State Farm Lloyds v. Mireles

63 S.W.3d 491, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5318, 2001 WL 883008
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 8, 2001
Docket04-00-00023-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 63 S.W.3d 491 (State Farm Lloyds v. Mireles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Farm Lloyds v. Mireles, 63 S.W.3d 491, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5318, 2001 WL 883008 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

Opinion by

KAREN ANGELINI, Justice

State Farm Lloyds appeals a jury verdict in favor of Peter and Carmen Mireles. In its sole issue, State Farm asserts there is no evidence of causation to support the judgment. We agree and reverse the trial court’s judgment, rendering judgment in State Farm’s favor.

Factual & ProCedural History

Peter and Carmen Mireles filed suit against State Farm Lloyds for breach of contract and other extra-contractual claims after State Farm denied the Mireleses’ foundation damage claim. To invoke coverage under the Mireleses’ insurance policy, the Mireleses were required to prove the foundation damage was caused by *493 plumbing leaks. State Farm moved to exclude the testimony of Per Schneider, the Mireleses’ causation witness, for failure to satisfy Rule of Evidence 702’s reliability and relevance requirements. After holding a “Daubert” hearing, the trial court denied State Farm’s motion. At trial, Schneider testified that the Mireleses’ foundation damage was caused by plumbing leaks, and the jury found in the Mi-releses’ favor, awarding them $103,392.50 in damages for breach of contract. Although the jury found the Mireleses were not entitled to damages under the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, it nevertheless awarded the Mireleses an additional $150,000 for State Farm’s knowing violations of the Insurance Code and the DTPA.

State Farm filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The trial court entered judgment in the Mireleses favor, but reduced the recovery amount to $81,887.14 for damages caused by the leak. The trial court also disregarded the jury’s findings of knowing violations of the Insurance Code and DTPA.

State Farm appeals the judgment in one issue. Specifically, it claims that the trial court erred in entering judgment in the Mireleses’ favor because there was no reliable or relevant evidence of causation to support the jury’s verdict. The Mireleses cross appeal, claiming that the trial court erred in reducing the jury’s award and in refusing to submit their requested damages questions relating to violations of the Texas Insurance Code and DTPA.

Discussion

In State Farm’s sole issue, it claims the trial court erred in entering judgment in the Mireleses’ favor because the testimony of the Mireleses’ expert, Per Schneider, amounted to no evidence of causation. Specifically, it claims Schneider’s testimony is neither rehable nor relevant.

A. Standard of Review

In determining whether there is evidence of probative force to support a jury’s finding, this court reviews ah of the record evidence in a light favorable to the jury’s finding, indulging every reasonable inference in the prevailing party’s favor. Mer-rell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 197 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1998, pet. denied). We will sustain a no evidence point when “(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact.” Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711.

B. Rules and Principles Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony

The question of the admissibility of expert testimony goes hand in hand with this court’s analysis under a legal sufficiency challenge. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 713 (describing how the supreme court in Daubert “explained that when “wholesale exclusion’ [of expert testimony] is inappropriate and the evidence is admitted, a review of its sufficiency is not foreclosed”). The factors announced in E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1995) thus guide our review of a no evidence challenge. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 713; see also Tex.R. Evid. 702; Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558. Robinson teaches that, in addition to demonstrating that an expert witness is qualified to testify under Texas Rule of Evidence 702, the proponent of the evidence must *494 demonstrate the expert’s testimony is relevant to the issues and based on a reliable foundation. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556.

To be relevant, the expert’s testimony must bear a relationship to the issue in the case such that the testimony will aid the jury. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.1998). To be reliable, the scientific evidence must be grounded in scientific method and procedure such that it amounts to more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Id.

In Robinson, the Texas Supreme Court enumerated a list of factors to determine the reliability of expert testimony. Specifically, those factors to consider are: whether the theory has or can be tested; whether the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the tester; whether the theory has been subjected to peer review or publication; the technique’s potential rate of error; whether the technique or underlying theory has been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community; and non-judicial uses of the technique. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556.

In Gammill, however, the court made it clear that the Robinson factors do not always apply to expert testimony because they do not always fit. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726. The criteria for determining reliability and relevance will vary, depending on the nature of the evidence. Id. In discharging its duty as gatekeeper, the trial court must determine how the reliability of particular testimony is to be assessed. Id. at 726. In some instances, the expert’s skill and experience may support a finding that his testimony is reliable and relevant. Id. at 726. Regardless of whether the Robinson factors are applied, however, the proponent of the expert testimony must still prove the testimony is reliable and relevant. Id. at 727.

In Gammill, the supreme court declined to apply the Robinson factors to the kind of expert testimony that was being offered — mechanical engineering. Id. Nonetheless, as the court stated in Gammill, a trial court is not required to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the “ipse dixit” or say so of the expert. Id.

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63 S.W.3d 491, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5318, 2001 WL 883008, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-farm-lloyds-v-mireles-texapp-2001.