State of Delaware v. Anthony Stanley
This text of State of Delaware v. Anthony Stanley (State of Delaware v. Anthony Stanley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) ID# 1101020723 & 1106019686 ) ANTHONY STANLEY, ) ) Defendant. )
ORDER
AND NOW TO WIT, this 25th day of February, 2016, upon consideration
of the Defendant’s Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief, and the record in this
case, IT APPEARS THAT:
1. On September 22, 2011, Anthony Stanley (“Stanley”) pled guilty to
Reckless Endangering First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), and Possession of a Firearm by a Person
Prohibited (“PFBPP”). 1 These charges arose from a shooting at First State Lanes
Bowling Alley in New Castle, Delaware (“Bowling Alley Shooting Case”). As
part of the plea agreement, Stanley agreed to testify truthfully at his two co-
defendants’ trials, and the State agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on the other
charges in the indictment. 2 At one of his co-defendant’s trial, Stanley did not
testify consistently with his prior statements.3 The State played recordings of
1 Case ID No. 1101020723. 2 Stanley v. State, 2015 WL 3545413, at *1 (Del. 2015). 3 Id. prison calls made by Stanley, in which he expressed a desire to undermine the
State’s case against the co-defendants.4
2. On January 31, 2012, prior to sentencing in the Bowling Alley Shooting
Case, Stanley pled guilty in connection with a separate and unrelated shooting
(“Claymont Street Shooting Case”), to Assault in the First Degree, PFDCF, and
PFBPP. 5 On June 8, 2012, Stanley was sentenced on both cases to a total of fifty-
six years of Level V incarceration, suspended after forty-nine years for decreasing
levels of supervision.6
3. Stanley filed a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court and on
February 12, 2013, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court.7
4. In 2013, Stanley filed his first pro se motion for postconviction relief
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”), and counsel was appointed
(“Rule 61 Counsel”) to represent Stanley. 8 Rule 61 Counsel filed an amended
motion for postconviction relief on June 17, 2014, arguing that Stanley’s trial
counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate and present mitigating
evidence at sentencing. 9
4 Id. 5 Case ID No. 1106019686. State, 2013 WL 543897 (Del. 2013). 6 D.I. 36 (Case ID. No. 1101020723); D.I. 23 (Case. ID. No. 1106019686). 7 Stanley v. State, 2013 WL 543897 (Del. 2013). 8 D.I. 46, 48 (Case ID. No. 1101020723); D.I. 33, 40, 38 (Case ID. No. 1106019686). 9 D.I. 59 (Case ID. No. 1101020723); D.I. 40 (Case ID. No. 1106019686). 2 5. The Court denied Stanley’s motion for postconviction relief.10 Stanley
appealed, arguing that: (1) the Superior Court failed to determine that Stanley
knowingly waived his trial rights in his Claymont Street Shooting guilty plea; and
(2) trial counsel provided inadequate advice concerning a presentence investigation
in the Bowling Alley Shooting Case. On June 4, 2015, the Supreme Court denied
Stanley’s appeal, holding that the appeal was wholly without merit and devoid of
any arguably appealable issue.11
6. On November 23, 2015, Stanley filed the instant pro se motion for
postconviction relief (his second), asserting two grounds for relief: (1) ineffective
assistance of counsel; and (2) coerced guilty plea. 12 Before addressing the merits
of Stanley’s second Rule 61 Motion, the Court must consider the procedural
requirements of Rule 61.13 Rule 61(i)(1) provides that a motion for postconviction
relief must be filed within one year of a final judgment of conviction.14 Under
Rule 61(i)(2), successive motions are barred unless the motion satisfies the
pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii).15 Rule 61(i)(3) bars
consideration of any claim not asserted in the proceedings leading up to the
judgment of conviction unless the movant can show “cause for relief from the
10 D.I. 64, 65 (Case ID. No. 1101020723); D.I. 55, 56 (Case ID. No. 1106019686). 11 Stanley v. State, 2015 WL 3545413 (Del. 2015). 12 D.I. 69 (Case ID. No. 1101020723); D.I. 61 (Case ID. No. 1106019686). 13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61; Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 3 procedural default” and “prejudice from violation of the movant’s rights.” 16 Rule
61(i)(4) provides that “[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated,
whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a
postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter
barred.”17
7. If a procedural bar exists, the Court will not consider the merits of the
postconviction claim unless the defendant can show that, pursuant to Rule
61(d)(2), the procedural bars are inapplicable. Pursuant to Rule 61(d)(2):
A second or subsequent motion under this rule shall be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion either: (i) pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or (ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.
8. Stanley’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally
barred by Rule 61(i)(2) as a successive motion, and Stanley fails to demonstrate
that this claim is exempt from the procedural bar. Stanley alleges that his trial
counsel was ineffective for filing an appeal on his behalf without informing
Stanley that “he had a right to raise any arguments or issues that [he] wished on
direct appeal.” This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is wholly conclusory
16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 4 and speculative.18 Stanley fails to plead with particularity that new evidence
creates a strong inference that he is innocent or a new rule of constitutional law
applies retroactively to invalidate his sentence.
9. Stanley’s claim that his guilty plea was coerced is procedurally barred by
Rule 61(i)(2) as a successive motion, and Rule 61(i)(4) as formerly adjudicated,
and Stanley fails to demonstrate that this claim is exempt from those procedural
bars. The Delaware Supreme Court has already held that Stanley’s challenge to his
guilty plea is procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because Stanley could have
challenged whether he knowingly entered a guilty plea in a motion to withdraw
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) or on direct appeal, but he did not.19
The Supreme Court also held that Stanley failed to demonstrate the claim was
exempt from Rule 61(i)(3)’s procedural bars, and specifically held that:
The record reflects that Stanley signed a Truth-In-Sentencing guilty plea form in which he marked “yes” to the question regarding whether he understood that by pleading guilty he would not have a trial and that he waived his right to a trial by jury. The transcript of the plea colloquy reflects that Stanley’s counsel informed the Superior Court that Stanley understood he waived the constitutional rights enumerated in the Truth-in-Sentencing guilty plea form and that his plea waived his right to trial.
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