State of Idaho v. Martin Lee Klett

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52257

STATE OF IDAHO, )

) Filed: August 18, 2026 Plaintiff-Respondent, )

) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. )

) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED MARTIN LEE KLETT, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. )

)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kierra W. Mai, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Allison C. Jaros, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem Martin Lee Klett appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND An officer stopped a vehicle on the interstate for conducting an unsafe lane change and almost striking the officer’s patrol vehicle. Klett was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. While the first officer was writing a citation, a second officer arrived at the scene. The first officer explained to the second officer that the first officer had been unable to confirm the vehicle’s registration. The second officer asked permission to “work some interdiction,” which the first officer granted. The second officer then approached Klett to discuss the registration of his vehicle.

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During this exchange, the second officer smelled marijuana. When the second officer asked if Klett had any illegal substances in the vehicle, he admitted to having “a pipe and hashish.” Klett consented to a vehicle search and, during the search of the vehicle, the second officer found a marijuana vape pen. Klett subsequently admitted that he was “delivering something” that was in a brown backpack. The second officer found the backpack, looked inside, and saw multiple bags of methamphetamine.

The State charged Klett with trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine and being a persistent violator. Klett filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop. The district court held a hearing on the motion and subsequently denied it. The parties prepared for trial, but Klett failed to appear and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Klett fled to California but later returned to Idaho to turn himself in to authorities. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Klett pled guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine (I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(B)), and the State dismissed the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. Klett appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

III.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, mindful of the district court’s factual findings, Klett argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the officers unlawfully extended the traffic stop. In response, the State asserts that Klett has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We agree.

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A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). In the traffic stop context, authority for a seizure ends when the tasks related to the stop are, or reasonably should have been, completed. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Tasks related to a traffic stop include addressing the traffic violation that precipitated the stop; determining whether to issue a traffic ticket; and making inquiries incident to the traffic stop, such as checking the driver’s license, inspecting the vehicle’s proof of insurance and registration, and conducting a criminal record check of the driver. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015); State v. Hale, 168 Idaho 863, 867, 489 P.3d 450, 454 (2021). Officers may not deviate from the purpose of a traffic stop by investigating (or taking safety precautions incident to investigating) other crimes without reasonable suspicion. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356.

However, the justification for a motorist’s detention is not permanently fixed at the moment the traffic stop is initiated. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183, 125 P.3d 536, 539 (Ct. App. 2005). An officer’s observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may--and often do--give rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). Furthermore, even without reasonable suspicion, officers may engage in lines of investigation unrelated to an otherwise lawful traffic stop as long as doing so does not prolong the stop. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (holding that a dog sniff conducted during an otherwise lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Hale, 168 Idaho at 867, 489 P.3d at 454 (recognizing the officers may “conduct certain unrelated checks” during a traffic stop).

In its memorandum decision and order, the district court found that the first officer stopped Klett’s vehicle for conducting an unsafe lane change and almost striking the officer’s patrol vehicle. Klett provided his driver’s license and directed the officer to a temporary registration tag on the back of the vehicle. The officer attempted to obtain the vehicle’s information but had

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difficulty communicating with Klett due to the noise of traffic and his slowed, slurred, and muffled speech. The officer thought Klett said that the vehicle was registered out of California. The officer asked dispatch to check the vehicle’s registration. While waiting for a response, the officer returned to his patrol vehicle and began writing Klett a citation for the unsafe lane change. During this time, dispatch reported that it could not find any registration for the vehicle in California. The officer then asked dispatch to check the vehicle registration out of Montana, which also produced no results.

A second officer arrived at the scene, and the first officer explained the status of the stop.

While the first officer continued writing the citation, the second officer approached Klett and told him that they were having difficulty locating the registration of his vehicle. Klett handed the second officer the vehicle’s temporary registration paperwork. During this exchange, the second officer smelled marijuana and Klett admitted to having “a pipe and hashish” in the vehicle. After Klett consented to a search of his vehicle, the second officer retrieved a marijuana vape pen. The second officer then questioned Klett further, at which point he admitted to the second officer that Klett was “delivering something” that was in a brown backpack. The second officer found the backpack, looked inside, and saw multiple bags of methamphetamine.

The district court found that the first officer initially had reasonable suspicion to stop Klett for the traffic violation. Further, the district court found that the second officer had reasonable suspicion to question Klett regarding the temporary registration due to the first officer’s inability to get information on the vehicle. As soon as the second officer smelled marijuana, the district court concluded that the second officer had independent reasonable suspicion to make inquiries about the presence of drugs in Klett’s vehicle.

Klett argued, and the district court agreed, that the second officer interrupted the first officer four times, adding approximately 1 minute 40 seconds to the stop. However, those interruptions included the reason for the stop, who was working patrol that night, other conversations unrelated to the stop and an inquiry into whether the first officer would mind if the second officer conducted interdiction. The district court found that pausing to answer unrelated inquiries from colleagues is not a deviation from the mission of the stop and the first officer completed his task within a reasonable amount of time. The district court found that the second officer smelled the odor of marijuana before the first officer printed Klett’s citation, so it did not

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prolong the time of the stop beyond the time necessary for the first officer to complete the traffic stop and issue a citation.

As part of its analysis, the district court relied on State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, 356, 458 P.3d 220, 224 (Ct. App. 2019), a case in which this Court declined to hold that “any pause during a traffic stop requires a conclusion . . . that the officers abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop.” After the district court issued its memorandum decision and order, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Still. In State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 227-28, 509 P.3d 1148, 1156-57 (2022), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an officer impermissibly extended a stop when he detoured from the stop’s original purpose to request a drug dog unit without any reasonable suspicion of additional illegal activity. In Karst, the Court made it clear that merely “detouring” or “deviating” from the mission of the stop (in this case writing a traffic citation) even if the delay is de minimis runs afoul of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Karst, 170 Idaho at 227, 509 P.3d at 1156. However, that opinion does not affect the outcome of Klett’s case because the second officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate beyond the initial purpose of the stop. See State v. Riley, 170 Idaho 572, 579-80, 514 P.3d 982, 989-90 (2022) (holding that deviation from mission of the stop did not impermissibly extend stop because reasonable suspicion of a new crime arose and a drug-dog alerted before citations were complete). Like Riley, reasonable suspicion of additional illegal activity by Klett arose well before the first officer completed the citation and, the deviations did not prolong or add time to the overall duration of the traffic stop. Accordingly, Klett has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Klett has failed to show that his traffic stop was unreasonably extended in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, Klett has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Accordingly, Klett’s judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine is affirmed.

Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge FLEMING, CONCUR.