State of Florida v. Zachary Joseph Penna

• Court: Supreme Court of Florida
• Decided: May 2, 2024
• Docket: SC2022-0458
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________

No. SC2022-0458 ____________

STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner,

vs.

ZACHARY JOSEPH PENNA, Respondent.

May 2, 2024

GROSSHANS, J.

We accepted for review a decision of the Fourth District Court

of Appeal that ordered suppression of certain statements made by

Zachary Penna, concluding that police obtained those statements in

violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Penna v.

State, 344 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). At the request of the

State, the district court certified a question to us involving the

requirements of Miranda as interpreted by Shelly v. State, 262 So.

3d 1 (Fla. 2018). In particular, the district court asked if Miranda is

“automatically violated” when an officer does not “re-read a Miranda warning following a defendant’s voluntary re-initiation of contact”

with law enforcement. Penna, 344 So. 3d at 442 (on motion for

certification). We answer that question in the negative and recede

from our decision in Shelly, which announced a per se rule that is

inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 1

I

In 2015, Penna unlawfully entered a home in Palm Beach

County and brutally stabbed two men to death when they refused

his demand for their vehicle. The force and number of stabbings

caused significant bloodshed throughout the home. Penna, covered

in the victims’ blood, scooped up some blood and drank it.

After stabbing the two men, Penna took their SUV, drove to a

nearby neighborhood, and robbed an elderly woman. Moments

later, Penna kidnapped a coworker from his home, but he was able

to escape when Penna stopped at a restaurant.

Undaunted, Penna drove north to Brevard County where he

abandoned the SUV. After locating another vehicle, he approached

the owner and demanded the keys. When the owner did not fully

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

-2- comply with his directives, Penna slashed the man’s throat with a

knife.2 Then, Penna fled into the woods.

Responding to the attack, law enforcement deployed a canine

that successfully located Penna. Penna stabbed the canine and

then ran out of the woods with a knife in hand. Officers ordered

Penna to drop the knife, but he refused. Only after being shot four

times did Penna stop charging at the officers.

Following his apprehension, Penna was transported to a

nearby hospital where he received medical treatment. The next day,

Detective Jonathan D’Angelo went to the hospital to speak with

Penna. At that time, Penna was shackled to his bed and on several

medications. Despite his physical condition, Penna was able to

communicate with the detective.

At the outset of their conversation, Detective D’Angelo asked

Penna if he had been advised of his Miranda rights. In response,

Penna began listing those rights, noting the right to silence and an

attorney. Despite this, the detective read Penna the Miranda

warnings as listed on his department-issued card.

2. This victim survived Penna’s attack.

-3- Detective D’Angelo then began asking questions related to the

murders. Penna answered the first few questions, generally

denying that he recognized the murder victims or their home. But

when Detective D’Angelo asked Penna how he came to have

possession of the stolen SUV, Penna invoked his right to counsel.

At that point, Detective D’Angelo stopped questioning Penna and

left the room. When another detective entered Penna’s room later

that day, Penna again invoked his right to counsel.

Following these interactions with law enforcement, Penna

remained in a hospital for roughly a month and a half, always

restrained to his bed. During this time, at least one officer was

assigned to constantly monitor him.

One of the assigned officers was Deputy Michael Nettles, who

started monitoring Penna roughly four weeks after the murders.

One day, Penna asked Deputy Nettles why he (Penna) was in the

hospital. Deputy Nettles responded by saying, “[Y]ou don’t know

why you’re here?” A short time later, Penna volunteered to Deputy

Nettles that he had “stabbed a couple of people.” In response to a

clarifying question, Penna confessed to stabbing a police dog and

confirmed that he had stabbed two men.

-4- Two days later, Deputy Nettles was again assigned to monitor

Penna. Without prompting, Penna stated that he was in a poor

mood and that his life was messed up. Deputy Nettles followed up

by asking why Penna had this dim outlook. Penna responded that

he had ruined his own life, adding: “I know what I did. I’m going to

prison for my whole . . . life.”

The very next day, Deputy Nettles was again assigned to watch

Penna. While talking with Deputy Nettles, Penna asked, “What do

you think I will get?” Penna clarified that he meant for “killing th[e]

two [men].” Redirecting that question, Deputy Nettles asked Penna

what he thought his punishment would be for the crimes. At that

point, Penna told Deputy Nettles that he would share what

happened. Deputy Nettles reminded Penna that he was an officer

and would write down his statements. In addition, Deputy Nettles

also cautioned Penna against talking unless he wanted to. Deputy

Nettles, though, stopped short of giving Miranda warnings to Penna.

Penna proceeded to offer additional details about his crime spree.

Roughly a week later, Penna again struck up a conversation

with Deputy Nettles. During that conversation, Penna once more

-5- spoke of his crimes and said that he thought the murders would

result in life sentences.

The final relevant conversation with Deputy Nettles occurred

roughly two weeks later. In addition to mentioning expected

criminal sanctions, Penna spoke of being reborn and his belief in

the Egyptian god Ra. Alluding to his anticipated prosecution,

Penna said that he would testify that Ra told him to do things.

Ultimately, the State charged Penna with several crimes,

including two counts of first-degree murder. Before trial, Penna

moved to suppress the statements made to Deputy Nettles, arguing

that such statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. The

trial court held a hearing on the motion at which Detective D’Angelo

and Deputy Nettles testified. Among other things, Deputy Nettles

testified about his conversations with Penna and the circumstances

surrounding those conversations. Following the evidentiary

hearing, the trial court denied the motion in its entirety, stressing

that Penna initiated all the conversations with Deputy Nettles.

Thus, in the court’s view, Penna had failed to establish a Miranda

violation.

-6- At the ensuing trial, the State presented substantial physical

evidence and witness testimony to establish Penna’s guilt. One of

its witnesses was Deputy Nettles. Through his testimony, the State

presented many of Penna’s incriminating statements. After the

State rested, Penna introduced evidence to support his insanity

defense. Rejecting that defense, the jury found Penna guilty as

charged on all counts. The court entered judgment consistent with

the verdicts and sentenced Penna to life in prison.

Penna appealed to the Fourth District. At the outset of the

majority opinion, the district court rejected what it characterized as

the parties’ “all or none” approach. Penna, 344 So. 3d at 431-32. It

found that the statements during the first two conversations were

not obtained in violation of Miranda. According to the majority,

such statements were not the products of police interrogation, i.e.,

they were either spontaneous or made in response to clarifying

questions. Id. at 434-36. However, partially agreeing with Penna,

the majority found that Deputy Nettles violated Miranda by failing

to “specifically” give Penna “his Miranda rights again” prior to

custodial interrogation during the final three conversations. Id. at

436-38. In support of that conclusion, the majority relied on its

-7- own precedent, see Quarles v. State, 290 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA

2020), which had interpreted our decision in Shelly to require a full

rereading of Miranda warnings under the circumstances of this

case. Penna, 344 So. 3d at 434 (discussing Quarles). The majority

went on to find that the error was not harmless, despite

acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Penna’s guilt. Id. at

438-39.

Judge Artau agreed that Quarles compelled a finding that

Miranda was violated. Id. at 440-41 (Artau, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part). But in his view, any error was harmless in

light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at 441-42. He also

questioned whether Shelly was correctly decided, though his doubts

about that case were not the basis of his partial dissent. Id.

Following issuance of the district court’s decision, the State

asked the court to certify a question of law to us. Granting that

request, the district court certified the following question as being of

great public importance, asking:

WHETHER A DEFENDANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT MIRANDA RIGHTS ARE AUTOMATICALLY VIOLATED WHEN AN OFFICER FAILS TO RE-READ A MIRANDA WARNING FOLLOWING A DEFENDANT’S VOLUNTARY RE-INITIATION OF CONTACT.

-8- Based on that certified question, we granted the State’s

request for review.

II

The certified question presents us with a pure legal issue. As

such, our standard of review is de novo. See City of Tallahassee v.

Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., 375 So. 3d 178, 183 (Fla. 2023).

In undertaking this review, we first discuss background legal

principles and then analyze our decision in Shelly against that

backdrop.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467-69, the U.S. Supreme

Court held that, in order to safeguard the Fifth Amendment’s right

against compelled self-incrimination, police must advise suspects of

certain rights—including the right to silence and counsel—before

subjecting them to custodial interrogation. See Andrew v. White, 62

F.4th 1299, 1333 (10th Cir. 2023) (noting Miranda’s recognition of

such rights); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439-40

(2000) (characterizing Miranda as being founded on Fifth

Amendment’s prohibition against compelled self-incrimination).

When a suspect unequivocally invokes the Miranda right to counsel,

-9- the officers must immediately stop questioning the suspect.

See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). However,

that invocation does not mean that law enforcement may never

again question the suspect in a custodial setting. Oregon v.

Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (plurality opinion).

Viewed collectively, Edwards and Bradshaw establish a two-

part test for assessing whether post-invocation statements violate

Miranda. First, the defendant must reinitiate contact with police.

See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044.

And second, there must be a valid waiver of the Miranda rights

already invoked. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9; Bradshaw, 462

U.S. at 1046. This waiver prong depends “upon the particular facts

and circumstances surrounding the case, including the

background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Bradshaw,

462 U.S. at 1046 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,

374-75 (1979)).

We relied on these principles in Welch v. State, 992 So. 2d 206

(Fla. 2008). Applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test, we found

no Miranda violation, specifically noting the factors relevant to our

analysis. Id. at 214-15 (“[I]f the accused initiates further

- 10 - conversation, is reminded of his rights, and knowingly and

voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating statements made

during this conversation may be properly admitted.” (citing

Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46)).

Ten years later, we again considered a situation where the

suspect invoked his Miranda rights but made subsequent

statements. Shelly, 262 So. 3d at 16. We held that the suspect’s

post-invocation statements were inadmissible under Miranda. In

finding that Miranda violation, we noted that the suspect did not

reinitiate contact with police. Id. at 17. Under the Bradshaw-

Edwards analysis, that conclusion would have been enough for a

Miranda violation.

But we did not confine our analysis to the re-initiation issue.

Instead, we discussed Bradshaw and Welch at length. Id. at 11-13.

Expanding upon those opinions, we established a categorical rule

that an accused must either be “reminded” of his Miranda rights or

“given” them again—we said both. Id. at 13 (“[I]f an accused

invokes his or her Miranda rights but later reinitiates

communication, an accused must be reminded of his or her Miranda

rights pursuant to this Court’s holding in Welch.”); id. (“Welch

- 11 - expands the requirements . . . by specifically including a

requirement that the accused be specifically given his or her

Miranda rights after an alleged reinitiation.”).

The State argues that Shelly’s remind-or-readvise requirement

is incompatible with U.S. Supreme Court precedent and urges us to

recede from Shelly to the extent it adopted that requirement. We

think the State’s argument has merit.

As our discussion above demonstrates, and as recognized in

Shelly itself, 3 Bradshaw does not state a legal rule that a suspect

must always be reminded of or re-given Miranda rights following re-

initiation of contact with police. See Shelly, 262 So. 3d at 22

(Lawson, J., dissenting) (noting that Bradshaw did not add “third

inquiry” of reminding the suspect of his or her Miranda rights).

Instead, Bradshaw laid out a two-part test that asked whether the

defendant reinitiated contact with police and waived his rights as

determined by the totality of the evidence. Id. Thus, at a

3. Specifically, we acknowledged that “the standard is not explicitly stated in Bradshaw.” Shelly, 262 So. 3d at 11. Instead, we looked to “the facts of [Bradshaw]” as supporting our conclusion. Id.

- 12 - minimum, Shelly improperly expanded Bradshaw by adding a new

requirement. 4

The federal courts of appeal are in line with this observation.

Circuit courts have consistently interpreted Bradshaw and

Edwards as simply requiring re-initiation by the defendant and a

voluntary waiver based on the totality of the circumstances.

See United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1087 (3d Cir. 1989);

Bush v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 573 Fed. App’x 503, 511 (6th

Cir. 2014); United States v. Robinson, 586 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir.

2009); Lamp v. Farrier, 763 F.2d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 1985); United

States v. Gonzalez, 202 Fed. App’x 284, 285 (9th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Willis, 826 F.3d 1265, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2016). We note

that Penna has not cited a single federal circuit opinion recognizing

Shelly’s categorical remind-or-readvise requirement.

Having concluded that Shelly improperly interpreted Fifth

Amendment precedent, we now consider whether stare decisis

4. We also note that the Shelly court improperly expanded Welch, which did not hold that Miranda warnings must always be re-given after a suspect invokes his rights. Rather, despite some questionable dicta, Welch properly applied a totality-of-the- circumstances test, treating the re-giving of Miranda warnings as a significant factor in that analysis.

- 13 - nevertheless demands our adherence to it. In carrying out this

inquiry, we must first consider whether Shelly was clearly

erroneous. See State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 506 (Fla. 2020).

Based on the analysis above, we conclude that our error in Shelly

was clear. Put simply, the Bradshaw-Edwards framework does not

include a categorical remind-or-readvise requirement following

invocation of Miranda rights. Moreover, there is no support in the

text of the Constitution or in any U.S. Supreme Court precedent

that this one factor is determinative of a Fifth Amendment violation.

Our conclusion that Shelly is clearly erroneous does not end

the analysis. Pursuant to Poole, we also evaluate whether there are

any valid reasons for retaining Shelly’s remind-or-readvise

requirement in our jurisprudence. The critical consideration is

reliance. See State v. Maisonet-Maldonado, 308 So. 3d 63, 69 (Fla.

2020). “In evaluating reliance interests, courts consider ‘legitimate

expectations of those who have reasonably relied on the

precedent.’ ” Id. (quoting Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390,

1415 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)). Unlike cases

“involving property and contract rights,” “reliance interests are

lowest in cases . . . ‘involving procedural and evidentiary rules.’ ”

- 14 - Id. (quoting Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507). Falling into this latter

category, Shelly announced a rule of criminal procedure that

governed police conduct. In our view, detained suspects like Penna

are not likely to have substantially altered their dealings with police

based on the existence of this one requirement. Penna does not

claim otherwise. Accordingly, we conclude that Penna has not

identified any significant reliance interests at stake. Nor has he

argued any other factor that would justify our adherence to Shelly.

For these reasons, we now recede from Shelly’s categorical

remind-or-readvise requirement. In doing so, we reiterate that

Bradshaw provides the proper standard which should be applied in

this case. 5 That standard asks two things: (1) did the suspect

reinitiate contact with police and, if so, (2) did he knowingly and

voluntarily waive his earlier-invoked Miranda rights. The latter

inquiry turns on the totality of the circumstances. We add a final

observation. Although we hold that there is no per se requirement

5. As best as we can tell, Shelly based its categorical rule on the federal constitution. For his part, Penna has not asked us to consider whether a higher standard should be adopted as a matter of Florida constitutional law. See art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.”).

- 15 - that an officer remind or readvise a defendant of his Miranda rights,

evidence of such would certainly be relevant to an overall analysis

of whether the defendant voluntarily waived those rights.

III

Based on the reasoning above, we answer the certified

question in the negative and quash the Fourth District’s decision

below, which relied on Shelly and its own precedent interpreting

Shelly. 6 We remand for reconsideration under the proper standard

as stated in this opinion.7

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

6. Because Quarles is inconsistent with this opinion, we disapprove it as well.

7. Since we leave for the district court to apply the Bradshaw standard on remand, we have no reason to assess the district majority’s harmlessness analysis.

- 16 - LABARGA, J., dissenting.

In receding from Shelly, 8 the majority holds that when a

defendant voluntarily reinitiates contact with law enforcement,

“there is no per se requirement that an officer remind or readvise

[an accused] of his Miranda[9] rights.” Majority op. at 15-16. I

respectfully dissent.

Our state constitution provides protection against self-

incrimination and states that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in

any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.” Art. I, § 9, Fla.

Const. Notwithstanding the majority’s conclusion that this Court’s

interpretation in Shelly constitutes an “improper[] expan[sion]” of

decisions from the United States Supreme Court and this Court,

majority op. at 13, “state courts are absolutely free to interpret state

constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual

rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution,”

Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866, 888 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Arizona v.

Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995)).

8. Shelly v. State, 262 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2018).

9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

- 17 - Because the majority has not chosen to do so, I respectfully

dissent.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Great Public Importance

Fourth District - Case No. 4D2020-0345

(Palm Beach County)

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Daniel William Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Allen L. Huang, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Petitioner

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Respondent

- 18 -