State Highway Commission v. Smith

175 N.E. 146, 93 Ind. App. 83, 1931 Ind. App. LEXIS 99
Indiana Court of Appeals·Decided March 4, 1931·No. No. 14,195.·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Lockyear, C. J.

This is an appeal from the award of the Industrial Board awarding the appellee compensation on account of the death of her husband, Perry Smith, who was employed by the State Highway Commission.

The deceased was engaged in the work of resurfacing *84 that part of state highway No. 39 between Lebanon and Frankfort when, it is alleged, the, decedent, together with 14 other workmen, were furnished drinking water which was furnished by a water boy in the employ of the Highway Commission from a tile ditch. Said Perry Smith drank the water which contained bacillus coli; as a result, he became sick with gastroenteritis, which developed into cardiac arthritis, which resulted in his death.

Appellee contends that the ultimate facts of this case as shown by the evidence are as follows:

The decedent, Perry Smith, along with 13 or 14 other fellow workmen, was in the employ of appellant for a period of several weeks up until July 20, 1929; the son of the foreman was working as water boy, and had been furnishing to Smith and the other workmen drinking water taken from the mouth of a tile ditch which was connected directly to a septic tank which received the sewage from a farmer’s house; the tile ditch also carried the surface run-off water which went into it from the territory which it served. It was proved that an examination by the State Board of Health disclosed that water from tile ditches in Indianá, on account of the populated condition of the state, contains intestinal bacteria and is generally unsafe for drinking purposes. The evidence discloses that Smith became sick on July 20, and, on the same date, the following fellow workmen also became sick: John Ross, Atla Goldsberry, Guy Goldsberry and Kenneth Kelley. They all described practically the same symptoms of vomiting and running off at the bowels. Their drinking water came from a common source, but their food came from different sources, and they lived in different localities. The diagnosis of the attending physician was that Smith was' suffering from gastroenteritis, which developed into pericarditis and caused his death, that the gastro *85 enteritis was a germ infection of the intestinal canal, and that the germ causing the infection had to enter through the medium of either food or drink. It is disclosed by the State Health Board’s examination of the ditch water that the water contained bacilli *coli, which are usually accompanied by other pathogenic organisms; that the water was unsafe for drinking purposes. Aside from the analysis of the water, the fact that several men became sick on the same day and after drinking the water, together with the facts that the ditch carried the effluent from the septic tank and the surface runoff of the neighborhood, would be sufficient to prove that the water was polluted with dangerous intestinal organisms, and that Smith’s sickness was a direct result of drinking the water, which appellee contends was sufficient evidence to support the board’s finding.

It is the contention of appellants: (1) That the record does not show that death of appellee’s husband, Perry Smith, was a death by accident within the meaning of our Workmen’s Compensation Act; (2) the burden was upon the appellee to show that the death of her husband for which she was awarded compensation was a death by accident arising out of and in the course- of his employment; (3) there is no competent evidence in the record to show that the water furnished appellant’s employees for drinking purposes contained any bacillus coli, that the only evidence offered on this subject was the analysis of a sample of water obtained by a witness who knew nothing about where the drinking water had been obtained, which sample was taken, not from the tile ditch, but from a hole at the end of the tile, and taken more than 20 days after the decedent last worked for the appellant. This evidence was objected to and it was error to admit it; (4) before appellee is entitled to compensation under our Workmen’s Compensation Act, she must show that the death of her husband was a *86 “death by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with appellant”; (5) it is also clear that a compensable injury under our law does not include “disease in any form” except as it shall result from the injury. #

Appellant contends that no sufficient facts are shown by the evidence in this cause to sustain any legitimate inference that the death of appellee’s decedent was the result of drinking water furnished by appellant to its employees; that there is no competent evidence shown by the record in this cause that the decedent drank any water furnished by appellant; that there is no competent evidence in the record to show that the water furnished by appellant to its employees on July 18 and 19, 1929, contained any pathogenic organisms of a disease producing type, or of any other type;'that there is no evidence in the record to show that the water furnished appellant’s employees on July 20,1929, was other than the purest of water; that the admission in evidence, over appellant’s objection, of the analysis of a purported sample of water taken from a “hole” at the end of two tile ditches, was error, but, in no event, does such analysis establish that the water furnished by appellant to its employees contained any pathogenic organisms capable of producing disease, and, therefore, contends the evidence was for this reason insufficient.

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State Highway Commission v. Smith, 175 N.E. 146, 93 Ind. App. 83, 1931 Ind. App. LEXIS 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1931).

175 N.E. 146 (State Highway Commission v. Smith) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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