State Highway Commission v. Peters

Wyoming Supreme Court

State Highway Commission v. Peters

416 P.2d 390, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 152

CourtWyoming Supreme Court

DecidedJuly 8, 1966

Docket3477

StatusPublished

Cited by39 cases

This text of 416 P.2d 390 (State Highway Commission v. Peters) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wyoming Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State Highway Commission v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390, 1966 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

Mr. Justice McINTYRE delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an eminent domain case involving condemnation by tire State Highway Commission of Wyoming of 1.05 acres of land belonging to Elmer L. Peters and Nadine S. Peters. From a jury award of $500 as the value of the land taken and $15,000 in damages to the remainder of owners’ property, the Highway Commission has appealed.

A new divided four-lane highway was constructed in front of the Peters property and place of business. The pre-existing highway, U.S. 30, was utilized as a service road for abutting owners. The right of way for this road was increased by approximately 100 feet, causing property of Mr. and Mrs. Peters to be taken. A fence was erected between the new traffic lanes and the service road to prevent traffic from moving from one road to the other.

Excessiveness of Verdict

The principal ground relied on by the state for setting aside the verdict of the jury is that the verdict is so excessive as to denote passion, bias and prejudice. Implicit in' the statement of this ground of appeal is recognition on the part of the Attorney General’s office that we will not ordinarily set a verdict aside merely because we may consider it excessive. Before a duly returned verdict of a jury will be set aside as excessive, it must appear it is “so” excessive as to denote passion, prejudice, bias, or some erroneous basis. Fitzsimonds v. Cogswell, Wyo., 405 P.2d 785, 787; Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Like, Wyo., 381 P.2d 70, 76.

Attorneys representing the state argue: “The jury would have had to disregard the trial court’s instructions numbered 8, 9 and 10 to reach such a shocking figure.” After setting forth these instructions in their brief, the attorneys conclude: “Appellant contends the jury completely disregarded the cited instructions.”

Of course, it is entirely possible that some of the court’s instructions were misunderstood or ignored by the jury. However, we have no way of knowing what *392 went on in the minds of the individual jurymen, and for us to say they disregarded certain instructions of the court would, under the circumstances of this case, be pure speculation and guesswork.

We shall try to demonstrate why we say what we do. In instruction numbered 9 the court instructed that the Highway Commission has a right to deprive an abutting owner of his right of immediate access to and from the highway which adjoins his property and substitute therefor another means, of access to the highway. Then the court said: “However, you are instructed that if it does so you may consider in making your award whether the substituted access is convenient.”

Just how will a jury determine what is “convenient” with respect to access ? It seems obvious to us the jury will consider the matter of convenience on a relative basis. For example, a new access may be convenient for an owner who previously had no access or a very circuitous access; while it could be thought of as inconvenient for one who previously had direct and unlimited access and now has á more circuitous access.

In State Highway Commission v. Newton, Wyo., 395 P.2d 606, 611-612, where the owner, a rancher, was required to go some 400 feet farther to gain access to the new highway, we said the only evidence presented in that case showed a substantial improvement in access and that there was an absence of sufficient evidence to support a verdict for damages on account of impairment of access. However, we pointed out that ordinarily the cases relating to an abutting landowner’s right of direct access pertain to a factual situation

The circumstances in the case now before us are different, and we.cannot say there is an absence of evidence • relative to impairment of access; neither can we say the new or substituted access is convenient and reasonable as a matter of law.

The Peters property is a business property depending upon trade from the public. Prior to changes in the highway, U.S. 30 was not an access controlled highway, and appellees’ business was readily accessible to the traveling public, from both directions. Now there is access to the new highway only by traveling some 4,000 feet or approximately three-forths of a mile to the west, where access is obtained on a circuitous interchange access. There is no way for traffic to go directly toward the east from appellees’ property, as it previously could.

The Attorney General’s office has included in its brief a plat showing the nature of defendants’ access before the change and another plat showing what the access situation is after such change. We *395 think these plats are sufficient to demonstrate that the jury could very well consider the substituted access inconvenient to and from the Peters place of business, in comparison with the access which existed before.

*393 not to scale before Segure 1

*394

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI