State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Stuart Smith

Ninth Circuit

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Stuart Smith

577 F. App'x 671

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 30, 2014

Docket12-35676

StatusUnpublished

This text of 577 F. App'x 671 (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Stuart Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Stuart Smith, 577 F. App'x 671 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Stuart Housel Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment against him in plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s diversity action seeking a declaratory judgment in connection with an insurance dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because under the plain language of the homeowners policy, the punching incident was not a covered “occurrence,” and Smith’s injuries were “expected or intended” by Bischof. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 128 Ohio St.3d 186, 942 N.E.2d 1090, 1097-98 (2010) (in the insurance context, doctrine of inferred intent applies where an “intentional act and the harm are intrinsically tied so that the act necessarily resulted in the harm”); Erie Ins. Co. v. Stalder, 114 Ohio App.3d 1, 682 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1996) (no covered “occurrence” where insured had acted in self-defense and intentionally punched a third party in the face); see also Randolf v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 57 Ohio St.2d 25, 385 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1979) (“[T]he word ‘occurrence,’ defined as ‘an accident,’ was intended to mean just that [-] an unexpected, unforeseeable event.”).

We reject as unsupported Smith’s contention that the district court mistakenly applied Ohio law and an objective intent standard.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Stuart Housel Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment against him in plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s diversity action seeking a declaratory judgment in connection with an insurance dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because under the plain language of the homeowners policy, the punching incident was not a covered “occurrence,” and Smith’s injuries were “expected or intended” by Bischof. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 128 Ohio St.3d 186, 942 N.E.2d 1090, 1097-98 (2010) (in the insurance context, doctrine of inferred intent applies where an “intentional act and the harm are intrinsically tied so that the act necessarily resulted in the harm”); Erie Ins. Co. v. Stalder, 114 Ohio App.3d 1, 682 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1996) (no covered “occurrence” where insured had acted in self-defense and intentionally punched a third party in the face); see also Randolf v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 57 Ohio St.2d 25, 385 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1979) (“[T]he word ‘occurrence,’ defined as ‘an accident,’ was intended to mean just that [-] an unexpected, unforeseeable event.”).

We reject as unsupported Smith’s contention that the district court mistakenly applied Ohio law and an objective intent standard.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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577 F. App'x 671, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-farm-fire-casualty-co-v-stuart-smith-ca9-2014.

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