Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed October 29, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0657 Lower Tribunal No. M21-23621 ________________
State of Florida, Appellant,
vs.
Eddie Poke, Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the County Court for Miami- Dade County, Betsy Alvarez-Zane, Judge.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Katryna Alexis Santa Cruz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J. The State appeals the trial court’s order granting defendant Eddie
Poke’s motion to suppress statements made and physical evidence
discovered during a traffic stop. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(c)(1)(B). Because the trial court improperly found the evidence barred
under Miranda,1 we reverse and remand.
I. Background
On June 6, 2021, Sergeant Jose Bonilla pulled over Poke’s vehicle
after determining that Poke’s license plate was expired. The sergeant
approached the window, informed Poke of the purpose of the stop, and
asked if there were any firearms inside the vehicle. Poke replied that his
license was suspended and that he had a rifle in a black duffel bag on the
back seat. The duffel bag was in plain sight on the back seat of the vehicle
on the driver’s side. The sergeant then asked Poke if he had a concealed
weapon permit, radioed a “Code 55” to dispatch, 2 and asked Poke to exit the
car.
After Poke exited, the sergeant frisked him and asked him to sit on the
front bumper of the police car while searching the vehicle. The sergeant also
asked Poke if the weapon was his, to which he responded affirmatively. The
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 “Code 55” references a weapons violation.
2 sergeant then opened Poke’s vehicle and opened the duffel bag, discovering
a loaded, unsecured AR-15 rifle. After informing Poke that the weapon was
not properly stored, the sergeant informed Poke that he was going to detain
him and placed him in handcuffs. While Poke was handcuffed, the sergeant
asked him additional questions about the weapon and if Poke had anything
else in the vehicle he should be concerned about. Poke indicated that there
was a “burned roach” of marijuana in the vehicle, and the sergeant
responded that he smelled it. The officer asked again if there were any other
firearms or anything else he should be concerned about, to which Poke
answered in the negative. After backup arrived, the sergeant searched the
vehicle and discovered an open, part-full bottle of Olde English malt liquor in
a bag on the passenger seat.
Poke was subsequently arrested and charged with driving with a
suspended license, carrying an unlicensed concealed firearm, and
possessing an open container of alcohol in the vehicle. He moved to
suppress both physical evidence found during the search of the vehicle (the
open container) and allegedly incriminating statements made during the
stop, claiming that they resulted from an improper custodial interrogation
without Miranda warnings. The trial court agreed, finding that Poke was in
custody for Miranda purposes from the time the sergeant reported the Code
3 55. The trial court reasoned that all statements and physical evidence
recovered after that point must be suppressed.
II. Analysis
The grant of suppression was error.3 “Miranda warnings apply only to
in-custody interrogations,” which refers to “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Ross v. State, 45
So. 3d 403, 414–15 (Fla. 2010) (quoting in part Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
But not every interaction with the police constitutes an arrest. See Ramirez
v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999) (“A person is in custody if a
reasonable person placed in the same position would believe that his or her
freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest.
The proper inquiry is not the unarticulated plan of the police, but rather how
a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have perceived the
3 “This Court’s review of the suppression order involves a mixed question of law and fact; the trial court’s factual findings are presumed correct if supported by competent, substantial evidence, while we review, de novo, the trial court’s ruling on the legality of the search.” State v. Harris, 273 So. 3d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). “[A] trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” Id. (quoting Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002)).
4 situation.” (citations omitted)); Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 198 (Fla.
2010) (“We emphasize that Miranda warnings are not required in any police
encounter in which the suspect is not placed under arrest or otherwise in
custody under Ramirez.”).
Here, a law enforcement officer pulled a driver over for an expired
license plate, asked questions about his license, and asked if he had any
weapons in the vehicle—all reasonable inquiries related in scope to the
purpose of the stop and officer safety during the stop. Questioning whether
there were any firearms in the vehicle didn’t convert the encounter into an
arrest for Miranda purposes. State v. Martissa, 18 So. 3d 49, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA
2009) (finding that defendant was not in custody when asked about illegal
substances in vehicle during temporary detention to investigate suspended
license). Once Poke responded to the inquiries and confirmed that his
license was suspended and that he had a concealed weapon in a duffel on
the driver’s side back seat, the sergeant instructed Poke to exit his vehicle
and wait on the bumper of the police cruiser. The sergeant then secured the
firearm. This was not equivalent to a custodial detention. This is so because
“the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry4 stop’ than to a
formal arrest. . . . [P]ersons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5 not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 439–40 (1984) (citations omitted).
The sergeant then examined the duffel bag and noted that the bag
wasn’t zipped closed and that the firearm wasn’t properly stored. When
pointing out to Poke that the firearm wasn’t properly stored, Poke walked
toward the sergeant. The sergeant told Poke to stay where he was and then
placed Poke in handcuffs.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed October 29, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0657 Lower Tribunal No. M21-23621 ________________
State of Florida, Appellant,
vs.
Eddie Poke, Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the County Court for Miami- Dade County, Betsy Alvarez-Zane, Judge.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Katryna Alexis Santa Cruz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J. The State appeals the trial court’s order granting defendant Eddie
Poke’s motion to suppress statements made and physical evidence
discovered during a traffic stop. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(c)(1)(B). Because the trial court improperly found the evidence barred
under Miranda,1 we reverse and remand.
I. Background
On June 6, 2021, Sergeant Jose Bonilla pulled over Poke’s vehicle
after determining that Poke’s license plate was expired. The sergeant
approached the window, informed Poke of the purpose of the stop, and
asked if there were any firearms inside the vehicle. Poke replied that his
license was suspended and that he had a rifle in a black duffel bag on the
back seat. The duffel bag was in plain sight on the back seat of the vehicle
on the driver’s side. The sergeant then asked Poke if he had a concealed
weapon permit, radioed a “Code 55” to dispatch, 2 and asked Poke to exit the
car.
After Poke exited, the sergeant frisked him and asked him to sit on the
front bumper of the police car while searching the vehicle. The sergeant also
asked Poke if the weapon was his, to which he responded affirmatively. The
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 “Code 55” references a weapons violation.
2 sergeant then opened Poke’s vehicle and opened the duffel bag, discovering
a loaded, unsecured AR-15 rifle. After informing Poke that the weapon was
not properly stored, the sergeant informed Poke that he was going to detain
him and placed him in handcuffs. While Poke was handcuffed, the sergeant
asked him additional questions about the weapon and if Poke had anything
else in the vehicle he should be concerned about. Poke indicated that there
was a “burned roach” of marijuana in the vehicle, and the sergeant
responded that he smelled it. The officer asked again if there were any other
firearms or anything else he should be concerned about, to which Poke
answered in the negative. After backup arrived, the sergeant searched the
vehicle and discovered an open, part-full bottle of Olde English malt liquor in
a bag on the passenger seat.
Poke was subsequently arrested and charged with driving with a
suspended license, carrying an unlicensed concealed firearm, and
possessing an open container of alcohol in the vehicle. He moved to
suppress both physical evidence found during the search of the vehicle (the
open container) and allegedly incriminating statements made during the
stop, claiming that they resulted from an improper custodial interrogation
without Miranda warnings. The trial court agreed, finding that Poke was in
custody for Miranda purposes from the time the sergeant reported the Code
3 55. The trial court reasoned that all statements and physical evidence
recovered after that point must be suppressed.
II. Analysis
The grant of suppression was error.3 “Miranda warnings apply only to
in-custody interrogations,” which refers to “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Ross v. State, 45
So. 3d 403, 414–15 (Fla. 2010) (quoting in part Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
But not every interaction with the police constitutes an arrest. See Ramirez
v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999) (“A person is in custody if a
reasonable person placed in the same position would believe that his or her
freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest.
The proper inquiry is not the unarticulated plan of the police, but rather how
a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have perceived the
3 “This Court’s review of the suppression order involves a mixed question of law and fact; the trial court’s factual findings are presumed correct if supported by competent, substantial evidence, while we review, de novo, the trial court’s ruling on the legality of the search.” State v. Harris, 273 So. 3d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). “[A] trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” Id. (quoting Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002)).
4 situation.” (citations omitted)); Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 198 (Fla.
2010) (“We emphasize that Miranda warnings are not required in any police
encounter in which the suspect is not placed under arrest or otherwise in
custody under Ramirez.”).
Here, a law enforcement officer pulled a driver over for an expired
license plate, asked questions about his license, and asked if he had any
weapons in the vehicle—all reasonable inquiries related in scope to the
purpose of the stop and officer safety during the stop. Questioning whether
there were any firearms in the vehicle didn’t convert the encounter into an
arrest for Miranda purposes. State v. Martissa, 18 So. 3d 49, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA
2009) (finding that defendant was not in custody when asked about illegal
substances in vehicle during temporary detention to investigate suspended
license). Once Poke responded to the inquiries and confirmed that his
license was suspended and that he had a concealed weapon in a duffel on
the driver’s side back seat, the sergeant instructed Poke to exit his vehicle
and wait on the bumper of the police cruiser. The sergeant then secured the
firearm. This was not equivalent to a custodial detention. This is so because
“the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry4 stop’ than to a
formal arrest. . . . [P]ersons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5 not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 439–40 (1984) (citations omitted).
The sergeant then examined the duffel bag and noted that the bag
wasn’t zipped closed and that the firearm wasn’t properly stored. When
pointing out to Poke that the firearm wasn’t properly stored, Poke walked
toward the sergeant. The sergeant told Poke to stay where he was and then
placed Poke in handcuffs.
Soon after handcuffing Poke, another officer arrived. The sergeant
then searched the remainder of the vehicle, discovering the open container.
The “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
provided a basis for the search of the vehicle. See Jones v. State, 279 So.
3d 342, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“There are three ways by which law
enforcement officers may validly conduct a warrantless search of a motor
vehicle. They are: (1) incident to a lawful arrest of a recent occupant of the
vehicle; (2) the ‘automobile exception,’ based on probable cause that the
vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime; and (3) pursuant
to an inventory search.”); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)
(“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may
conceal the object of the search.”).
6 Poke fails to identify a basis for suppression of the evidence. This is so
even if we agreed that the traffic stop morphed into an arrest at some point
after Poke revealed he had a concealed firearm in the vehicle. The search
of the vehicle would have been permitted anyway, as a search incident to a
lawful arrest, and the same items recovered. See Jones, 279 So. 3d at 347;
see also State v. Ojeda, 147 So. 3d 53, 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (explaining
that “under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence otherwise subject to
suppression can be admitted if the State shows that the officers ultimately
would have discovered the evidence independently of the improper police
conduct by means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would
have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure” (quotations
omitted)). We therefore reverse the order of suppression and remand for
further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.