State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Davis

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: August 22, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01673
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 STATE FARM MUTUAL CASE NO. C23-1673JLR AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 11 COMPANY, ORDER 12 Plaintiff, v. 13

SAMUEL DAVIS, et al., 14 15 Defendants.

16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Before the court is Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s 18 (“State Farm”) motion for summary judgment. (Mot. (Dkt. # 38); Reply (Dkt. # 40).) 19 None of Defendants Samuel Davis, Anacortes Yacht Charters, Inc. (“Anacortes Yacht”), 20 Julia Simmonds, or William Simmonds filed a responsive brief. (See generally Dkt.) 21 The court has reviewed State Farm’s motion, the relevant portions of the record, and the 22 applicable law. Being fully advised, the court GRANTS State Farm’s motion. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 On September 5, 2022, Mr. Davis struck a pedestrian, Ms. Julia Simmonds, while

3 driving a 2013 Chevrolet Silverado owned by his employer, Anacortes Yacht. (7/12/24 4 Kirkpatrick Decl. (Dkt. # 39) ¶ 6.) The accident occurred during Mr. Davis’s shift, and 5 “[t]he parties agree that at the time of the accident, Mr. Davis was driving the truck in his 6 employment capacity.” (Id.) 7 Mr. Davis’s parents are insured under State Farm automobile liability policy 8 number 479 3538-D19-47 (the “Policy”). (See id. ¶ 5, Ex. 5 (“Policy”).) After Ms.

9 Simmonds and her husband sued Anacortes Yacht and Samuel Davis in Skagit County 10 Superior Court, “State Farm denied that its insurance policy covered Samuel Davis for 11 th[e] accident.” (Id. ¶ 6.) State Farm filed this action for declaratory relief on November 12 2, 2023 (see Compl. (Dkt. # 1)), and it now “moves for a declaratory judgment that its 13 automobile insurance policy does not cover Samuel Davis for the September 5, 2022

14 accident where he struck pedestrian Julia Simmonds while driving a Chevy Silverado 15 owned by his employer Anacortes Yacht” (Mot. at 1-2). 16 III. ANALYSIS 17 Below, the court sets forth the relevant legal standard before turning to the merits. 18 A. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

19 A party may obtain a declaratory judgment through a motion for summary 20 judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (authorizing district 21 courts to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 22 declaration”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kolb, 884 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1989) 1 (affirming grant of summary to State Farm in declaratory judgment action). Federal Rule 2 of Civil Procedure 56, which governs summary judgment motions, “requires a district

3 court to enter judgment on a claim or defense if there is ‘no genuine dispute as to any 4 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Dupree v. 5 Younger, 598 U.S. 729, 731 (2023) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “Trial courts 6 resolving unopposed summary judgment motions have an obligation to evaluate 7 independently the sufficiency of the moving papers.” Lopez-Gomez v. Sessions, 693 F. 8 App’x 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, “[e]ven when a motion for summary judgment is

9 unopposed, . . . the moving party retains its burden to demonstrate the absence of any 10 issue of material fact.” Id. 11 B. Declaratory Judgment 12 State Farm argues that the Policy “excludes vehicles owned by a Resident 13 Relative’s employer.” (Mot. at 2.) The court agrees.

14 “In Washington, insurance policies are construed as contracts.” Weyerhaeuser Co. 15 v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 15 P.3d 115, 122 (Wash. 2000) (quoting Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. 16 B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 256 (Wash. 1998)). The policy “is 17 construed as a whole” and given a “fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would 18 be given to the contract by the average person purchasing insurance.” Am. Nat. Fire Ins.,

19 951 P.2d at 256 (quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna (CIGNA) Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 20 881 P.2d 201, 206-07 (Wash. 1994)). Where the “policy language is clear and 21 unambiguous, [the court] must enforce it as written” and “may not modify it or create 22 ambiguity where none exists.” Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 733, 737 1 (Wash. 2005). Unambiguous provisions in insurance contracts are enforceable unless 2 they are “contrary to public policy [or] statute.” State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson,

3 687 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Wash. 1984). 4 Here, the undisputed facts show that, at the time of the accident, Mr. Davis was 5 not driving a vehicle that qualified for coverage. Anacortes Yacht’s Chevrolet Silverado 6 does not meet any of the Policy’s five definitions of potentially covered vehicles. 7 The first definition covers “your car”: 8 Your Car means the vehicle shown under YOUR CAR on the Declarations Page. Your Car does not include a vehicle that you no longer own or lease. 9 (Policy at 11.) This definition is inapplicable because the car listed on the declarations 10 page is a 2008 Mercury Mountaineer, not a Chevrolet Silverado. (See id. at 2.) 11 The second definition covers a “newly acquired car”: 12 Newly Acquired Car means a car newly owned by you. 13 (Id. at 10.) This definition is inapplicable because the Chevrolet Silverado was owned by 14 Anacortes Yacht, not Mr. Davis’s parents (the Policy holders). (See 7/12/24 Kirkpatrick 15 Decl. ¶ 6.) 16 The third definition covers “trailers”: 17 Trailer means . . . only those trailers . . . designed to be pulled by a private 18 passenger car . . . [or] a farm implement or farm wagon while being pulled on public roads by a car. 19 (Policy at 11.) This definition is inapplicable because a Chevrolet Silverado is a truck, 20 not a trailer. (See 7/12/24 Kirkpatrick Decl. ¶ 6.) 21 The fourth definition covers “non-owned” cars: 22 1 Non-Owned Car means a car that is in the lawful possession of you or any resident relative and that neither: 2 1. is owned by: a. you; 3 b. any resident relative; c. any other person who resides primarily in your household; 4 or d. an employer of any person described in a., b., or c. above; 5 (Policy at 10.) This definition is inapplicable because, even assuming Mr. Davis was a 6 resident relative, he was driving a car owned by his employer. (See 7/12/24 Kirkpatrick 7 Decl. ¶ 6.) 8 The fifth definition covers “temporary substitute” cars: 9 Temporary Substitute Car means a car that is in the lawful possession of the 10 person operating it and that: 1. replaces your car for a short time while your car is out of use due 11 to its: a. breakdown; 12 b. repair; c. servicing; 13 d. damage; or e. theft; and 14 2. neither you nor the person operating it own or have registered.

15 (Policy at 11.) This definition is inapplicable because Mr. Davis was driving the 16 Chevrolet Silverado as part of his job, not as a replacement for the 2008 Mercury 17 Mountaineer while it was out of use. (See 7/12/24 Kirkpatrick Decl. ¶ 6.) 18 The Policy unambiguously does not cover Mr. Davis for the accident involving 19 Anacortes Yacht’s Chevrolet Silverado. The court concludes that the relevant language 20 is enforceable because it is reasonable, not contrary to public policy, and because the 21 court is unaware of any statute prohibiting such language in insurance contracts. Thus, 22 the court grants State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS State Farm’s motion for summary

3 judgment (Dkt. # 38). The court DECLARES that the Policy does not cover Mr. Davis 4 for the September 5, 2022 accident involving pedestrian Julia Simmonds. 5 Dated this 22nd day of August, 2024. A 6 JAMES L. ROBART 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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