State of Idaho v. Hunter Nathen Rowden

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 52294 & 52295

STATE OF IDAHO, )

) Filed: September 2, 2026 Plaintiff-Respondent, )

) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. )

) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED HUNTER NATHEN ROWDEN, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. )

)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Ross D. Pittman, District Judge.

Order revoking probation, affirmed; judgment of conviction and unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years, for felony domestic battery and concurrent determinate term of five years for violation of a no-contact order, affirmed; orders denying I.C.R. 35 motions for reduction of sentences, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

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Before TRIBE, Chief Judge; LORELLO Judge;

and FLEMING, Judge

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PER CURIAM In Docket No. 52294, Hunter Nathen Rowden pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1). In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district court sentenced Rowden to a unified term of three years, with a minimum period of confinement of one year; suspended the sentence; and placed Rowden on probation.

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Subsequently, Rowden violated the terms of his probation multiple times and was returned to probation.

In Docket No. 52295, Rowden pled guilty to felony domestic battery, I.C. §§ 18-903 and 18-918(2), and violation of a no-contact order, I.C. § 18-920(2). The district court sentenced Rowden to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years, for felony domestic battery and a concurrent determinate term of five years for violation of a no- contact order. The district court revoked Rowden’s probation in Docket No. 52294 and ordered execution of his unified sentence of three years, with a minimum period of confinement of one year. The district court ordered that Rowden’s sentence Docket No. 52294 be served consecutively to his sentences in Docket No. 52295. Rowden filed I.C.R. 35 motions for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied.

Rowden appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, that the district court should have retained jurisdiction, that his sentences are excessive, and that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35 motions for reduction of his sentences.

It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this

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Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014- 15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).

A trial court’s decision whether to retain jurisdiction is, like the original sentencing decision, a matter committed to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 230, 832 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Ct. App. 1992). Retained jurisdiction allows the trial court an extended time to evaluate a defendant’s suitability for probation. State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 379, 924 P.2d 637, 641 (Ct. App. 1996). The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation. State v. Atwood, 122 Idaho 199, 201, 832 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Ct. App. 1992).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).

Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation or imposing sentence.

Rowden also argues that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35 motions for reduction of his sentences. A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea

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for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Upon review of the record, including any new information submitted with Rowden’s Rule 35 motion, we conclude no abuse of discretion has been shown.

Therefore, the order revoking probation, the judgment of conviction, the orders denying Rowden’s I.C.R. 35 motions for reduction of his sentences are affirmed.