STATE Ex SPARKS Et v. WEBER Et

192 N.E. 386, 48 Ohio App. 60, 13 Ohio Law. Abs. 506, 1 Ohio Op. 14, 1933 Ohio App. LEXIS 548
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 12, 1933
DocketNo 2752
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 192 N.E. 386 (STATE Ex SPARKS Et v. WEBER Et) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
STATE Ex SPARKS Et v. WEBER Et, 192 N.E. 386, 48 Ohio App. 60, 13 Ohio Law. Abs. 506, 1 Ohio Op. 14, 1933 Ohio App. LEXIS 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933).

Opinions

*507 WILLIAMS, J.

The cause is submitted on the pleadings and the question presented is whether or not an Act to establish a police court in the Village of Ottawa Hills, Lucas County, Ohio, passed April 10, 1931, approved May 1, 1931 and filed in the office of the Secretary of State May 5, 1931, confers upon the police court of Ottawa Hills the jurisdiction in civil actions formerly exercised by the justice of the peace in Ottawa Hills Township. The Act establishes the police court in the Village of Ottawa Hills, the territorial limits of which are co-extensive with those of Ottawa Hills Township, and bestows upon it appropriate jurisdiction in criminal matters. With the extent of that jurisdiction, we are not concerned. The only provisions of the act that bear upon the question whether such jurisdiction in civil actions was conferred upon the police court is found in the following sections'.

“Sec 14694-6, GC.
Section 7. The judge shall have the right to perform marriage ceremonies, take acknowledgments of deeds and other instruments, administer oaths, and perform any other duty now given or that may be conferred upon justices of the peace. All fees, including marriage fees, earned by a police judge by virtue of this section, when not connected with any cause or proceeding in the police court, shall be collected by and belong to the judge so earning said fees.”
“See 14694-9 GC.
Section 10. The police court shall be the successor of the justice court of Ottawa Hills Township, Lucas County.”
“Sec 14694-10 GC.
Section 11. Upon the qualification of the police judge, the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in Ottawa Hills Township in all criminal and civil matters shall cease and the office of justice of the jjeace and constable shall be, and the same is hereby abolished.”

Counsel for relators contends that “in construing grants of power to inferior courts of limited jurisdiction, or courts not proceeding according to the course of common law, nothing is to be held as granted by implication which is not necessary to the full exercise of the powers expressly granted, and such courts are confined strictly within the limits of the powers granted.” There is no reason for quarreling with this rule for in construing the sections of the General Code quoted above, this court shall not go beyond the powers expressly granted by the Act. There is another rule which is of vital concern in determining the meaning of the provisions under scrutiny. It is found in the fourth syllabus of Cochrel v Robinson, 113 Oh St, 526:

“In the construction of a statute the primary duty of the court is tp give effect to the intention of the Legislaure enacting it. Such intention is to be sought in the language employed and the apparent purpose to be subserved, and such a construction adopted which permits the statute and its various parts to be construed as a whole and give effect to the paramount object to be attained.”

In fine, the Act takes away the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in Ottawa Hills township, both civil and criminal, 'and abolishes the offices- of justice of the peace and constable within that township, and establishes a police court and makes that police court the successor of the justice court and requires that the judge of the police court shall “perform any other duty” now given or that may be hereafter conferred upon justices of the peace in addition to performing marriage ceremonies, taking acknowledgments of instruments and administering oaths. It is evident that the paramount object sought to be obtained by the legislature as shown by the intention expressed in the language employed in the Act, was to abolish entirely the office of justice of the peace within the township and create a police court as a successor thereto, which should exercise criminal jurisdiction as therein expressed and perform all the duties which the justice of the peace would have performed if that office had not been abolished. It was the duty of the justice of the peace to try civil actions within the limitation imposed by law and we must hold that the duty to try civil actions formerly triable by the justice of the peace of Ottawa Hills township now *508 rests upon the judge of the newly-created police court.

Counsel for relator makes the contention that the Act is unconstitutional. In passing, it is only necessary to say that in our judgment the contention is not well-founded.

The writ of prohibition is denied and the petition dismissed.

RICHARDS, J, concurs. LLOVD, J, dissents.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dillow v. Mallard Coach Co.
615 N.E.2d 1076 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1992)
In re Custody Wolfe
187 N.E.2d 658 (Preble County Juvenile Court, 1962)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
192 N.E. 386, 48 Ohio App. 60, 13 Ohio Law. Abs. 506, 1 Ohio Op. 14, 1933 Ohio App. LEXIS 548, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-sparks-et-v-weber-et-ohioctapp-1933.