State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Scott

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Scott

49 A.D.3d 465, 854 N.Y.2d 132

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 27, 2008

StatusPublished

This text of 49 A.D.3d 465 (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Scott, 49 A.D.3d 465, 854 N.Y.2d 132 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008).

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Opinion

There is no merit to respondents’ argument that the timeliness of the proceeding under CPLR 7503 (c) should be measured from service of their attorney’s April 16, 2007 letter notifying petitioner of their intention to arbitrate their “uninsured motorist claims.” That letter gave no indication whether such claims were being brought under the lack-of-coverage or hit-and-run provision of the uninsured motorist claim section of [466]*466the subject policy. Rather, timeliness should be measured from service of respondents’ May 30, 2007 demand to arbitrate. That was the first notice given by respondents that their claims were being brought under the hit-and-run provision, and thus when petitioner first learned that it had a ground for seeking a stay of arbitration, namely, respondent passenger’s statement to petitioner shortly after the accident that there was no physical contact with the offending vehicle (see Matter of Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v Hobson, 67 NY2d 19 [1986]; cf. Matter of Allcity Ins. Co. [Jimenez], 78 NY2d 1054, 1056 [1991]). No hearing was required since the lack of physical contact was undisputed. We have considered respondents’ other contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Gonzalez, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ.

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There is no merit to respondents’ argument that the timeliness of the proceeding under CPLR 7503 (c) should be measured from service of their attorney’s April 16, 2007 letter notifying petitioner of their intention to arbitrate their “uninsured motorist claims.” That letter gave no indication whether such claims were being brought under the lack-of-coverage or hit-and-run provision of the uninsured motorist claim section of [466]*466the subject policy. Rather, timeliness should be measured from service of respondents’ May 30, 2007 demand to arbitrate. That was the first notice given by respondents that their claims were being brought under the hit-and-run provision, and thus when petitioner first learned that it had a ground for seeking a stay of arbitration, namely, respondent passenger’s statement to petitioner shortly after the accident that there was no physical contact with the offending vehicle (see Matter of Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v Hobson, 67 NY2d 19 [1986]; cf. Matter of Allcity Ins. Co. [Jimenez], 78 NY2d 1054, 1056 [1991]). No hearing was required since the lack of physical contact was undisputed. We have considered respondents’ other contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Gonzalez, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

49 A.D.3d 465, 854 N.Y.2d 132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-farm-mutual-automobile-insurance-v-scott-nyappdiv-2008.

Opinion

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