State of Florida v. Keith Alexander Times

• Court: Supreme Court of Florida
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: SC2024-0647
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________

No. SC2024-0647 ____________

STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner,

vs.

KEITH ALEXANDER TIMES, Respondent.

June 25, 2026

SASSO, J.

The State of Florida appeals an order suppressing evidence

obtained during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that was

executed on the home of Respondent, Keith Alexander Times. It is

undisputed that law enforcement violated section 933.09, Florida

Statutes (2020), a knock-and-announce statute, 1 during the

execution of the warrant. Based on that violation, the trial court

granted Times’ motion to suppress the evidence. Bound by State v.

1. Section 933.09 is one of two “knock-and-announce” statutes in Florida. Section 933.09 pertains to search warrants while section 901.19, Florida Statutes (2025), pertains to arrests. Cable, 51 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2010), where this Court held that

exclusion is the applicable remedy for knock-and-announce

violations, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial

court’s order. State v. Times, 383 So. 3d 555, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA

2024). But the First District certified the following question as one

of great public importance:

WHETHER EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER A VALID SEARCH WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED TO REMEDY A VIOLATION OF THE KNOCK-AND- ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 933.09, FLORIDA STATUTES?

Id. at 560. For the reasons below, we answer that question in the

negative. 2 In doing so, we quash the decision below and recede

from our decision in Cable to the extent that it is inconsistent with

this opinion.

I

While investigating a suspected drug trafficking organization

(DTO) in Leon County, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement

(FDLE) determined that one member of the DTO, Ja’Mario

Paramore, was using a residence to store narcotics and the

2. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

-2- proceeds from their distribution. Based on that information, FDLE

lawfully obtained a search warrant for the residence. FDLE and the

Tallahassee Police Department executed the search warrant after

forcibly entering the home with a battering ram. Times, 383 So. 3d

at 557. Before entry, law enforcement knocked multiple times and

announced their presence twice, demanding that someone come to

the door. Id. However, it was not until seconds before entry that an

officer stated that the police were in possession of a search warrant.

Id. Paramore, Times, and two others were located inside the

residence. Law enforcement located cocaine, the drug “Molly,” over

$23,000 in cash, and two firearms. Times was ultimately charged

with trafficking in amphetamines, possession of cocaine, and

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id.

Times moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search,

arguing that the officers violated section 933.09. Id. After a

hearing, the trial court concluded that the officers did not comply

with section 933.09 because a resident is not required to open the

door until the officer announces he has a search warrant, and here,

the occupants were not given sufficient time after the officer

announced the warrant to answer the door. Id. at 558. Based on

-3- this Court’s precedent in Cable prescribing exclusion as a remedy

for a violation of the knock-and-announce statute, the trial court

suppressed the evidence. The State appealed, but the First District

affirmed. Id. at 560. In doing so, the First District agreed on the

binding nature of Cable but noted that its holding requiring

suppression for a knock-and-announce violation “appears [to] be

the minority position among the various states that have considered

the issue in the eighteen years since the United States Supreme

Court decision in Hudson [v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)].”

Times, 383 So. 3d at 560. Judge Nordby specially concurred,

agreeing that the evidence must be suppressed but recognizing the

State’s “compelling arguments highlighting why [this Court’s]

precedent should be revisited.” Id. at 561 (Nordby, J., specially

concurring). The State then sought discretionary review of the First

District’s decision based on the certified question of great public

importance. This Court accepted jurisdiction.

II

A

There are two knock-and-announce statutes in Florida. See

§§ 901.19, 933.09, Fla. Stat.; see also Times, 383 So. 3d at 557 n.1.

-4- These are not new laws––section 933.09, which is the applicable

statute here, was first codified in 1923. See ch. 9321, § 9, Laws of

Fla. (1923). The knock-and-announce statutes represented a

codification of the English common law, which “recognized the

fundamental sanctity of one’s home yet nevertheless provide[d] that

an arresting officer ‘may break open doors, if the party refused

upon demand to open them.’ ” Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706,

710 (Fla. 1964) (quoting 1 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the

Pleas of The Crown 583 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 1736)).

Importantly though, the exclusionary rule was not a feature of

common law. See Cable, 51 So. 3d at 444 (Polston, J., dissenting)

(citing 8 John Henry Whitmore, A Treatise on the Ang[l]o–American

System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2183 (3d ed. 1940)

(“[I]t has long been established that the admissibility of evidence is

not affected by the illegality of the means through which the party

has been enabled to obtain the evidence.” (citing to English

precedent dating to 1723) (emphasis omitted))). Even so, in 1964,

this Court announced an exclusionary rule for knock-and-

announce violations. See Benefield, 160 So. 2d at 711; Cable, 51

So. 3d at 438-39. And in 1982, Florida voters amended article I,

-5- section 12 of the Florida Constitution to require conformity to the

United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of Fourth Amendment

issues. See art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. This development inserted the

issue of whether the Federal Constitution demanded the knock-

and-announce rule into Florida’s Constitution.3

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 (1995), marked the

first time the United States Supreme Court expressly stated the

knock-and-announce requirement was a feature of the Fourth

Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry and therefore a matter of

federal constitutional law. But in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586

(2006), the United States Supreme Court clarified that violations of

the knock-and-announce rule did not require the suppression of all

evidence found in the search. Id. at 594.

Following Hudson, two Florida district courts of appeal split on

the issue of whether exclusion nevertheless remained the applicable

3. See Erin Elizabeth Cassinelli, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Knock and Announce: The Ninth Circuit Knocks and the Supreme Court Announces a Re-Emphasis on the Case-by-Case Analysis. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003), 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 295, 306 (2005) (discussing conflict among state and federal courts about the link between the knock-and-announce rule and the Constitution).

-6- remedy for statutory knock-and-announce violations. Compare

Cable v. State, 18 So. 3d 37, 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that

Hudson did not “displace the existing Florida precedent, which

mandates the application of the exclusionary rule”), with State v.

Brown, 36 So. 3d 770, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“[R]eversal is

[independently] required . . . because of the holding of Hudson that

even established violations of the [knock-and-announce] principle

do not implicate the exclusionary rule so as to suppress pertinent

evidence.”). We resolved the conflict between the districts in Cable

by siding with the Second District. 51 So. 3d at 441. We concluded

that the exclusionary rule was the applicable remedy “[a]s a matter

of state law.” Id. at 442. To reach that conclusion, we

characterized our decision in Benefield as holding that “a violation

of Florida’s knock-and-announce statute vitiated the ensuing arrest

and required the suppression of the evidence obtained in

connection with the arrest.” Id. at 435. We concluded that

“because the remedy of exclusion in Benefield was based on a

violation of Florida’s knock-and-announce statute, and not the

Fourth Amendment,” Hudson did not require us to recede from

Benefield. Id.

-7- In addition to distinguishing Hudson, we set forth other

factors that weighed against receding from Benefield. Specifically,

we rejected the State’s argument that the 1982 constitutional

amendment to article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution,

requiring that section to be interpreted in conformity with the

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, necessitated

receding. Id. at 442-43. We concluded that, like Hudson, that

amendment was inapplicable to a statutory analysis. Id. We also

rejected the State’s argument that Jenkins v. State, 978 So. 2d 116

(Fla. 2008), governed because, unlike the statute in Jenkins, the

knock-and-announce statute at issue in Cable lacked an “explicit”

remedy. Cable, 51 So. 3d. at 443.

B

Against this backdrop, we analyze the State’s argument that

this Court clearly erred in Cable when it determined that the

remedy of exclusion of evidence should be applied for a violation of

section 933.09. We review this issue de novo. See Statler v. State,

349 So. 3d 873, 878-79 (Fla. 2022) (explaining that holdings

implicating both statutory interpretation and constitutional issues

are reviewed de novo).

-8- The issue in Cable was one of remedy. We therefore begin by

examining the statutory text because the remedy for violations of a

Florida statute “fall[s] within the purview of the Legislature.”

Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130. Section 933.09 provides that a law

enforcement officer may forcibly enter a house while executing a

warrant “if after due notice of the officer’s authority and purpose he

or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything

therein.” § 933.09, Fla. Stat. In other words, a law enforcement

officer may not forcibly enter a home to execute a warrant until he

or she has knocked, announced his or her authority and purpose,

and been refused admittance. See id.

The plain text of section 933.09 does not authorize, let alone

require, the suppression of evidence. See Cable, 51 So. 3d at 444

(Polston, J., dissenting) (“Florida’s knock-and-announce statute at

issue [in section 901.19] does not contain an exclusionary rule.”);

State v. Pruitt, 967 So. 2d 1021, 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (Villanti,

J., specially concurring) (concluding that the exclusionary rule

should not apply because “nothing in the language of section

933.09 requires suppression of the evidence if the rule is violated”).

But chapter 933, Florida Statutes, is not without a statutory

-9- remedy. See Times, 383 So. 3d at 561 (Nordby, J., specially

concurring). Indeed, chapter 933 deters violations of section

933.09 by threatening wayward police officers with criminal

penalties. Chapter 933’s enforcement provision—entitled

“[e]xceeding authority in executing search warrant; penalty”—states

that “[a]ny officer who in executing a search warrant willfully

exceeds his or her authority or exercises it with unnecessary

severity, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.” §

933.17, Fla. Stat. (2025).4

Because section 933.09 does not itself contain an exclusionary

rule and section 933.17 prescribes remedies for violations of section

933.09, we do not infer that the remedy of exclusion is available for

violations of section 933.09.5 See Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130. We

4. This statutory enforcement mechanism dates to the original chapter law codifying the knock-and-announce rule for search warrants. See ch. 9321, §§ 9, 17, Laws of Fla. (1923). Like the current version of the statute, the 1923 enactment made the “[p]enalty for exceeding” an officer’s “authority” under the Act a “fine[]” of up to $500, “imprison[ment] for not more than six months,” and potential “suspension from and removal from office.” Id. § 17.

5. Times argues that section 933.17 does not cover violations of section 933.09 because the former requires one to “willfully” exceed their authority while the latter has no mens rea

- 10 - typically do not insert remedies that the Legislature has omitted.

See, e.g., QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condo. Apartment Ass’n, 94

So. 3d 541, 553 (Fla. 2012); see also Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130

(noting that statute at issue did not expressly list the exclusionary

rule as a remedy and, therefore, we do not infer that this remedy is

available for violations of the statute). By contrast, the Legislature

has demonstrated that, when it intends to include a remedy of

exclusion, it knows how to do so. See, e.g., § 934.06, Fla. Stat.

(2025) (prescribing exclusion as penalty for violation of wiretapping

statute); § 318.14(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2025) (establishing that certain

compelled statements during traffic investigations “shall not be

used as evidence in any other proceedings”); see also Brooks v.

State, 363 So. 3d 181, 184-85 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (holding that

section 901.16, Florida Statutes (2018), did not require suppression

of statements where the statute did not include that remedy).

Times argues that absence of explicit legislative authorization

requirement. Times reasons that law enforcement would be free to not train themselves on section 933.09 and then be free from penalization. But this perceived insufficiency is a policy matter and does not make the remedy more or less applicable.

- 11 - of an exclusionary rule should not deter us. This is so, Times

submits, because while not explicitly stated in the statute, the

exclusionary rule is part of the background against which the

Legislature passed the knock-and-announce statute in 1923.

Times therefore urges this Court to conclude that the Legislature

would have understood a remedy of exclusion to be coextensive with

a codification of the common law knock-and-announce rule, such

that the remedy would be necessarily implied by the text. But a

close examination of this argument reveals its weakness.

First, Times’ attempt to demonstrate a historical context that

included the exclusionary rule falls short. For pre-codification

support, Times relies exclusively on Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329

(Fla. 1922), in which two justices of this Court joined in an opinion

discussing the exclusionary rule in the context of an alcohol

possession offense. Id. at 332. But Chief Justice Browne’s opinion

in Atz was not an “opinion of this Court,” and his reasoning was

therefore not binding precedent. See id. at 330 (opinion of Ellis &

West, JJ.). So limited, we reject Times’ characterization of this

opinion as the “default” position of the Court. But even if the

opinion were indicative of a developing legal principle, Chief Justice

- 12 - Browne’s reasoning in Atz was based on what this Court viewed as

a constitutional violation6 rather than a statutory violation. Id.

Thus, any time Atz references “illegally” acquired evidence, it is in a

markedly different context. Id. at 332. Atz therefore does not

dissuade us from our understanding that, by codifying common

law, suppression was not an applicable remedy for a violation of

section 933.09.

Second, Times’ post-codification arguments fail as well. Times

argues that if this Court “had interpreted the intent of the

legislature incorrectly . . . there would undoubtedly be a lot more

legislative activity on the issue.” But “[w]e walk on quicksand when

we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling

legal principle.” Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020, 1030 (Fla. 2023)

(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940)

(Frankfurter, J.)). What is more, the view that we can assume a

certain construction is correct because the Legislature has not

6. Further, the constitutional violation at issue in Atz examined vastly different facts than this case. For example, the police were “admitted by the defendant” into the property and did not have a search warrant. Atz, 94 So. at 330.

- 13 - amended a statute is based on the “patently false premise that the

correctness of statutory construction is to be measured by what the

current [Legislature] desires, rather than by what the law as

enacted meant.” Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671

(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). So, we reject this argument.

C

Having determined that a remedy of exclusion is not required

nor authorized by section 933.09, we conclude that our decision in

Cable was wrongly decided. And in retrospect, it is clear how we

committed that error.

Our primary mistake in Cable was failing to assess whether

Benefield was correct as a matter of statutory interpretation.

Instead, we presumed that the remedy of exclusion was justified

based on “state law grounds” and concluded that Hudson did not

prohibit a state from providing exclusion as a remedy for knock-

and-announce violations. Cable, 51 So. 3d at 442.

The problem with employing that presumption is that

Benefield’s decision to exclude the “fruits of the search” was not

grounded in an analysis of the statute, and it is unclear whether we

grounded the remedy in state law or instead in federal

- 14 - constitutional law. Benefield involved a warrantless search that we

concluded was “unreasonable under any standard that would be

approved by a free country.” 160 So. 2d at 709. And although we

noted that one of the officers’ many transgressions included a

disregard of the responsibility to knock and announce, we

ultimately held that “the fruits of the search being the product of an

unlawful arrest and a search incident thereto, should have been

excluded by the trial court upon proper motion.” Id. at 711.

Further, while we noted the common law underpinnings of the

knock-and-announce statute, we did not suggest that an

exclusionary rule was similarly a feature of common law. Id. at

710.

As a result, we erred in Cable when we overread Benefield and

applied it in a case involving a search pursuant to a warrant where

the sole issue was one of remedy for a statutory violation. We then

misunderstood our role as a court, first by discounting section

933.17’s chosen remedy, and then compounding that error by

concluding that we could therefore supply one. That error put us in

tension with precedent like Jenkins, where we have acknowledged

that the inclusion or omission of remedies for statutory violations is

- 15 - a legislative prerogative. 7

A conclusion that a predecessor Court has erred, however,

does not end our analysis. “[O]nce we have chosen to reassess a

precedent and have come to the conclusion that it is clearly

erroneous, the proper question becomes whether there is a valid

reason why not to recede from that precedent.” State v. Poole, 297

So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020). “The critical consideration ordinarily

will be reliance.” Id. But here, no reliance interest compels

adherence to Cable because no one “ ‘altered his behavior in

expectation of the’ remedy holding from which we recede.” State v.

Manago, 375 So. 3d 190, 203 (Fla. 2023) (citing Poole, 297 So. 3d at

507).

7. The dissent’s position that we should adhere to Cable because it offers a judicial remedy conflicts with precedent and our constitutional role. See, e.g., Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130 (“remedies for violation of this statute fall within the purview of the Legislature”); see also art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. (“No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches . . . .”). Similarly, the dissent’s penalty/remedy distinction in this context is a red herring. We are not authorized to supply a remedy to a statute, even if chapter 933’s enforcement provision is characterized as a penalty, because that policy choice remains with the Legislature. See Dade County. v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla. 1984) (“The courts cannot amend or complete acts of the legislature intending to supply relief in instances where the legislature has not provided such relief.”).

- 16 - III

Having receded from our decision in Cable, we answer the

certified question in the negative, quash the decision of the First

District, and remand this case to the First District for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., dissenting.

The certified question before this Court asks whether the

exclusionary rule should be applied to remedy a violation of

Florida’s statutory knock-and-announce requirement. State v.

Times, 383 So. 3d 555, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). This Court

answered the question in the affirmative sixteen years ago in State

v. Cable, 51 So. 3d 434, 435-37 (Fla. 2010). Because there has

been no change in the law regarding Florida’s knock-and-announce

requirements since Cable was decided, I dissent from the majority’s

decisions to recede from Cable, to quash the First District’s decision

- 17 - in State v. Times, and to answer the certified question in the

negative.

Since this Court decided Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706,

(Fla. 1964), in 1964, “the district courts of appeal have applied the

exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce

statutes.” Cable, 51 So. 3d at 439 (citing Guerrie v. State, 691 So.

2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Kistner v. State, 379 So. 2d

128, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); and Moreno v. State, 277 So. 2d 81,

83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)). This Court in Cable approved of this

longstanding practice. Id. at 441-42 (holding the exclusionary rule

should apply to statutory knock-and-announce violations even

though the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Hudson

v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), made “clear that the exclusionary

rule does not apply to Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce

violations”). Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion

that this Court erred in Cable by “overread[ing] Benefield and

appl[ying] it in a case involving a search pursuant to a warrant

where the sole issue was one of remedy for a statutory violation.”

Majority op. at 15. Cable did not rely on Benefield. Instead, Cable

- 18 - merely declined to recede from Benefield in light of Hudson, because

Benefield, like this case, was decided on statutory, not

constitutional grounds. 51 So. 3d at 435.

Because this case concerns solely a violation of Florida’s

knock-and-announce statute, rather than a constitutional violation,

the majority’s discussion of the conformity clause is misplaced. See

majority op. at 5-6. While it is true that article I, section 12 of the

Florida Constitution is to be construed in conformity to the Fourth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, courts are under no such

conformity requirement when construing Florida statutes and

common law, which may provide additional protections. See Cable,

51 So. 3d at 443 (concluding that article I, section 12 is

inapplicable because “Hudson is not automatically dispositive of the

question of whether the exclusionary rule may be applied for

violations of Florida’s knock-and-announce statute because it

involved a Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce violation—not

one based on a state statute”).

I would approve this Court’s decision in Cable.

The certified question in Cable expressly acknowledged that

- 19 - the exclusionary rule is a “judicial remedy”—not a statutory one.

Id. at 435. This is in line with United States Supreme Court

precedent on the issue. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 248

(2011) (explaining that “the exclusionary rule is not a personal

constitutional right. It is a judicially created sanction, specifically

designed as a windfall remedy to deter future Fourth Amendment

violations.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Since

Benefield, the Florida judiciary has used the exclusionary rule as a

windfall remedy for violations of Florida’s knock-and-announce

statutes. But despite the Supreme Court’s definition of the

exclusionary rule as a “judicially created sanction,” id., and this

Court’s reaffirmance that “the judicial remedy of exclusion of

evidence [should] be applied for violations of Florida’s statutory

knock-and-announce provisions,” Cable, 51 So. 3d at 435, 437, the

majority now concludes that this Court erred in Cable by inferring

the remedy of exclusion for statutory knock-and-announce

violations when it was not explicitly authorized by the Legislature.

Majority op. at 8-14. I disagree.

Cable did not “supply” a remedy for knock-and-announce

violations, as the majority claims. Id. at 15. Rather, Cable merely

- 20 - approved of the “judicial remedy of exclusion of evidence” which

Florida courts had been applying to remedy statutory knock-and-

announce violations since Benefield. 51 So. 3d at 435, 437-39. In

reaching its decision, this Court in Cable discussed the important

interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement. These

include “the protection of human life and limb,” “the protection of

property,” and the protection of “those elements of privacy and

dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance.” Cable, 51 So.

3d at 440 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594); see Times, 383 So. 3d

at 559 (listing the policies underlying the knock-and-announce

requirements as: “(1) decreasing the risk of violence when executing

a warrant, (2) protecting the privacy of the occupants of the home,

and (3) preventing physical destruction of property” (citation

omitted)). In my view, each of these interests weigh in favor of this

Court’s conclusion in Cable—that Florida courts should apply the

exclusionary rule to remedy statutory knock-and-announce

violations. I dissent from the majority’s decision to recede from

Cable and remove the remedy of exclusion for statutory knock-and-

announce violations as it undermines the significant public

interests which Florida’s statutory knock-and-announce provisions

- 21 - are meant to protect.

III

I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the

Legislature provided a remedy for statutory knock-and-announce

violations in section 933.17. Under the majority’s view, section

933.17 is the Legislature’s “chosen remedy” and is therefore the

only remedy available for statutory knock-and-announce violations.

Majority op. at 15. However, a remedy is “[t]he means of enforcing a

right or preventing or redressing a wrong.” Remedy, Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). A “penalty,” on the other hand, is

“[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer, usu. in the form of

imprisonment or fine.” Penalty, Black’s Law Dictionary. Because

section 933.17 merely threatens to impose punishment on a

wrongdoing officer, without purporting to “enforce” any “right” or

“prevent” or “redress” any “wrong,” the statute is a penalty, not a

remedy. In addition to lacking any remedial effect whatsoever, the

title of section 933.17 labels it a “penalty.”

Exceeding authority in executing search warrant; penalty. Any officer who in executing a search warrant willfully exceeds his or her authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of

- 22 - the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

§ 933.17, Fla. Stat.

While section 933.17 purports to threaten officers with a

punishment of up to sixty days in jail and up to a $500 fine, this

does not cover all statutory knock-and-announce violations, as

Florida has two knock-and-announce statutes. Section 933.09

governs the execution of search warrants, while section 901.19

governs arrests. Because section 933.17 only applies when

“executing a search warrant,” violations of section 901.19 are

beyond its reach. Further, there are many ways officers could

violate section 933.09 without “willfully” exceeding their authority

or acting with “unnecessary severity.” Such statutory knock-and-

announce violations are also beyond the scope of section 933.17

and therefore could not be prosecuted—even if the State so desired.

It is also worth noting that the State does not claim to enforce

its statutory knock-and-announce provisions using section 933.17.

In fact, the State provides no examples of an officer ever being

prosecuted for their knock-and-announce violation under section

933.17. See Pet’r’s Initial Br.; see also Pet’r’s Reply Br. The fact

- 23 - that no officer has been charged for a statutory knock-and-

announce violation under section 933.17 since its enactment over

one hundred years ago illustrates that the exclusionary rule is the

only available deterrent for statutory knock-and-announce

violations. Indeed, the absolute absence of criminal prosecutions

against law enforcement officers for violating the knock-and-

announce statute since the enactment of section 933.17, of which

there must have been hundreds if not thousands, serves as a

significant indicator of the provision’s functional nullity.

Finally, in the highly unlikely event that an officer was

prosecuted for their statutory knock-and-announce violation under

section 933.17, any evidence the officer obtained through their

commission of the statutory violation could still be used in the

prosecution. Thus, applying section 933.17 in the knock-and-

announce context would merely be a “penalty” for the violating

officer, not a “remedy” for the Floridian whose home was entered in

violation of the knock-and-announce statute. While the statute

threatens the violating officer with criminal punishment, it does not

“redress” or “prevent” statutory knock-and-announce violations, so

it cannot be labeled a “remedy” for such violations. Penalty,

- 24 - Remedy, Black’s Law Dictionary. Taken together, these facts

illustrate that section 933.17 is a penal statute which the State

does not use to enforce its knock-and-announce statutes.

Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “section

933.17 prescribes remedies for violations of section 933.09.”

Majority op. at 10.

CONCLUSION

For decades, Florida courts have applied the exclusionary rule

as a judicial remedy for statutory knock-and-announce violations to

protect the privacy and dignity of any occupants of the home being

entered, to prevent violence, and to protect property. In Cable, this

Court expressly approved of this longstanding practice. By receding

from Cable, the majority fails to adequately protect these essential

public interests. I would approve Cable on the basis of stare

decisis, answer the certified question in the affirmative, and affirm

the First District’s decision in State v. Times.

Because the majority’s decision fails to do so, I dissent.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Great Public Importance

First District - Case No. 1D2022-0887

- 25 - (Leon County)

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Acting Solicitor General, and Adam B. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Petitioner

Kevin Alvarez of the Law Office of Kevin Alvarez P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,

for Respondent

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