IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana State of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff FILED Mar 12 2025, 9:17 am
v. CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
Jeremiah Allen Hendricks, Sr., Appellee-Defendant
March 12, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-972 Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-2302-F2-17
Opinion by Judge May Judge Pyle concurs. Judge Brown dissents with a separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 1 of 17 May, Judge.
[1] The State appeals following the trial court’s order granting the motion to
suppress filed by Jeremiah Allen Hendricks, Sr. The State raises one issue for
our review, which we revise and restate as whether law enforcement’s incursion
onto the curtilage of Hendricks’s home in the middle of the night violated the
Indiana Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History 1
[2] At approximately 11:30 p.m. on March 10, 2023, Officer Daniel Anthrop and
Officer Steven Ceballos-Olieas of the Lafayette Police Department went to
Hendricks’s house. Hendricks’s son Giovanni Hendricks (“Giovanni”) was a
known associate of Damarion Jackson, and the police were looking for Jackson
because Jackson was a suspect in a recent shooting and there was an active
warrant for Jackson’s arrest. The officers knew Giovanni had lived at
Hendricks’s house approximately two years earlier, but they did not have any
information that he was living there at the time of their visit.
[3] Both Officer Anthrop and Officer Ceballos-Olieas parked their marked police
cars down the street from Hendricks’s residence. After the two officers
1 On August 21, 2024, this Court granted the State's motion to substitute exhibit, and the State subsequently submitted the substituted exhibit. The substituted exhibit contained three video files. On August 27, 2024, the State filed a notice indicating that only the largest of the three video files had been submitted as evidence at the suppression hearing. We acknowledge the State's notice and considered only the largest video file in rendering our opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 2 of 17 conferred, Officer Ceballos-Olieas walked through Hendricks’s side yard
around to the back of Hendricks’s house. He stationed himself behind the
house to ensure that no one exited the back of the residence. Meanwhile,
Officer Anthrop walked through Hendricks’s front yard to the front door.
Officer Anthrop smelled the odor of marijuana while standing outside the front
door. He turned away from the front door without knocking, walked to the
side of Hendricks’s house to assess where the side windows were located, and
then returned to his police cruiser. Officer Anthrop contacted his shift
supervisor and “[s]he requested before [Officer Anthrop and Officer Ceballos-
Olieas] started the search warrant process that [they] attempt contact at the
front door.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 30.)
[4] At 11:48 p.m., Officer Anthrop and Officer Ceballos-Olieas approached
Hendricks’s front door. Officer Anthrop repeatedly rang the doorbell and
knocked, but Hendricks did not answer the door. Officer Anthrop then walked
away from Hendricks’s front door through Hendricks’s yard and back to his
police cruiser. Officer Ceballos-Olieas walked back through the side yard of
Hendricks’s house and continued observing the back of the residence. Officer
Anthrop applied for a search warrant based on the odor of marijuana, and the
trial court granted the warrant. Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on March 11, 2023,
officers used a battering ram to enter through the front door of Hendricks’s
house and served the search warrant on Hendricks, who was home with his
infant son. During the search of Hendricks’s house, the officers found several
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 3 of 17 firearms and large quantities of marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms. Police
arrested Hendricks.
[5] The State subsequently charged Hendricks with one count of Level 2 felony
conspiracy to commit dealing in a schedule 1 controlled substance, 2 three
counts of Level 2 felony dealing in a schedule 1 controlled substance, 3 one
count of Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in marijuana, 4 one count
of Level 5 felony dealing in marijuana, 5 one count of Level 6 felony possession
of marijuana, 6 two counts of Level 6 felony possession of a controlled
substance, 7 one count of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, 8 and one count
of Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. 9
[6] On October 10, 2023, Hendricks filed a motion to suppress seeking exclusion of
“all information or evidence gathered after law enforcement’s unlawful search
of Mr. Hendricks’s curtilage.” (App. Vol. 2 at 38.) Hendricks asserted the
officers’ actions at his house on March 10, 2023, violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court held an
2 Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 & Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2(f). 3 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2(f). 4 Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 & Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10(d)(2)(A)(i). 5 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10(d)(2)(A)(i). 6 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(c)(1). 7 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7(b). 8 Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1). 9 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 4 of 17 evidentiary hearing on Hendricks’s motion to suppress on November 1, 2023.
On January 12, 2024, the trial court issued an order granting Hendricks’s
motion to suppress. The State then filed a motion to correct error arguing
Hendricks was not prejudiced by the officers’ conduct because the challenged
evidence would have inevitably been discovered had Officer Anthrop followed
the paved path to Hendricks’s front door rather than cutting through the yard.
On February 26, 2024, the trial court entered an order granting the State’s
motion to correct error. The trial court concluded that the previously excluded
evidence was admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule and reversed its suppression order.
[7] Hendricks then filed another motion to suppress evidence arguing that the
officer’s search of his curtilage violated the Indiana Constitution. On April 2,
2024, the trial court issued an order granting the motion to suppress. The trial
court concluded that the degree of concern or suspicion that a violation had
occurred was low. It explained:
Police had no evidence or suspicion the Defendant was involved in any criminal activity. They were there to conduct a “knock and talk” in an effort to locate a person they suspected was involved in a shooting that occurred a week prior. They had information that the person they were looking for had prior associations with Defendant’s child(ren). They had no immediate information that the suspect was present or would be found inside Defendant’s residence.
(Id. at 105.) The trial court also found “the degree of intrusion was great
considering the time and manner in which police approached the porch, or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 5 of 17 curtilage, of the residence.” (Id.) With respect to the extent of law enforcement
needs, the trial court determined that while attempting to speak with Hendricks
or Giovanni may have been a legitimate law enforcement purpose, “there were
no emergencies or immediate exigent circumstances that existed at that time of
night to justify police by-passing the normal routes of approach to the house.”
(Id.) The trial court also concluded “[t]he ‘Inevitable Discovery’ exception to
an invalid search is not found in the Indiana Constitution. . . . Thus, the odor
of marijuana discovered by police after they improperly approached
Defendant’s porch cannot be admitted under an ‘Inevitable Discovery’ theory.”
(Id. at 106.)
Discussion and Decision [8] The State asserts the trial court erred when it concluded that the actions of
Officer Anthrop and Officer Ceballos-Olieas violated the Indiana Constitution.
Because the State appeals from a negative judgment, it bears the burden of
showing that the trial court’s order was contrary to law. State v. Serrano, 136
N.E.3d 249, 252-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. An order granting a
motion to suppress is contrary to law when the evidence is without conflict and
all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion other than that reached by the
trial court. State v. E.R., 123 N.E.3d 675, 679 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
130 (2020). “The State cannot make this showing if there is substantial,
probative evidence supporting the suppression ruling.” Id. We review the trial
court’s factual findings deferentially – neither reweighing the evidence nor
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 6 of 17 judging the credibility of the witnesses – and the trial court’s legal conclusions
de novo. State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1183 (Ind. 2014).
[9] Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
“The legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on
an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of
the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005).
Whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances generally turns on the balance of three factors: “1) the degree of
concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of
intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary
activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 361.
[10] We evaluate the first Litchfield factor by looking at the information available to
the officers at the time of the search or seizure. Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932,
943 (Ind. 2020). The State contends Jackson and Giovanni were “known to be
members of the same gang” and several days earlier, they “had been observed
in Lafayette leaving the scene of a shooting together in a white car.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 12-13.) In addition, the State notes Officer Anthrop testified
fugitives often stay with friends or family members to avoid apprehension. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 7 of 17 However, Officer Anthrop and Officer Ceballos-Olieas had no specific
information that either Giovanni or Jackson was at Hendricks’s house. They
knew Giovanni had lived at the house approximately two years earlier, but they
had no indication that he was living there on March 10, 2023. There was no
reason for the officers to believe Jackson was staying at Hendricks’s house as
opposed to the residence of any other friend or family member. Thus, the
officers’ degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge of criminal activity was
low because they had nothing more than a generalized suspicion that they
might find either Giovanni or Jackson at Hendricks’s house. See Jacobs v. State,
76 N.E.3d 846, 852 (Ind. 2017) (holding first Litchfield factor weighed against
the State because while “officers had sufficient cause to be suspicious of Jacobs
in general, that suspicion was not sufficiently linked to any articulable criminal
activity”).
[11] Moving to the second Litchfield factor, Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution protects against warrantless intrusions both into the house and
onto the curtilage—the area immediately surrounding and associated with the
house. See Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 941 (Ind. 2006) (analyzing whether
officer’s incursion onto the curtilage of defendant’s home was reasonable under
the Indiana Constitution). However, “[n]o unreasonable search occurs when
police enter areas of curtilage impliedly open to use by the public to conduct
legitimate business.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 2006). This
implicit license “includes knock and talks where police use normal routes of
ingress and egress to make appropriate inquiries of the occupants.” Warren v.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 8 of 17 State, 73 N.E.3d 203, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The resident is not obligated to
open the door, “[a]nd when the knock is not answered, officers generally must
leave and secure a warrant if they want to pursue the matter.” Id. Here, Officer
Ceballos-Olieas went through Hendricks’s side yard and positioned himself a
short distance away from the back of Hendricks’s house. This is not a typical
route of ingress or egress and was a more invasive intrusion of the curtilage
than a private visitor is implicitly authorized to make. Officer Anthrop’s
approach was less intrusive because, even though he cut across Hendricks’s
front yard, his destination was the area outside the front door where visitors are
implicitly authorized to stand when attempting to contact a house’s occupants.
[12] Nonetheless, Officer Anthrop approached Hendricks’s front door at 11:30 p.m.
That is not a time when people expect to be disturbed by uninvited visitors. See,
e.g., Carmel (Ind.) City Code § 4-26(c)(1) (“Door-to-door solicitation by
vendors may be conducted in the City between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and dusk,
local time.”) & City of Bloomington (Ind.) Municipal Code § 4.16.140
(prohibiting door-to-door solicitation between dusk and 8:00 a.m.). The State
directs us to Carpenter v. State, 974 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In that
case, we held the officers’ approach of a suspect’s residence at 12:30 a.m. to
serve an arrest warrant was minimally intrusive. Id. at 575. We explained that
an arrest warrant carries with it limited authority for the police to enter a
suspect’s dwelling to effectuate an arrest, and it was reasonable for the officers
to conclude the subject of the search was inside the residence “given the late
hour, the vehicles in the driveway, and the lights on at the residence[.]” Id. at
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 9 of 17 573. In contrast, Officer Anthrop was not serving an arrest warrant. He was
simply seeking information regarding Jackson’s whereabouts. While Officer
Anthrop smelled the odor of marijuana before knocking on the front door, he
still exceeded societal norms by approaching the front door to summon the
house’s occupants at a time when the occupants rightfully expected not to be
disturbed. Considering both Officer Anthrop’s approach in the middle of the
night and Officer Ceballos-Olieas’s walk through the side yard, we conclude the
degree of intrusion was high. See, e.g., Divello v. State, 782 N.E.2d 433, 439
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding officer invaded the curtilage of homeowner’s
property by walking through the yard beyond where visitors could be expected
to go), trans. denied.
[13] We assess the third Litchfield factor by looking at both “the needs of the officers
to act in a general way” and “the needs of the officers to act in the particular
way and at the particular time they did.” Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946-47. The
State points to law enforcement’s need to look for Jackson. However, there was
no emergency or exigent circumstance that required the officers to approach
Hendricks’s house at 11:30 p.m. While Jackson was a suspect in a recent
shooting, the shooting occurred several days earlier, and the police were not
responding to an active threat when they traversed onto the curtilage of
Hendricks’s house. The officers may have had a legitimate law enforcement
need to speak with Hendricks to gain information about the location of either
Jackson or Giovanni, but their need to do so in the middle of the night was
minimal. Cf. Masterson v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1001, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 10 of 17 (holding the extent of law enforcement need to perform warrantless search of
vehicle was high when suspect was seen minutes earlier fleeing the scene of an
armed robbery in the vehicle), trans. denied.
[14] Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold the entry of
Officer Anthrop and Officer Ceballos-Olieas onto Hendricks’s property at 11:30
p.m. on March 10, 2023, was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution, and
we affirm the trial court’s grant of Hendricks’s motion to suppress. 10 See, e.g.,
Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 19 (Ind. 2010) (holding officers’ entry into
defendant’s apartment was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution when
the officers’ suspicion that wanted individual was inside apartment was low, the
degree of intrusion was high, and law enforcement’s need to enter the
apartment was low).
Conclusion [15] The incursion of Officer Anthrop and Officer Ceballos-Olieas onto Hendricks’s
property at 11:30 p.m. was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution. The
officers’ degree of suspicion that a suspect or an associate of the suspect was
10 The State also argues that the evidence seized from Hendricks’s house “should not be suppressed because the evidence eventually seized was attenuated from the officer’s conduct.” (Appellant’s Br. at 18-19.) However, the search warrant authorizing law enforcement to search Hendricks’s residence was premised on Officer Anthrop’s smell of marijuana emanating from the house, which only occurred after Officer Anthrop unconstitutionally trod upon the curtilage of Hendricks’s house. Therefore, the trial court properly suppressed the evidence. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 862 N.E.2d 695, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding traffic stop violated the Indiana Constitution and evidence derived from the stop had to be suppressed).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 11 of 17 inside the house was low, the degree of intrusion was high, and the level of law
enforcement need was low. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
[16] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., concurs. Brown, J., dissents with a separate opinion.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Terrance Kinnard Kinnard, Rowley, Powers, Jimenez Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 12 of 17 Brown, Judge, dissents with a separate opinion.
[17] I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority. With respect to
the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred,
Officer Anthrop was looking for Jackson who was wanted for an escape charge
and was a suspect in a recent shooting. A few days prior to the shooting,
Giovanni was identified with Jackson in the area of the shooting and both were
documented gang members of the same gang. While Officer Anthrop did not
have information that Giovanni, a known associate of Jackson, was living at his
father’s residence, he knew that Giovanni had previously lived at the residence.
[18] As for the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposed on
the citizen’s ordinary activities, Officer Anthrop merely walked across the front
yard of the residence to the front door where he immediately detected the odor
of marijuana. Specifically, at the suppression hearing, Officer Anthrop testified,
“I approached the door and when I approached the door, I observed the odor of
marijuana coming from the inside of the residence.” Transcript Volume II at
23. While he approached the residence at approximately 11:30 p.m., Officer
Anthrop testified that a light was on upstairs at that time. 11 Officer Anthrop did
not knock on the door or disturb the residents before detecting the odor of
marijuana. I cannot say that the time of day of Officer Anthrop’s approach of
11 While the majority phrases the issue as whether law enforcement’s incursion onto the curtilage of Hendricks’s home “in the middle of the night” violated the Indiana Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure, I note that Officer Anthrop initially approached the residence at 11:30 p.m. and saw that a light was on.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 13 of 17 the front door alone should determine the outcome. It was only after the search
warrant had been obtained that the officers entered the residence. With respect
to the entry, the video reveals that the police activated the emergency lights on
their vehicles, which appear to be parked in the yard of the residence, at
approximately 1:02 a.m. State’s Exhibit 2. The officers made an
announcement over a loudspeaker at 1:03:08-1:03:15 a.m., which stated “Police
Department. Search Warrant. Residents of 3717 Tesla Drive come to the front
door now.” Id. At 1:03:55 a.m., an officer knocked on the front door and
announced, “Lafayette Police Department. Come to the door.” Id. An officer
began striking the front door with a battering ram at 1:04:17 a.m. Id. Given
that the residents were given multiple opportunities to open the door prior to
forceful entry I would find that the degree of intrusion the method of the search
or seizure imposed on the citizen’s ordinary activities was not unreasonable.
[19] With regard to the extent of law enforcement needs, Officer Anthrop was
attempting to locate a fugitive and suspect in a recent shooting. While
approaching the front door of a residence with a light on, Officer Anthrop
detected the odor of marijuana which served as the basis for the search warrant.
Under these circumstances, I would conclude that Officer Anthrop’s actions
leading up to his discovery of the odor of marijuana coming from the residence
were reasonable.
[20] Even assuming that some of the officers’ other conduct was improper, I still
conclude that reversal is warranted. In Wright v. State, the Indiana Supreme
Court held that the attenuation doctrine can apply under the Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 14 of 17 Constitution. 108 N.E.3d 307, 311 (Ind. 2018). The Court observed, “As we
see it, by examining the causal chain between the illegality and the discovered
evidence or looking at the totality of the circumstances, attenuation is the
natural, reasonable limit to the exclusionary rule’s fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine.” Id. at 317 (citing in part Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444,
828 N.E.2d 510, 518 (2005) (citation omitted) (explaining that since the
attenuation doctrine asks whether the police exploited the illegality to gain
evidence, “the attenuation rule is ‘not an exception to the exclusionary rule but
a test of its limits’”)).
[21] The Court held:
An attenuation inquiry under Article 1, Section 11 will begin by considering three elements: (1) the timeline—particularly, the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the intervening circumstances—what, if any, intervening circumstances occurred in that time; and (3) the police misconduct. This third element, like the federal test, scrutinizes the purpose and egregiousness behind the official misconduct. It examines whether the police exploited the initial illegality to gain more evidence against the defendant and then whether “the evidence came from the ‘exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” Turner v. State, 862 N.E.2d 695, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). See also Wong Sun [v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963)]; Brown [v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975)].
Id. at 318. “[T]he above test considers the entire timeline, what happens during
that timeline, and scrutinizes the police’s misconduct—which comports with
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 15 of 17 Indiana’s Article 1, Section 11 precedent.” Id. “[E]ven so, we will not rigidly
limit ourselves to only these three factors.” Id. “Every case must be considered
on the totality of the circumstances. If other factors present themselves, they
will be considered.” Id.
[22] With respect to the timeline, Officer Anthrop detected the odor of marijuana
emitting from the residence after he approached the front door. In the Affidavit
of Probable Cause related to the initial search warrant, Officer Anthrop
asserted:
Affiant went up to the door of the residence and could smell the odor of burnt marijuana [emitting] from inside the residence. Affiant observed [the residence] is a two-story, single-family residence with numbers . . . affixed to the mailbox in front of the residence. Affiant recognized the odor to be marijuana based on his training and experience as a law enforcement officer which includes training at the Law Enforcement Academy on drug recognition where Affiant was shown samples of marijuana so he could become familiar with the appearance and odor of marijuana, and during the . . . of Affiant’s experience as a law enforcement officer, he has encountered similar odors on numerous occasions where plant material was found which Affiant recognized as marijuana based on its appearance and pungent odor and which field tested positive for marijuana.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 16 of 17 Exhibits Volume 3 at 4. 12 Thus, the initial search warrant was based upon
Officer Anthrop’s detection of marijuana and was not based upon any
observations by Officer Ceballos-Olieas.
[23] As for the intervening circumstances, the record reveals perhaps problematic
conduct such as Officer Ceballos-Olieas walking toward the rear of the
residence, but this action occurred either after or simultaneously with Officer
Anthrop’s detection of the odor of marijuana. With respect to the police
misconduct, I cannot say that the police committed flagrant misconduct or
exploited any illegal search.
[24] Considering the totality of the circumstances, I would conclude that Officer
Anthrop’s detection of marijuana, which occurred after he approached the front
door of the residence with a light on, and which served as the basis of the initial
search warrant, was sufficiently attenuated from any later police misconduct so
as to be purged of any taint. Under these circumstances, I would reverse the
trial court.
[25] For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
12 The copy in the Exhibits Volume is somewhat blurred.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-972 | March 12, 2025 Page 17 of 17