State of Idaho v. Cameail Tolain Green

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52516

STATE OF IDAHO, )

) Filed: August 21, 2026 Plaintiff-Respondent, )

) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. )

) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED CAMEAIL TOLAIN GREEN, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. )

)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Cynthia Yee-Wallace, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Stacey M. Donohue, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________

TRIBE, Chief Judge Cameail Tolain Green appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Officers responded to a call from a convenience store clerk requesting a welfare check on Green. The store clerk reported that Green had been in the store for twenty to thirty minutes, was talking to himself, and had entered the restroom where he remained for approximately fifteen additional minutes. The store clerk did not report criminal conduct and did not ask Green to leave. After the officers knocked on the bathroom door and identified themselves as officers, Green exited the bathroom. The officers observed that Green was sweating, had bloodshot eyes, was slow to respond, and appeared confused. The officers asked Green to exit the store, and he

2

complied. Green verbally provided a name and birthdate to the officers; however, dispatch advised no records matched the provided name and birthdate. After learning the information provided by Green did not correspond to any records, the officers began questioning him about his criminal history. When the officers informed Green that it is against the law to provide false information to law enforcement, he attempted to leave. The officers physically restrained Green and placed him under arrest. The officers found multiple illegal substances during a search of Green’s belongings.

The State charged Green with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), possession of drug paraphernalia, resisting and obstructing an officer, and providing false information to law enforcement. Green filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was unlawfully seized. The district court denied the motion, concluding the officers’ conduct was initially justified under the community-caretaking function. The district court further concluded that the officers’ community-caretaking function ended when they began questioning Green regarding his criminal history. However, the district court found that, at that point, the officers possessed reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative detention into whether Green “was trespassing and whether he was under the influence and therefore in possession of an illegal drug.” Pursuant to a plea agreement, Green entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance (Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)), reserving his right to appeal the denial of this motion to suppress. Green appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

3

III.

ANALYSIS

Mindful of the district court’s factual findings, Green argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, asserting he was unlawfully seized when the officers asked for his name and identification because they did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Although Green agrees that the initial contact was lawful under the community-caretaking function, he contends that the function ceased prior to the officers requesting identifying information. The State responds that, by the time the community-caretaking function ended, the officers had already developed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to support an investigative detention. We hold that Green has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). The State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Id. Seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. State v. Huntley, 170 Idaho 521, 526, 513 P.3d 1141, 1146 (2022): Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. Although the quantity and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that of probable cause, this reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences drawn from those facts, which may be informed by the officer’s experience and law enforcement training. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). Ultimately, this Court considers the totality of the circumstances rather than individual facts in isolation. State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 424, 361 P.3d 1280, 1287 (Ct. App. 2015).

Here, the parties agree the officers’ initial contact with Green was lawful under the community-caretaking function. The community-caretaking function arises from the duty of

4

police officers to help citizens in need of assistance and is detached from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2002). Nevertheless, Green argues he was unlawfully seized when the officers requested identifying information because they lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The State responds that the officers had already developed reasonable suspicion based on Green’s behavior and appearance. We agree with the State.

Before requesting identifying information, the officers knew that Green had been in the store for twenty to thirty minutes, had been observed talking to himself, and had remained in the bathroom for approximately fifteen additional minutes. Based on the officers’ training and experience, an individual loitering in a store bathroom for a long period of time can be an indication of illegal drug use. After Green exited the bathroom, the officers observed that he was sweating, had bloodshot eyes, responded slowly to questions, and appeared confused. The officers testified that, based on their training and experience, these observations were consistent with drug impairment. These observations--combined with the information provided by the store clerk--constituted specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that Green had committed or was about to commit a crime, particularly that he was under the influence in public or in possession of a controlled substance.

Green emphasizes that the store clerk requested only a welfare check, did not report criminal conduct, and did not ask Green to leave the premises. Green also emphasizes that he assured the officers that he was fine and engaged in conversation with them. These facts do not negate the officers’ observations. Although the encounter initially began as a welfare check, the officers were not required to ignore facts suggesting criminal activity that arose during the encounter. By the time the officers questioned Green about his criminal history--and the community-caretaking function had ended--the officers had already observed multiple indicators of drug impairment and reasonably relied on their training and experience in evaluating those observations. As such, the transition from the community-caretaking function to the investigative detention was, based on a totality of the circumstances, supported by reasonable suspicion and, therefore, lawful. Accordingly, Green has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

5

IV.

CONCLUSION

Because the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Green once the community-caretaking function ended, the district court properly denied Green’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, Green’s judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.

Judge FLEMING and Judge PETTY, CONCUR.