Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC19-912 ____________
STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner,
vs.
BRIAN K. MCKENZIE, Respondent.
September 23, 2021
PER CURIAM.
The issue in this case is whether a circuit court has
jurisdiction to impose a sexual predator designation on an offender
who qualifies under section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2018), the
Florida Sexual Predators Act, when the sentencing court did not
impose the designation at sentencing and the offender’s sentence
has been completed. This case is before the Court for review of the
decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in McKenzie v. State,
272 So. 3d 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), which decided the issue by
holding that imposition of the designation was precluded. The Fifth District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the
decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Cuevas v. State, 31
So. 3d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, §
3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Because we reject the Fifth District’s conclusion
that the circuit court was deprived of jurisdiction to impose the
sexual predator designation in such circumstances, we quash
McKenzie and approve Cuevas.
BACKGROUND
In 2009, as part of a negotiated plea agreement with the State,
Brian K. McKenzie entered a no contest plea to one count of
engaging in sexual activity with a child while in a position of familial
or custodial authority, in violation of section 794.011(8)(b), Florida
Statutes (2002). In accordance with the written plea agreement,
McKenzie was sentenced to six months’ incarceration, followed by
two years of sex offender community control, followed by three
years of sex offender probation. Neither McKenzie nor the State
appealed the sentence.
McKenzie completed all portions of his sentence in 2015.
Based on the completion of McKenzie’s sentence, the Department of
-2- Corrections informed McKenzie that he was no longer under its
supervision.
In 2018, the State filed a notice with the trial court, stating
that McKenzie’s original offense, violation of section 794.011(8)(b),
was an enumerated offense under section 775.21—which obligated
the trial court to designate McKenzie as a sexual predator.
McKenzie filed a written objection, asserting that the court no
longer had jurisdiction in the matter because he had completed all
the terms of his criminal sentence. The trial court set a hearing on
the issue.
After the hearing, the trial court determined that section
775.21 placed an obligation on the court to designate McKenzie as a
sexual predator and that McKenzie must comply with the
registration requirements for those given such a designation. The
trial court relied on the Third District’s Cuevas opinion, the only
district court opinion that then had directly answered the issue
before the trial court: whether a trial court has jurisdiction to
impose a sexual predator designation under section 775.21 when
the offender’s sentence has already been completed. See Cuevas,
31 So. 3d at 291-92 (holding that “designation as a sexual predator
-3- [under section 775.21] may be ordered after a defendant has served
his sentence and been released” (emphasis added)). McKenzie
appealed the trial court’s decision.
Upon appeal, the Fifth District held that section 775.21 does
not grant jurisdiction to a trial court to impose a sexual predator
designation on an offender when the offender’s sentence has
already been completed. McKenzie, 272 So. 3d at 808-09, 811 (“We
conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
order . . . . [S]ection 775.21 . . . did not grant authority to the trial
court to belatedly designate McKenzie as a sexual predator.”). In
reaching its holding, the Fifth District noted that section
775.21(5)(a) “references three types of proceedings in which a trial
court is to designate an otherwise qualified offender to be a sexual
predator.” Id. at 810. The court made the following observations
regarding section 775.21(5)(a):
[S]ection 775.21(5)(a)1. sets forth the procedure to be followed when an offender is determined to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to a civil commitment proceeding under Chapter 394. [S]ection 775.21(5)(a)2. sets forth the procedure to be followed when an offender is before the court for sentencing. [S]ection 775.21(5)(a)3. sets forth the procedure to be followed when the offender was civilly committed or committed a similar criminal sexual offense in another jurisdiction,
-4- but has established or maintained a permanent, temporary, or transient residence in Florida.
Id. The court stated further, “McKenzie was an offender who should
have been, but was not, designated as a sexual predator at the time
of sentencing.” Id. (citing § 775.21(5)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2009)).
The Fifth District focused on section 775.21(5)(c), which states
in part:
If the Department of Corrections, the [D]epartment [of Law Enforcement], or any other law enforcement agency obtains information which indicates that an offender meets the sexual predator criteria but the court did not make a written finding that the offender is a sexual predator as required in paragraph (a), the Department of Corrections, the department, or the law enforcement agency shall notify the state attorney who prosecuted the offense for offenders described in subparagraph (a)1., or the state attorney of the county where the offender establishes or maintains a residence upon first entering the state for offenders described in subparagraph (a)3.
The court stated, “Notably, . . . section [775.21(5)(c)] references
subsections (5)(a)1. and (5)(a)3., but fails to reference subsection
(5)(a)2.—the subsection applicable to McKenzie.” McKenzie, 272 So.
3d at 810.
The Fifth District reasoned that the absence of a reference to
section 775.21(5)(a)2. in section 775.21(5)(c) means that section
775.21(5)(c) does “not provide a ‘recapture’ provision for offenders
-5- described in subsection (5)(a)2.” Id. at 811 (citing Cuevas, 31 So.
3d at 292 (Shepherd, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, the Fifth District
concluded, for offenders who fall under section 775.21(5)(a)2.,
section 775.21 does not grant jurisdiction to trial courts to
designate the offender as a sexual predator if the offender’s
sentence has already been completed. Id. The Fifth District
reversed, remanded, and certified conflict with the Third District’s
Cuevas opinion. Id.
The Certified Conflict Case: Cuevas
Defendant Cuevas “entered a plea of guilty to charges of lewd
and lascivious molestation on a child under 12 and lewd and
lascivious conduct on a child under 16, in violation of sections
800.04(5)(b) and 800.04(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2000),” which were
enumerated offenses under section 775.21. Cuevas, 31 So. 3d at
291. Cuevas was sentenced to 56 months of incarceration, but the
trial court failed to designate Cuevas as a sexual predator at the
time of sentencing. Id. Shortly before Cuevas was released from
incarceration, the State filed a motion with the trial court to
designate Cuevas as a sexual predator under section 775.21. Id.
Cuevas was released from incarceration prior to the trial court
-6- setting a hearing on the State’s motion. Id. After the hearing, the
trial court granted the State’s motion to designate Cuevas a sexual
predator under section 775.21. Id. Cuevas appealed.
Upon appeal, the Third District held that when an offender
was required to be designated a sexual predator under 775.21 at
the time of sentencing but the trial court failed to meet that
requirement, section 775.21(5)(a)2. does not bar the trial court’s
subsequent exercise of jurisdiction. Id. The court may still impose
the sexual predator designation after the completion of the
offender’s sentence. Id. In reaching its holding, the Third District
noted that section 775.21(4)(a) places an obligation on the trial
court to designate an offender as a sexual predator. Id. n.2 (noting
that section 775.21(4)(a) states that “an offender shall be
designated” as a sexual predator).
The court then turned its attention to section 775.21(5)(c). Id.
at 292. The Third District explicitly rejected the argument that the
mentioning of sections 775.21(5)(a)1. and 775.21(5)(a)3. in section
775.21(5)(c) thwarted the trial court’s jurisdiction. Id. The court
stated that “[a] careful reading of the special language applicable to
the two categories (section[s] 775.21(5)(a)1. and [775.21(5)(a)]3.)
-7- reveals that those are special notice and venue rules for those
special cases, not exclusive descriptions of the only circumstances
in which the State can perform its duty after the defendant is
sentenced.” Id. (footnote omitted). The court explained further:
In the case of [s]ection 775.21(5)(a)1., a sexually violent predator under [s]ection 775.21(4)(d), one of the three enumerated state offices must notify the state attorney who prosecuted the offense. In the case of [s]ection [775.21](5)(a)3., a sexual predator who was convicted of a qualifying offense in another jurisdiction before establishing or maintaining a residence in a Florida county, notice is to be given to the state attorney of that new county. In the case of a person like Cuevas, indisputably qualified to be designated a sexual predator but not designated at sentencing as the Legislature directed, no special notifications or interjurisdictional rules are required, and [s]ection 775.21(5)(c) then specifies (without limitation) that the “state attorney shall bring the matter to the court’s attention in order to establish that the offender meets the sexual predator criteria.”
Id. n.3 (quoting § 775.21(5)(c), Fla. Stat.).
ANALYSIS
To resolve the certified conflict, we are called upon to
determine whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to impose a
sexual predator designation on an offender who qualifies under
section 775.21, when the designation was not imposed at
sentencing and the offender’s sentence has been completed. This
-8- question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review.
See Bay Cnty. v. Town of Cedar Grove, 992 So. 2d 164, 167 (Fla.
2008).
As we have stated, “In interpreting . . . statute[s], we follow the
‘supremacy-of-text principle’—namely, the principle that ‘[t]he
words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they
convey, in their context, is what the text means.’ ” Ham v. Portfolio
Recovery Associates, LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (quoting
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). “[E]very word employed in [a legal text] is
to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless
the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
157-58 (1833), quoted in Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 69.
“Context always matters” because “sound interpretation requires
paying attention to the whole law, not homing in on isolated words
or even isolated sections.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 500-01
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Context is important as “a tool for
understanding the terms of the law, not an excuse for rewriting
them.” Id. at 501.
-9- In addressing section 775.21, we first focus our attention on
section 775.21(4), which sets forth who can be designated as a
sexual predator. Section 775.21(4)(a) lists enumerated offenses, as
well as “violation[s] of . . . similar law[s]” of other jurisdictions that
warrant the sexual predator designation. Additionally, section
775.21(4)(d) states that “[a]n offender who has been determined to
be a sexually violent predator pursuant to a civil commitment
proceeding under chapter 394” is a sexual predator. In both cases,
i.e., offenders who qualify as sexual predators from either their
criminal offense or civil commitment, the offender “shall be
designated as a ‘sexual predator.’ ” § 775.21(4)(a), (d), Fla. Stat.
(emphasis added). The use of the word “shall” makes clear that the
Legislature imposed a substantive duty on the court to give the
sexual predator designation for these offenders.
Section 775.21(5)(a) then places procedural requirements on
the court as a means of carrying out the substantive purpose of the
Legislature to impose the sexual predator designation on qualifying
offenders. First, section 775.21(5)(a)1. pertains to those offenders
who qualify as sexual predators as a result of civil commitment
under chapter 394. Next, section 775.21(5)(a)2. refers to offenders
- 10 - who are before the court for sentencing for the enumerated offenses
under section 775.21(4)(a). Stated in full, section 775.21(5)(a)2.
provides:
An offender who meets the sexual predator criteria described in paragraph (4)(a) who is before the court for sentencing for a current offense committed on or after October 1, 1993, is a sexual predator, and the sentencing court must make a written finding at the time of sentencing that the offender is a sexual predator, and the clerk of the court shall transmit a copy of the order containing the written finding to the department within 48 hours after the entry of the order . . . .
(Emphasis added.) Lastly, section 775.21(5)(a)3. pertains to
offenders who meet the sexual predator designation criteria based
on a civil commitment or criminal offense that occurred previously
in another jurisdiction and who now maintain permanent,
temporary, or transient residence in Florida. In each of the three
subsections of section 775.21(5)(a), for those offenders who qualify
as sexual predators, the court is obligated to impose the
designation and “make a written finding” of the offender’s sexual
predator status. § 775.21(5)(a)1.-3., Fla. Stat.
Section 775.21(5)(a)2. addresses offenders at sentencing but
does not directly address the category of offenders that are at issue
here: offenders who were statutorily mandated to be designated as
- 11 - sexual predators at sentencing but were not. But we cannot
reasonably read the procedural directions under section
775.21(5)(a)2. regarding the timing of the designation in a way that
defeats the Legislature’s substantive mandate to impose the sexual
predator designation.
Section 775.21(5)(a)2. is simply one procedural mechanism
designed to implement the Legislature’s substantive policy of
protecting the public from sexual predators. The Legislature made
clear:
The state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual predators and in protecting children from predatory sexual activity, and there is sufficient justification for requiring sexual predators to register and for requiring community and public notification of the presence of sexual predators.
. . . It is the purpose of the Legislature that, upon the court’s written finding that an offender is a sexual predator, in order to protect the public, it is necessary that the sexual predator be registered with the department and that members of the community and the public be notified of the sexual predator’s presence.
§ 775.21(3)(c)-(d), Fla. Stat. Prohibiting the sexual predator
designation because of the sentencing court’s failure to act timely
under section 775.21(5)(a)2. would directly thwart the Legislature’s
stated purpose under section 775.21(3). And nothing in the
- 12 - statutory scheme can be reasonably understood to preclude
imposing the statutorily mandated designation when the sentencing
court has failed to follow the direction contained in section
775.21(5)(a)2. The statutory scheme provides no basis for
concluding that a fumble by the sentencing court should immunize
a sexual predator from the legally required designation and
registration.
Contrary to the Fifth District’s analysis in McKenzie, we do not
read section 775.21(5)(c) as limiting a court’s jurisdiction for
offenders under section 775.21(5)(a)2. Section 775.21(5)(c) states:
If the Department of Corrections, the department, or any other law enforcement agency obtains information which indicates that an offender meets the sexual predator criteria but the court did not make a written finding that the offender is a sexual predator as required in paragraph (a), the Department of Corrections, the department, or the law enforcement agency shall notify the state attorney who prosecuted the offense for offenders described in subparagraph (a)1., or the state attorney of the county where the offender establishes or maintains a residence upon first entering the state for offenders described in subparagraph (a)3. The state attorney shall bring the matter to the court’s attention in order to establish that the offender meets the sexual predator criteria. If the state attorney fails to establish that an offender meets the sexual predator criteria and the court does not make a written finding that an offender is a sexual predator, the offender is not required to register with the department as a sexual predator. The
- 13 - Department of Corrections, the department, or any other law enforcement agency shall not administratively designate an offender as a sexual predator without a written finding from the court that the offender is a sexual predator.
(Emphasis added.)
We agree with the Third District in Cuevas: Section
775.21(5)(c) simply sets forth certain notice requirements for
offenders under sections 775.21(5)(a)1. and 775.21(5)(a)3. For
these offenders, section 775.21(5)(c) simply places an obligation on
the department or another law enforcement agency to “notify” the
appropriate state attorney, who in turn must “bring the matter to
the court’s attention.” Section 775.21(5)(c) goes on to state that the
offender is not obligated to register with the department unless the
State brings the matter to the court’s attention and the court then
makes a written finding that the offender qualifies as a sexual
predator. But nothing in section 775.21(5)(c) places a restriction on
the court’s jurisdiction over those offenders who were required to be
designated as sexual predators at sentencing but were not. The
text contains no such express restriction and the implication of
such a restriction is unreasonable given the whole statutory
context. This provision of the statute is designed to help ensure
- 14 - that sexual predators do not escape designation as such. It is not
designed to require that a judicial fumble will guarantee that a
sexual predator will forever escape designation and the attendant
consequences.
We thus reject the view that the absence of a mechanism in
subparagraph (c) specifically addressing the type of error presented
by this case—a failure to impose the required designation at
sentencing—implies that the error is beyond subsequent remedy.
An interpretation should not be imposed on the statutory text by
implication when that interpretation contradicts the manifest
purpose of the text as well as an unequivocal requirement stated in
the text.
Lastly, we address the relationship between section 775.21
and the criminal offenses that can give rise to the sexual predator
designation. The imposition of sexual predator status under section
775.21 is related to the underlying criminal offense—but is not
itself a sentence or punishment. “The designation of a person as a
sexual predator is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply
a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes.”
§ 775.21(3)(d), Fla. Stat.; see also Kelly v. State, 795 So. 2d 135,
- 15 - 138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“[T]he sexual predator designation is part
of a substantive statutory enactment designed and intended to
accomplish . . . policy objectives, [and] the courts have recognized
that the designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment.”).
Thus, arguments which contend that a court surrenders
jurisdiction over an offender because the offender’s sentence has
been completed are flawed. The Legislature merely used the
underlying criminal offense as a basis of classification for sexual
predators, separate and distinct from a sentence or punishment.
Section 775.21 is plainly applicable to offenders for which this
state never had jurisdiction over the original criminal offense. See
§ 775.21(4)(a), (5)(a)3., Fla. Stat. So it cannot be the case that the
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sexual predator designation
is tethered to the original court’s jurisdiction regarding imposition
of the underlying criminal sentence. Completion of the underlying
criminal sentence does not abrogate jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that a circuit court has jurisdiction to impose a
sexual predator designation on an offender who qualifies under
section 775.21, when the sentencing court did not impose the
- 16 - designation at sentencing and the offender’s sentence has been
completed. We therefore quash McKenzie and approve Cuevas.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. COURIEL, J., concurs with an opinion. POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
COURIEL, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion and the reasoning of the
Third District in Cuevas v. State, 31 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010),
that section 775.21(5)(c) does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction
to designate a person as a sexual predator at any time after
conviction of an offense listed in section 775.21(4)(a). That is
because, for one thing, “[s]ection 775.21(5)(c) simply sets forth
certain notice requirements for offenders . . . [and] places an
obligation on the department or another law enforcement agency to
‘notify’ the appropriate state attorney, who in turn must ‘bring the
matter to the court’s attention.’ ” Majority op. at 14; see also
Cuevas, 31 So. 3d at 291-92. I do not see in the plain words of this
- 17 - provision, or in the part it plays in the structure of the Florida
Sexual Predators Act as a whole, a decision by the Legislature to
thwart the purpose of the statute expressly stated in section
775.21(3)(d). In that way, today’s decision applies the long-settled
rule that “[a] textually permissible interpretation that furthers
rather than obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.”
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 63 (2012).
What is more, the statute does not take from the trial court
jurisdiction it would have otherwise had to entertain an effort by the
State to seek Brian K. McKenzie’s designation as a sexual predator.
That designation is, the statute says, “neither a sentence nor a
punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of
certain crimes.” § 775.21(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018). It is not, for
example, the imposition of a term of a sentence upon a defendant,
see Advisory Opinion to the Governor re Implementation of
Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070,
1081-82 (Fla. 2020), so much as it is the trial court’s command that
certain actions be taken by public officers to comply with the
- 18 - expressly stated purpose of the Florida Sexual Predators Act. 1
These actions are ministerial duties, neither requiring nor
permitting the exercise of discretion by the trial court, the
Department of Law Enforcement, or the Department of Corrections.
For this reason, the State might have sought a writ of
mandamus from the circuit court requiring the Department of
Corrections to designate McKenzie as a sexual predator. Art. V,
§ 5(b), Fla. Const.; see also Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 (Fla.
2009) (To be entitled to mandamus relief, “the petitioner must have
a clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have
an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action, and the
petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available.” (quoting
Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000))); Philip J.
Padovano, Florida Civil Practice § 30:1 (2021 ed.) (“Mandamus is a
1. It stands to reason, therefore, that the statute affords McKenzie no right to contest the designation once the factual predicate for it has been established: it is not a sanction directed at him. We have recently found the absence of such a requirement to be meaningful where, as here, the statute commands as mandatory a certain action by the court in the performance of its duties at sentencing. Cf. State v. J.A.R., 318 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 2021) (trial court was not required to provide defendant notice and hearing prior to imposing a statutorily required, mandatory fee of $100 at sentencing).
- 19 - common law remedy to enforce an established legal right by
compelling a public officer or agency to perform a ministerial duty
required by law.”).
POLSTON, J., dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s decision holding that a circuit
court has jurisdiction to belatedly impose a sexual predator
designation on an offender who qualifies under section 775.21,
Florida Statutes (2018), the Florida Sexual Predators Act, when the
sentencing court failed to impose the designation at sentencing, and
the offender’s sentence has been complete for over three years.
I agree with the reasoning set forth in Judge Shepherd’s
dissenting opinion in the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in
Cuevas v. State, 31 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), and would
conclude that a plain reading of section 775.21(5)(c) does not grant
a circuit court authority to designate a sexual predator once the
sentence has been completed. Accordingly, I would approve the
Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in McKenzie v. State, 272
So. 3d 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), and disapprove the Third District’s
decision in Cuevas.
- 20 - I. BACKGROUND
The Fifth District in McKenzie set forth the following facts:
Brian K. McKenzie appeals an order designating him as a sexual predator under section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2018). The order was entered after McKenzie had completed his sentence. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order and, accordingly, reverse. In doing so, we certify conflict with Cuevas v. State, 31 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). On October 28, 2009, McKenzie entered a nolo contendere plea to one count of engaging in sexual activity with a child while in a position of familial or custodial authority, in violation of section 794.011(8)(b), Florida Statutes (2009). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, McKenzie was sentenced to six months’ incarceration, followed by two years of sex offender community control, followed by three years of sex offender probation. The trial court further found that McKenzie qualified as a sex offender. Neither party appealed the judgment and sentence. McKenzie served his jail time and successfully completed his community control and probation. The sentence was completed in April 2015, and McKenzie was notified by the Department of Corrections that he was no longer under supervision. Three years later, the State filed a notice with the trial court, requesting that McKenzie be designated a sexual predator. After a hearing, and over McKenzie’s objection, the trial court entered an order designating McKenzie a sexual predator and ordering him to comply with the registration requirements set forth in section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2018). At the time the trial court entered its order, Cuevas was the only Florida appellate court opinion directly addressing the issue of whether a sexual predator designation order may be entered after a defendant has completed his sentence.
- 21 - The trial court appropriately relied on Cuevas in entering its order.
272 So. 3d at 808-09 (footnote omitted).
On appeal, the Fifth District explained that pursuant to the
text of section 775.21 and other caselaw interpreting the statute,
designating a sexual predator is a mandatory duty intended to take
place at sentencing but that a trial court still has jurisdiction to
designate a sexual predator while the sentence is being served. Id.
at 809. The Fifth District then discussed the established rule that a
trial court in a criminal proceeding loses subject matter jurisdiction
over an offender once the probationary sentence is finished. Id. at
810.
Turning to the facts of this case, the Fifth District concluded
that McKenzie was an offender who should have been, but was not,
designated at the time of sentencing under subparagraph (5)(a)2.
but that subsection (5)(c) only expressly mentions subparagraphs
(5)(a)1. and (5)(a)3. Id. at 810-11. Concluding that Judge
Shepherd’s dissent in Cuevas correctly interpreted the statute
based on its plain language, the Fifth District held that section
775.21(5)(c) did not grant the circuit court jurisdiction to belatedly
- 22 - designate McKenzie as a sexual predator and reversed. McKenzie,
272 So. 3d at 811. The Fifth District also certified conflict with
Cuevas, and this appeal followed. McKenzie, 272 So. 3d at 811.
II. ANALYSIS
The majority holds that section 775.21 confers jurisdiction on
a trial court to designate a sexual predator after he is sentenced
and completes his probation. I disagree because the plain language
of section 775.21 does not expressly grant a trial court this
authority.
A court’s determination of the meaning of a statute begins
with the language of the statute. See Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451,
453 (Fla. 2018) (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla.
1984)). If that language is clear, the statute is given its plain
meaning, and the court does “not look behind the statute’s plain
language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory
construction.” City of Parker v. State, 992 So. 2d 171, 176 (Fla.
2008) (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64
(Fla. 2005)).
The Florida Sexual Predator Act provides for the registration
and public notification of sexual predators. See § 775.21, Fla. Stat.
- 23 - (2018). Originally enacted in 1993 and amended in 1996, the Act
now sets forth a detailed process for designating sexual predators,
which requires a written finding and designation by a trial court.
See Therrien v. State, 914 So. 2d 942, 946 (Fla. 2005); see also ch.
96-388, § 61, Laws of Fla. The Act describes legislative findings
and purposes in subsection (3), the criteria for qualifying as a
sexual predator in subsection (4), and the process for designating
qualifying offenders in subsection (5). See § 775.21(3)-(5). A sexual
predator designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment. See
§ 775.21(3)(d) (“The designation of a person as a sexual predator is
neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting
from the conviction of certain crimes.”). “Under the 1996
amendment, and continuing up to the present, the duty to register
[as a sexual predator] is triggered solely by the trial court’s finding
that the offender is a sexual predator.” Therrien, 914 So. 2d at 946.
And, under subsection (4)(c), an offender is not designated as a
sexual predator unless there has been a written finding by a court
that the offender meets the sexual predator criteria. § 775.21(4)(c).
An offender may qualify as a sexual predator in three ways.
First, and foremost for this case, an offender may qualify by being
- 24 - convicted of an enumerated current offense. § 775.21(4)(a).
Second, an offender may qualify by committing a comparable
offense in another jurisdiction. § 775.21(4)(a)1.a.-b. Third, “[a]n
offender who has been determined to be a sexually violent predator
pursuant to a civil commitment proceeding” automatically qualifies
as a sexual predator under the Act. § 775.21(4)(d).
Most pertinent to the question before this Court, section
775.21(5) details the process by which a qualifying offender may be
designated as a sexual predator:
(5) Sexual predator designation.--An offender is designated as a sexual predator as follows:
(a) 1. An offender who meets the sexual predator criteria described in paragraph (4)(d) is a sexual predator, and the court shall make a written finding at the time such offender is determined to be a sexually violent predator under chapter 394 that such person meets the criteria for designation as a sexual predator for purposes of this section. The clerk shall transmit a copy of the order containing the written finding to the department within 48 hours after the entry of the order;
2. An offender who meets the sexual predator criteria described in paragraph (4)(a) who is before the court for sentencing for a current offense committed on or after October 1, 1993, is a sexual predator, and the sentencing court must make a written finding at the time of sentencing that the offender is a sexual predator, and the clerk of the court shall transmit a copy of the order
- 25 - containing the written finding to the department within 48 hours after the entry of the order; or
3. If the Department of Corrections, the department, or any other law enforcement agency obtains information which indicates that an offender who establishes or maintains a permanent, temporary, or transient residence in this state meets the sexual predator criteria described in paragraph (4)(a) or paragraph (4)(d) because the offender was civilly committed or committed a similar violation in another jurisdiction on or after October 1, 1993, the Department of Corrections, the department, or the law enforcement agency shall notify the state attorney of the county where the offender establishes or maintains a permanent, temporary, or transient residence of the offender’s presence in the community. The state attorney shall file a petition with the criminal division of the circuit court for the purpose of holding a hearing to determine if the offender’s criminal record or record of civil commitment from another jurisdiction meets the sexual predator criteria. If the court finds that the offender meets the sexual predator criteria because the offender has violated a similar law or similar laws in another jurisdiction, the court shall make a written finding that the offender is a sexual predator.
When the court makes a written finding that an offender is a sexual predator, the court shall inform the sexual predator of the registration and community and public notification requirements described in this section. Within 48 hours after the court designating an offender as a sexual predator, the clerk of the circuit court shall transmit a copy of the court’s written sexual predator finding to the department. If the offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment or supervision, a copy of the court’s written sexual predator finding must be submitted to the Department of Corrections. ....
- 26 - (c) If the Department of Corrections, the department, or any other law enforcement agency obtains information which indicates that an offender meets the sexual predator criteria but the court did not make a written finding that the offender is a sexual predator as required in paragraph (a), the Department of Corrections, the department, or the law enforcement agency shall notify the state attorney who prosecuted the offense for offenders described in subparagraph (a)1., or the state attorney of the county where the offender establishes or maintains a residence upon first entering the state for offenders described in subparagraph (a)3. The state attorney shall bring the matter to the court’s attention in order to establish that the offender meets the sexual predator criteria. If the state attorney fails to establish that an offender meets the sexual predator criteria and the court does not make a written finding that an offender is a sexual predator, the offender is not required to register with the department as a sexual predator. The Department of Corrections, the department, or any other law enforcement agency shall not administratively designate an offender as a sexual predator without a written finding from the court that the offender is a sexual predator.
§ 775.21(5).
Subsection (5)(a) provides separate processes for offenders
who have been civilly committed, convicted of a current offense, or
convicted in another jurisdiction. See § 775.21(5)(a)1.-3.
Subparagraph (5)(a)2. is the operative subsection for an offender,
- 27 - like McKenzie, who could have been designated as a sexual
predator by the trial court at sentencing. 2
The plain language of subparagraph (5)(a)2. only grants a trial
court the authority to designate a sexual predator at the time of
sentencing. § 775.21(5)(a)2. (providing that an offender who has
been convicted of a qualifying offense in subsection (4)(a) “who is
before the court for sentencing for a current offense committed on
or after October 1, 1993, is a sexual predator” and must be
designated as such). Further, it mandates that the trial court
imposing the designation “must make a written finding at the time
of sentencing that the offender is a sexual predator.” Id. These
provisions expressly limit a trial court’s authority to designate a
sexual predator to the time when the offender is before the court for
sentencing, and thus a trial court does not have jurisdiction to
designate a sexual predator after he has completed his sentence
under this subparagraph.
2. Subparagraph (5)(a)1. applies to offenders who have been civilly committed and (5)(a)3. applies to offenders convicted in an outside jurisdiction, so neither applies in a case where an offender was convicted of a qualifying offense in a Florida court.
- 28 - Section 775.21(5)(c) is a “recapture” provision that provides for
designation of a qualifying offender in the event a court did not
make a written finding as required in subsection (a). Specifically,
subsection (5)(c) provides that if a law enforcement agency obtains
information that an offender meets the criteria as a sexual predator
but was not designated at sentencing, the agency shall inform a
state attorney who must then bring the matter before a trial court
for a written determination. § 775.21(5)(c). By its plain language,
this provision applies to those offenders upon whom the trial court
was required to, but did not, impose the sexual predator
designation at sentencing. But the provision specifies that an
agency is required to notify the state attorney who prosecuted the
offense for offenders described in subparagraph (a)1. and
subparagraph (a)3., neither of which is applicable to this case.
Subsection (5)(c) fails to reference subsection (5)(a)2.—the
subsection applicable to McKenzie. See Cuevas, 31 So. 3d at 294
(Shepherd, J., dissenting) (“However, [section 775.21(5)(c)] . . . is
inapplicable on its face because subparagraph (a)1 pertains only to
offenders who have been civilly committed under the Jimmy Ryce
Act, § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2000), and subparagraph (a)3 pertains to
- 29 - persons who have committed a similar violation in another
jurisdiction. By its terms, this subsection does not include
offenders described in section 775.21(a)2, the category in which
Cuevas falls.”). Accordingly, the plain language of section 775.21(5)
does not expressly grant a trial court this authority.
The majority attempts to circumvent the plain language of
section 775.21(5)(c) by reading something into section 775.21 that
is not there. The majority focuses on the Legislature’s use of the
language “shall” in section 775.21(4), see majority op. at 10, but
ignores the remaining language included in that directive that it
“shall” be designated under subsection (5), which still subjects the
designation to the processes and restrictions set forth in subsection
(5). Under subsection (5)(a)2., the designation occurs by a written
finding at the time of sentencing. The majority concludes that this
subsection does not apply to the category of offenders at issue in
this case, and “[t]he statutory scheme provides no basis for
concluding that a fumble by the sentencing court should immunize
registration.” See majority op. at 12-13. However, the Legislature
expressly contemplated a “fumble” by the sentencing court and the
- 30 - parties when it included a recapture provision in subsection 5(c),
which, by its plain language, does not apply to this case. As urged
by the State, the majority concludes that subsection 5(c) simply
sets forth certain notice requirements. See majority op. at 14.
However, this Court has previously explained that subsection (5) is
a “second chance” provision “applicable to persons who could have
been but were not declared sexual predators at sentencing.” See
Therrien, 914 So. 2d at 947. And the plain language of subsection
(5)(c) and its express limitations simply do not allow the State to
impose McKenzie’s sexual predator designation three years after his
sentence was completed.
III. CONCLUSION
I would approve the Fifth District’s decision in McKenzie,
disapprove the Third District’s decision in Cuevas, and conclude
that a plain reading of section 775.21 does not grant a circuit court
authority to designate sexual predators once they have completed
their sentence.
I respectfully dissent.
LABARGA and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
- 31 - Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fifth District - Case No. 5D18-2206
(Orange County)
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, and Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Wesley Heidt, Bureau Chief, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Terrence E. Kehoe of Law Office of Terrence E. Kehoe, Orlando, Florida,
for Respondent
- 32 -