State of Florida v. Ridge Gabriel

Supreme Court of Florida

State of Florida v. Ridge Gabriel

DecidedApril 8, 2021

DocketSC19-2155

StatusPublished

This text of State of Florida v. Ridge Gabriel (State of Florida v. Ridge Gabriel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State of Florida v. Ridge Gabriel, (Fla. 2021).

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Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________

No. SC19-2155 ____________

STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner,

vs.

RIDGE GABRIEL, Respondent.

April 8, 2021

POLSTON, J.

We review the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in

Gabriel v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2913 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 6,

2019), in which the Fifth District certified the following question of

great public importance:

IS THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE AS DEFINED BY AND APPLIED IN SECTION 921.0024(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, AN INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM SENTENCE AND NOT A COLLECTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCE WHERE THERE ARE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS SUBJECT TO SENTENCING ON A SINGLE SCORESHEET? Id. at D2913. In its decision, the Fifth District also certified conflict

with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in

Champagne v. State, 269 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). 1

For the reasons explained below, we answer the certified

question in the affirmative, quash the Fifth District’s decision in

Gabriel, and approve the Second District’s decision in Champagne

to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Ridge Gabriel was convicted of attempted first-degree murder

with a firearm of a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with

violence, attempted robbery with a firearm, and aggravated assault

with a firearm. Gabriel, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D2913. The Fifth

District reversed the attempted first-degree murder conviction,

which was stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. Id. at D2914

n.1. On remand, Gabriel was resentenced for attempted robbery

with a firearm (primary offense), aggravated assault with a firearm

(additional offense), and resisting an officer with violence (additional

offense). Id. at D2913; see also Gabriel v. State, 248 So. 3d 265,

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

-2- 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018). The Criminal Punishment Code (CPC)

Scoresheet indicated the lowest permissible sentence (LPS) was

107.25 months, and the trial court agreed with the State that the

LPS is an individual minimum sentence that must be applied to

each offense before the sentencing court if the LPS exceeds each

individual statutory maximum sentence. Gabriel, 44 Fla. L. Weekly

at D2913. On his second-degree felony of attempted robbery with a

firearm, the trial court sentenced Gabriel to the statutory maximum

sentence of 15 years with a 10-year mandatory minimum because

the LPS of 107.25 months did not exceed the individual statutory

maximum sentence. Id. On his third-degree felony of aggravated

assault with a firearm, the trial court sentenced Gabriel to 107.25

months with a 3-year minimum mandatory because the LPS of

107.25 months exceeded the statutory maximum sentence of 5

years. Id. Similarly, on his third-degree felony of resisting an

officer with violence, the trial court sentenced Gabriel to 107.25

months because the LPS of 107.25 months exceeded the statutory

maximum sentence of 5 years. Id. Due to consecutive sentences,

Gabriel’s sentences totaled approximately 33 years. Id.

-3- “On appeal, Gabriel argue[d] that his sentences for aggravated

assault with a firearm and resisting an officer with violence are

unlawful because they exceed the statutory maximum for those

offenses.” Id. The Fifth District applied the language in section

921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2012), which provides that “[t]he

permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible

sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in

s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses

before the court for sentencing.” Id. The Fifth District also applied

this Court’s decision in Moore v. State, 882 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2004),

and concluded “that the sentencing range for Gabriel was 107.25

months, the LPS, to twenty-five years, the collective statutory

maximum sentence.” Gabriel, 44 Fla. L. Weekly at D2913. The

Fifth District interpreted this Court’s decision in Moore as standing

for the proposition that “the LPS is the collective total minimum

sentence for all offenses, but each has its own statutory maximum,”

and “[t]he LPS is not the sentence which must be applied to each

offense at sentencing.” Id. (quoting Dennard v. State, 157 So. 3d

1055, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (Warner, J., dissenting)). The Fifth

District explained, “[W]hen applying the provision of section

-4- 921.0024(2), which requires the trial court to impose the LPS if it

exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the LPS must exceed the

collective statutory maximum, not each individual statutory

maximum, before such exception is triggered.” Id. The Fifth

District further explained:

In this case, the statutory maximum sentence is twenty-five years–fifteen plus five plus five. Because the LPS does not exceed twenty-five years, the trial court was not required to impose the LPS, and the sentences should have been capped by their individual statutory maximum sentences. Consequently, Gabriel’s sentences for aggravated assault with a firearm and resisting an officer with violence are illegal because they exceed the statutory maximum sentence in contravention of section 921.0024(2).

Id.

Ultimately, the Fifth District reversed the trial court and

certified that its decision conflicts with the Second District’s

decision in Champagne. In Champagne, the defendant “was

convicted of robbery with a firearm, a first-degree felony punishable

by life in prison, and false imprisonment, a third-degree felony.”

269 So. 3d at 630 (citation omitted). The LPS was 240.15 months,

and the trial court sentenced the defendant to a life sentence on the

robbery count and “to twenty years (240 months) in prison on the

-5- false imprisonment count,” an additional offense. Id. at 631. The

trial court ruled that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence

that applies to each offense even though the LPS did not exceed the

statutory maximum sentence for the primary offense, which was a

life sentence. See id.

On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the life sentence

imposed on his primary offense but argued that the 240-month

sentence imposed on his conviction for false imprisonment was

illegal because it exceeded the 5-year statutory maximum sentence

for that offense. Id. at 630. The Second District examined the

statutory language in section 921.0024(2) and existing precedent

and “conclude[d] that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence

which must be imposed when the LPS exceeds the statutory

maximum sentence for each offense and therefore [the defendant]’s

sentence is legal.” Id. at 630. Accordingly, the Second District

affirmed the trial court and certified the same question of great

public importance as the Fifth District’s decision in Gabriel.

-6- II. ANALYSIS

The State argues that, based on the plain language of section

921.0024(2), the LPS is an individual minimum sentence, and the

trial court properly sentenced Gabriel to 107.25 months (the LPS)

on both of his third-degree felony convictions because the LPS

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