This means that this Court should affirm, regardless of what it thinks of the trial court’s stated reason for letting the State use a morsel of that evidence when it cross-examined Ralph.
See State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 599 (Iowa 2021) (we may affirm a ruling
admitting evidence on any grounds established by the record, even if not argued
or relied on below).8
Alternatively, the State argues that the evidence of prior physical abuse was
admissible for the limited purposes of impeaching Ralph’s testimony and proving
that he had a motive to commit a sex act with A.C. against her will. The State
emphasizes that the court specifically cited Goodson in its ruling admitting the
evidence.9 See 958 N.W.2d at 801. The State concedes that “[t]o a certain extent,
Ralph is right when he asserts that ‘[t]he State’s entire case depended on [A.C.]’s
credibility.’” But according to the State:
That’s why Goodson is so pertinent: it explained that proof of prior acts of domestic abuse in that same relationship is highly relevant to establish motive (including motive to commit sexual abuse)—which becomes critical when a jury needs to resolve conflict in direct testimony on whether the defendant had sex with the victim, against her will.
See id. at 801–02 (“[T]he evidence helps to set the stage for the antagonistic
relationship between [the defendant] and [the victim] and eliminates the necessity
of the jury to conduct a pure ‘he said, she said’ test of credibility.”).
8 Ralph urges that it “would be fundamentally unfair to affirm on a theory not presented below without allowing Ralph a proper limiting instruction and his counsel the opportunity to address it in her closing argument.” 9 The State points out that “Ralph’s brief on appeal does not discuss, cite, or
mention Goodson.” Neither does Ralph’s reply brief. 16
In sum, the State argues that if “Ralph had a motive to exert power and
control over [A.C.], that fact made it more likely that Ralph had sex with [A.C.]
against her will, as she described. And this evidence of Ralph’s prior acts of
physical abuse towards [A.C.] during this relationship helped establish that
motive.” See id. The State also insists that the “need for this evidence was
heightened when Ralph’s testimony suggested that his relationship with [A.C.], up
to that point, had included no prior instances of physical abuse.” See Taylor, 689
N.W.2d at 130 (stating that a defendant is “not entitled to have the jury determine
his guilt or innocence on a false presentation that his and the victim’s
relationship . . . [was] peaceful and friendly” (citation omitted)). So, according to
the State, “the court did not err in admitting evidence of prior instances of physical
abuse as relevant to establish Ralph’s motive to commit sexual abuse.”
We agree with the State that the evidence was admissible to prove Ralph’s
motive to commit a sex act with A.C. against her will. True, motive itself was not
an element of the sexual abuse count. But the State did have to prove that Ralph
“performed the sex act by force or against [A.C.’s] will.”10 The State summarized
the case to the jury in its closing argument this way:
The element for you to deliberate on, essentially, in this entire trial is Element Number 2. Did [Ralph] commit the sex act by force or against the will of [A.C.]? What does that mean? Did she consent? . . . And in this case, you have both of them, Mr. Ralph and [A.C.], telling you they were together that night and there was a sex act. They diverge on consent, and you have to decide what version of events is more credible, what version of events makes more sense based on all of the evidence that you have.
10 Ralph recognizes that this element was a legitimate issue in dispute at trial. 17
As in Goodson, Ralph and A.C. “offered the jury highly conflicting versions”
of their sexual encounter. See 958 N.W.2d at 801. And the jury had to choose a
version when deciding whether the sex act was consensual. So, relying on
Goodson, the district court properly admitted evidence of the prior instances of
physical abuse in their relationship because it was relevant “to show what
motivated” Ralph on the night of the charged offenses—his desire to exert power
and control over A.C.11 See id. It was also “relevant on the question of whose
story to believe”—whether Ralph committed a sex act against her will, as A.C.
testified, or whether they engaged in consensual sex, as he testified. See id. We
reject Ralph’s argument that offering the evidence was an impermissible effort to
show that he had a propensity for violence. Instead, the evidence was “designed
to show the nature of the relationship between [A.C.] and [Ralph] that had direct
relevance to determining what happened” during their sexual encounter. See id.
Thus, the district court properly exercised it discretion in allowing the State
to cross-examine Ralph about the prior incidents. And the relevance of the
testimony was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See id. at 802
(“In cases with conflicting direct testimony, it is crucial to have triangulating
evidence to resolve the issue.”). Ralph is not entitled to a new trial.
11 As here, the prior bad acts in Goodson involved physical assaults against the
victim—none of the prior incidents were sexual in nature. See 958 N.W.2d at 797.