State of Alabama v. Abraham Hatch

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: CR-2025-0655
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: February 6, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________

CR-2025-0655 _________________________

State of Alabama

v.

Abraham Hatch

Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CC-22-4218)

ANDERSON, Judge.

The State of Alabama brings this pretrial appeal pursuant to Rule

15.7, Ala. R. Crim. P., challenging the Mobile Circuit Court's order

refusing to admit the out-of-court statements of a child witness as

substantive evidence under §§ 15-25-31 and 15-25-32, Ala. Code 1975. CR-2025-0655

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's order and

remand the case for further proceedings.

Because the State is appealing from a pretrial order, we pretermit

any unnecessary discussion of the facts underlying the prosecution of the

defendant, Abraham Hatch. See Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532, 534 (Ala.

2003) ("Because the trial in this case has not yet taken place, it would be

imprudent for this Court to further comment on the evidence at this

time."). Nonetheless, a brief recitation of the procedural history and facts

underlying the State's pretrial appeal is warranted.

Hatch was indicted for the murder of a minor child, Ty.E. The State

contends that Ty.E.'s brother, T.E., was a witness to Hatch's abusive

behavior toward Ty.E. and was also a victim of similar abuse. Before

trial, the State filed a series of motions relating to T.E., including a

motion requesting that the trial court allow T.E. to testify via closed-

circuit television and a motion to admit T.E.'s out-of-court statements

regarding the abuse allegedly committed by Hatch. Those motions were

denied in a brief order. (C. 292.) Subsequently, Hatch filed a response to

the State's motion to admit the out-of-court statements, and additional

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arguments were presented to the trial court at a pretrial hearing in

August 2025.

On August 15, 2025, the trial court entered a second order denying

the State's motion to admit the out-of-court statements, finding in

pertinent part:

"[T]hese statements do not meet the requirements of Section 15-25-32[, Ala. Code] (1975). The interviews are clearly hearsay. The brother of the victim, now age 10[,] who gave the statements will be available to testify at the trial.

"These two interviews are in the nature of a police investigation, and intended to be used for criminal prosecution of the Defendant. These statements are testimonial and investigative in nature.

"The Court is not reasonably satisfied that the statements in question possess the necessary particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under Section 15-25-32(2)(b) ….

"This includes the following factors:

"1. The child's age and maturity.

"2. The timing of the child's statements and the circumstances under which the statements were taken.

"3. The statements are partly suggestive due to improperly leading questions.

"The State will be allowed to use the statements at trial to question the witness. The Court simply cannot allow the statements to be admitted into evidence and go back to the jury."

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(C. 306-07.) After the State certified that the trial court's order, if not

reversed on appeal, would be "fatal to the prosecution of the charge"

against Hatch, see Rule 15.7(a), this appeal followed.

Under Alabama's Child and Protected Person Physical and Sexual

Abuse, and Violent Offense Victim Protection Act ("the Protection Act"),

§ 15-25-30 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, special provisions apply to out-of-court

statements of children who witness certain crimes. Specifically, an out-

of-court statement made by "a child under 12 years of age at the time the

statement is made" is admissible "if the requirements of Section 15-25-

32[, Ala. Code 1975,] are met." § 15-25-31. This is true even if those

statements would otherwise be considered hearsay. State v. Baker, 90 So.

3d 785, 789 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012). In turn, § 15-25-32 provides two

alternate and mutually exclusive requirements for the admission of such

statements. First, a child's out-of-court statements are admissible if

"[t]he witness testifies at the proceeding, testifies by means of video deposition as provided by Section 15-25-2, or testifies by means of closed circuit television as is provided in Section 15- 25-3, [Ala. Code 1975], and at the time of the testimony is subject to cross-examination about the out-of-court statements."

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§ 15-25-32(1). If the child witness does not testify, then an out-of-court

statement can be admitted only if

"[t]he court finds that the witness's out-of-court statement is shown to the reasonable satisfaction of the court to possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant or someone acting on behalf of the defendant has intentionally removed the witness from the jurisdiction of the court or that the defendant engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the witness."

§ 15-25-32(2). In either case, the proponent of such a statement is

required to "inform the adverse party of the opponent's intention to offer

the statement and the content of the statement sufficiently in advance of

the proceeding to provide the defendant with a fair opportunity to

prepare a response to the statement before the proceeding at which it is

offered." § 15-25-35, Ala. Code 1975.

In this case, the record indicates that the State notified Hatch of its

intent to offer T.E.'s out-of-court statements at trial, and defense counsel

indicated that he had reviewed those statements. Further, the State

clearly indicated during the motions hearing that T.E. would testify at

Hatch's trial. (R. 21, 43.) Indeed, the State -- by separate motion -- sought

to have T.E. testify "by closed circuit equipment," as provided for by § 15-

25-3, Ala. Code 1975.

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In cases in which a child witness will testify, § 15-25-32 does not

provide for or require any "reliability" finding by the trial court for the

child witness's out-of-court statement to be admissible. Instead, the

process is simple and straightforward: If the child will testify and be

subject to cross-examination, the out-of-court statement is admissible as

substantive evidence. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court made this clear

in M.L.H. v. State, 99 So. 3d 911 (Ala. 2011), explaining:

"If a witness's prior inconsistent statement does not fall within the category of statements exempted from the definition of hearsay by Rule 801(d)(1)(A)[, Ala. R. Evid.]-- in other words, if the witness's prior inconsistent statement is, in fact, hearsay -- then the admissibility of the statement is governed by Rule 802, Ala. R. Evid., Alabama's 'Hearsay Rule.' Rule 802 provides: 'Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama or by statute.' (Emphasis added.) By definition, if a hearsay statement is admissible under an exception to Rule 802, it is admissible as substantive evidence -- i.e., 'to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Rule 801(c); see, e.g., Biles v. State, 715 So. 2d 878, 887 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting and relying upon Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 803(4), Ala. R. Evid., which state that, under the hearsay exception expressed in Rule 803(4), 'all statements serving reasonably as the basis of diagnosis or treatment' are 'admitted as substantive proof of the matter asserted'), and Gwarjanski v. State, 700 So. 2d 357, 359 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that a logbook that was 'admissible into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule ... could be considered as substantive evidence'). Section 15-25-31, [Ala. Code 1975,] the section of the [Protection] Act the Court of Criminal Appeals determined conflicts with Rule

6 CR-2025-0655

801(d)(1)(A), creates a statutory exception to the hearsay rule. T.P. v. State, 911 So. 2d 1117, 1123 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); see also Charles W. Gamble, Gamble's Alabama Rules of Evidence § 802, Author's Statement of the Rule n.3 (2d ed. 2002). Therefore, if a hearsay statement, even a prior inconsistent out-of-court statement, falls within the parameters of § 15-25-31 and satisfies the other requirements of the Act, it is admissible as substantive evidence."

99 So. 3d at 914.

Consequently, the circuit court erred in at least two ways. First, it

erred by applying § 15-25-32 as though that statute provided a two-part

test rather than providing two separate methods for admitting a child's

out-of-court statements. In ruling on the State's motion, the trial court's

inquiry should have ended with the State's assurance that T.E. would

testify. See § 15-25-32(1). Instead, by ruling that it would not admit T.E.'s

out-of-court statements into evidence because it was "not reasonably

satisfied that the statements in question possess the necessary

particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under Section 15-25-32(2)"

(C. 306), the trial court went beyond the inquiry permitted by § 15-25-32.

The "trustworthiness" of T.E.'s out-of-court statements would have been

relevant only if T.E. would not be testifying. See § 15-25-32(2).

Second, the trial court erred by ruling that T.E.'s out-of-court

statements could be "use[d] … at trial" without being "admitted into

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evidence." (C. 307.) In effect, the trial court's order treated T.E.'s out-of-

court statements as if the State proposed using them to refresh his

recollection or as being analogous to prior inconsistent statements. See,

e.g., Trawick v. State, 86 So. 3d 1105, 1110 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). But

under the plain language of the Protection Act, a child's out-of-court

statements are admissible as substantive evidence. Accordingly, the trial

court exceeded its discretion when it ruled that T.E.'s out-of-court

statements would not be treated as substantive evidence if T.E. testifies

and is subject to cross-examination at trial.

Although evidentiary rulings are matters generally left to the

sound discretion of the trial court, see, e.g., Stevenson v. State, 794 So.

2d 453, 456 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), when a trial court improperly applies

the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the trial

court's judgment. See Ex parte Jackson, 886 So. 2d 155, 159 (Ala. 2004)

(citing Ex parte Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Mobile, 636

So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1994)). On the record before us, there is no question that

T.E. was below the age of 12 years old when he made the out-of-court

statements and that the State intends to make him available for cross-

examination at trial. Based on those facts and representations, T.E.'s out-

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of-court statements are admissible as substantive evidence under §§ 15-

25-31 and 15-25-32. See M.L.H., 99 So. 3d at 914 ("Therefore, if a hearsay

statement, even a prior inconsistent out-of-court statement, falls within

the parameters of § 15-25-31 and satisfies the other requirements of the

[Protection] Act, it is admissible as substantive evidence."). Because the

trial court's ruling was based on an erroneous understanding of § 15-25-

32, we must reverse the trial court's order.

Although Hatch argues that the admission of T.E.'s out-of-court

statements as substantive evidence would violate the Confrontation

Clause, this Court has long recognized that the Confrontation Clause is

not violated by the admission of a child's out-of-court statement pursuant

to § 15-25-31 so long as the child testifies and is subject to cross-

examination. As we have explained:

"Section 15-25-32(1), Ala. Code 1975, provides that an out-of- court statement may be admitted as provided in § 15-25-31 if the child testifies at the proceeding and is subject to cross- examination about the out-of-court statements.

"E.M. testified at trial. Therefore, Crawford[ v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),] which addressed '[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial,' 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S. Ct. 1354, was not implicated, and King's right to confront and cross-examine his accuser was fully satisfied. Because the provisions of the …Protection Act relevant to this case did not violate the holding of Crawford or

9 CR-2025-0655

the principles of the Confrontation Clause, King's argument is moot, and we need not address the constitutionality of the statute as a whole."

King v. State, 929 So. 2d 1032, 1036-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). Similarly,

here, the admission of T.E.'s out-of-court statements pursuant to § 15-25-

32(1) will not violate either the Confrontation Clause or the United

States Supreme Court's holding in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36

(2004), under the facts presented to the trial court, so long as T.E.

testifies consistent with the State's representations.

We note that Hatch argues for the first time in his appellate brief

that T.E.'s out-of-court statements were properly excluded because "the

State [failed] to present any witness to testify regarding evidence to meet

the 'act' and 'material' element [sic] of § 15-25-31." (Hatch's brief at 13.)

However, Hatch -- who possessed copies of T.E.'s out-of-court statements

-- made no such arguments below. (C. 289-90.) Furthermore, the trial

court -- which reviewed those statements -- did not rely on this alleged

inadequacy in its order excluding them as substantive evidence. Because

neither the State nor Hatch sought to have those statements included in

the record on appeal, they are not available for our review. For these

reasons, we cannot and do not reach Hatch's claim that T.E.'s out-of-court

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statements would have been properly excluded because they do not

address any "material element" of the crime with which Hatch has been

charged.

For the reasons expressed above, we reverse the trial court's order

excluding T.E.'s out-of-court statements, and we remand this case to the

trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur. Windom, P.J., recuses herself.