State of Indiana v. James O. Young (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 5, 2017
• Docket: 20A04-1604-PC-855
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 05 2017, 8:38 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Brendan K. Lahey Attorney General of Indiana Charles W. Lahey George P. Sherman South Bend, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana, June 5, 2017 Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A04-1604-PC-855 v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court James O. Young, The Honorable Gretchen S. Lund, Appellee-Petitioner. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D04-1210-PC-97

Mathias, Judge.

[1] In 2003, James O. Young (“Young”) was convicted of resisting law

enforcement based on an incident that occurred in 2001. Young did not appeal

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 1 of 11 this conviction. However, after he was later convicted on another charge and

sentenced to fifteen years of incarceration, Young filed a petition for post-

conviction relief in 2012 seeking to attack his prior 2003 conviction. The

Elkhart Superior Court granted Young’s petition, and the State of Indiana

appeals. Concluding that the post-conviction court erred as a matter of law in

granting Young’s petition, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of December 27, 2001, the Elkhart County Sheriff’s Department

received a call regarding a custody dispute between Young and his ex-wife.

Young, who was at his parents’ house, had called the police because his ex-wife

had threatened to move to Illinois with their son. Three deputies were

dispatched to the scene: Deputy Ryan Hubbell (“Deputy Hubbell”), reserve

Deputy Mark Ledbetter (“Deputy Ledbetter”), and Deputy Kelly Todd

(“Deputy Todd”). Deputy Hubbell recognized Young’s name from a prior

encounter. The deputies were also informed by dispatch that there were two

“civil warrants” for a James Young. The description of James Young given by

the dispatch was that of a white male, 5' 11" tall, weighing 190 pounds, with

blond hair and blue eyes. This description generally matched that of Young and

was consistent with the James Young Deputy Hubbell knew.1

1 Young testified that he kept his hair shaved or very closely shorn, and his father described his son’s hair as light brown as opposed to blond.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 2 of 11 [3] By the time the deputies arrived, Young and his wife had settled their

immediate dispute, and Young did not desire to speak with the police because

he had become emotionally upset. He therefore told his father to tell the police

that he was not in the house. However, when pressed by the police, Young’s

father admitted that his son was inside. Young came to the front door of the

house and stepped outside. Deputy Hubbell informed Young that there was a

warrant for his arrest and started to grab Young’s hand or arm to place

handcuffs on him.

[4] What happened next was a matter of great dispute at Young’s trial, but the facts

most favorable to the jury’s verdict show that, as Deputy Hubbell attempted to

handcuff Young, he jerked his arm away. Young’s fist narrowly missed Deputy

Hubbell’s face, and his elbow struck Deputy Todd in the nose. Deputy Hubbell

attempted to restrain Young, and both men went to the ground. Young kept his

hands underneath his body and, despite the deputies’ orders, refused to move

them so that he could be restrained. After Deputy Hubbell applied a pressure-

point hold on Young’s chin, the deputies were able to restrain Young.2

[5] Young was then placed in Deputy Ledbetter’s vehicle. At this point, Young

could see the deputy’s police computer console listing the information regarding

the bench warrant. Young pointed out to the deputy that the information for the

2 According to Young and his father, both of whom testified on Young’s behalf, Young had recently had warts surgically removed from his hand and involuntarily flinched when Deputy Hubbell grabbed his hand. Young and his father testified that he did not strike any of the deputies and only struggled in an attempt to breathe as he was placed in a choke hold.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 3 of 11 James Young listed on the warrants did not match him. In fact, the James

Young listed on the warrants was a black male, was shorter than Young, was

twenty years older than Young, and had a different middle name. When the

deputies discovered their mistake, they decided to release Young.3

[6] On December 31, 2001, the State charged Young with resisting law

enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor. A jury trial was held on January 7,

2003. At trial, Young’s trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined each of the

deputies, and each deputy admitted that the bench warrant was not for Young,

but for another James Young. Young’s trial counsel emphasized that, had the

deputies simply checked to see if they had the right individual, none of the

subsequent events would have occurred. Still, the jury found Young guilty as

charged, and the trial court sentenced Young to one year, conditionally

suspended on “good behavior,” plus fines and costs. Supp. Appendix p. 4.

[7] On October 29, 2012 — almost eleven years after the incident leading to the

charges and almost ten years after his conviction — Young filed a petition for

post-conviction relief. The State filed a response in December of that year.

Young then filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief on January 5,

2015. The State filed a response to this petition on September 14, 2015. The

State asserted the affirmative defense of laches in its answer.

3 According to Young, Deputy Hubbell told him, “sometimes in life people make mistakes,” and “I will forget about the resisting arrest if you forget about this.” Tr. p. 160. Young’s father also testified that Deputy Hubbell stated, “Well, if you’ll forget about this, we’ll forget about the resisting arrest.” Id. at 133. Obviously, no one forgot about the resisting arrest, as Young was subsequently charged with resisting law enforcement.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 4 of 11 [8] The post-conviction court held a hearing on December 2015. At this hearing,

the post-conviction court repeatedly informed Young that the purpose of the

hearing was to address the State’s affirmative defense of laches, and the court

limited Young’s questioning and evidence to the issue of laches. The State

presented the testimony of the three deputies, each of whom testified that

although they could generally remember what happened on the night of

December 27, 2001, they could not remember specific details about the incident

with Young. The post-conviction court also took judicial notice that Young had

attached to his post-conviction petition a copy of one of the warrants for the

arrest of James E. Young, the person the deputies had confused him with.4

[9] On May 2, 2016, the post-conviction court entered an order granting Young’s

petition and vacating his conviction for resisting law enforcement. The post-

conviction court agreed with the State that Young’s delay in filing his post-

conviction petition was unreasonable but concluded that the State had not

adequately demonstrated that it was prejudiced by the delay; therefore, the

defense of laches did not apply. However, instead of proceeding to hold an

evidentiary hearing on the merits of Young’s post-conviction claims, the post-

conviction court determined that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary and

proceeded to address Young’s post-conviction claims. The court determined

that Young’s claim regarding what he termed the “sufficiency of the evidence”

4 We have been unable to locate a copy in the materials provided to us of the warrant attached to Young’s post-conviction petition. Instead, in the appellant’s appendix, immediately after Young’s petition, there is a photocopy of a sheet with a photograph and the physical descriptors for James E. Young and the petitioner James O. Young.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 5 of 11 was more akin to a claim of newly discovered evidence. This “newly

discovered” evidence was a copy of a warrant showing that the subject of the

warrant was for James E. Young, who as noted above, was a black male not

fitting the description of Young. The post-conviction court concluded:

In the instant case, the newly-discovered evidence potentially consists of evidence that Petitioner was not the actual subject of the warrants relied upon to effect his arrest and even more so, did not in any material way fit the description of the individual who was the subject of those warrants. Therefore, the evidence is material and relevant, and not cumulative of any other evidence presented at trial. Also, it appears to the Court that the evidence was discovered since Petitioner’s trial, or most certainly due diligence should have produced it such that it would have been presented at trial. Further the evidence is more than merely impeaching. Evidence that destroys or obliterates the testimony upon which a conviction was obtained is not merely impeaching evidence, rather it is in the nature of being exculpatory. There is nothing about the evidence that is privileged or incompetent. Finally, the new evidence presented by Petitioner is certainly worthy of credit under the circumstances of this case, it can be produced upon retrial of the case, and may produce a different result. Moreover, the Indiana Post Conviction Rules provide that when there exists evidence of material fact, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice, an adequate ground for post- conviction relief has been stated. The Court hereby concludes that Petitioner has met this burden with respect to his claim of newly discovered evidence.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 6 of 11 Appellant’s App. pp. 29-30 (citations omitted).5 The State filed a motion to

correct error on March 8, 2016, and the trial court denied this motion on March

22, 2016. The State now appeals.

Post-Conviction Standard of Review

[10] Post-conviction proceedings are not super-appeals and provide only a narrow

remedy for subsequent collateral challenges. State v. Oney, 993 N.E.2d 157, 161

(Ind. 2013). “If an issue was known and available, but not raised on direct

appeal, it is waived. If it was raised on appeal, but decided adversely, it is res

judicata.” Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind. 2001) (citations

omitted). Where, as here, the State appeals a judgment granting a defendant’s

petition for post-conviction relief, “we review using the standard in Indiana

Trial Rule 52(A).” Oney, 993 N.E.2d at 161. That is, we will not set aside the

findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous, and we give due regard

to the opportunity of the post-conviction court to judge the credibility of

witnesses. Id. (citing T.R. 52(A)). Under this “clearly erroneous” standard of

review, we review only for the sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., we neither

reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, and we

consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the

judgment, and we will reverse only on a showing of clear error. “Clear error” is

5 The post-conviction court’s order rejected Young’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, the court also noted that there had been an issue with the trial transcript because a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument had not been recorded and transcribed. The post-conviction court therefore concluded that this, in addition to the newly discovered evidence, entitled Young to post-conviction relief.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 7 of 11 that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made. Id.

Discussion and Decision

[11] The State claims6 that the post-conviction court clearly erred in determining that

the copy of the warrant describing James E. Young, instead of James O.

Young, was newly discovered evidence that entitled Young to a new trial.

Newly discovered evidence requires a new trial only when the petitioner

demonstrates that:

(1) the evidence has been discovered since trial; (2) it is material and relevant; (3) it is not cumulative; (4) it is not merely impeaching; (5) it is not privileged or incompetent; (6) due diligence was used to discover it in time for trial; (7) it is worthy of credit; (8) it can be produced upon a retrial of the case; and (9) it will probably produce a different result at trial.

Whedon v. State, 900 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. granted,

summarily aff’d, 905 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. 2009). We analyze these nine

requirements with care, as the basis for newly discovered evidence should be

received with great caution and the alleged new evidence carefully scrutinized.

6 The State also argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred in determining that the State had not met its burden with regard to the affirmative defense of laches. We need not decide this issue, however, as even if we reject the State’s argument regarding laches, reversal is required because, as explained in detail infra, we agree with the State that Young is not entitled to a new trial based on allegedly newly discovered evidence. Furthermore, because we reverse the post-conviction court on grounds that his evidence was not “newly discovered,” we do not address the State’s additional argument that the post-conviction court erred by not conducting a full evidentiary hearing on Young’s petition after determining that the State had not established the defense of laches.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 8 of 11 Id. The burden of showing that all nine requirements are met rests with the

petitioner for post-conviction relief. Id.

[12] Here, the warrants at issue were for James E. Young, not James O. Young.

Young attached a copy of one of the warrants to his amended petition for post-

conviction relief. This, the post-conviction court determined, constituted newly

discovered evidence that required a new trial. We disagree.

[13] First, we are unable to see how the warrant was “discovered” since trial. The

transcript of Young’s jury trial clearly shows that all parties — Young, his trial

counsel, and the prosecutor — all knew that that the warrants at issue had not

been for Young but for an individual with a similar name. In fact, it was Young

himself who first noticed the discrepancy when he was in the back of Deputy

Ledbetter’s patrol car. The discrepancy between the physical description of

Young and the James Young described in the warrant was repeatedly

emphasized at trial by Young’s trial counsel. Thus, the existence of the warrant

was known before trial and cannot be said to have been discovered since trial.

[14] Furthermore, the copy of the warrant showing that the person described was

not the petitioner could have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.

A request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is subject to a

hostile inference of want of due diligence in the absence of a clear showing to

the contrary. Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing

Denney v. State, 695 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ind. 1998)).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 9 of 11 [15] Again, here the fact that the warrants were not for the petitioner but for another

James Young was known to all the parties prior to trial. Indeed, the post-

conviction court itself found that “due diligence should have produced [the

warrant] such that it would have been presented at trial.” Appellant’s App. p.

29. We must therefore conclude that obtaining a copy of the warrant was

possible with the exercise of due diligence. See Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d

1022, 1052 (Ind. 2007) (noting that the due diligence requirement includes a

showing of why the evidence at issue was unavailable if it was known to the

defense).

[16] In short, the existence of the warrant was known to all parties prior to trial.

Therefore, we cannot say that it was newly discovered evidence.7 Because the

evidence was not newly discovered, Young is not entitled to a retrial, and the

post-conviction court’s vacation of Young’s conviction for resisting law

enforcement was clearly erroneous.8

7 Even if the first eight requirements for a claim of newly discovered evidence were met here, we would conclude that the post-conviction court clearly erred in concluding that the final requirement (that the evidence will probably produce a different result at trial) was met. This is because the validity of the warrants bears no relevance on the issue of whether Young resisted arrest. As this court recently stated in Patterson v. State, 11 N.E.3d 1036, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), “a private citizen may not use force in resisting a peaceful arrest by an individual who he knows, or has reason to know, is a police officer performing his duties regardless of whether the arrest in question is lawful or unlawful.” (emphasis supplied). Therefore, in the present case, it is immaterial whether the police actually had probable cause or a warrant to arrest Young. 8 The post-conviction court also concluded that the gap in the transcript of the State’s closing argument at Young’s trial, combined with Young’s claim of newly discovered evidence, required it to grant Young’s request for post-conviction relief. As noted by the State, however, this was not a claim raised in Young’s petition for post-conviction relief, and the court could not grant relief on this unraised claim. See Walker v. State, 843 N.E.2d 50, 58 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that issues not raised in a petition for post- conviction relief are waived). Moreover, the post-conviction court did not conclude that this gap in the transcript, by itself, was ground for granting relief, only that this gap, in combination with what it considered

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 10 of 11 Conclusion

[17] Even if we agreed with the post-conviction court that the State did not meet its

burden of establishing the affirmative defense of laches, the post-conviction

court clearly erred when it determined that the copy of the warrant attached to

Young’s post-conviction petition was newly discovered evidence. To the

contrary, this evidence was clearly known to the parties prior to trial and thus

could have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, we

reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

[18] Reversed.

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

to be newly discovered evidence, was additional grounds for relief. Since we have concluded that Young’s claim of newly discovered evidence fails, this gap in the transcript, standing alone, provides no basis for relief.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1604-PC-855 | June 5, 2017 Page 11 of 11