State ex rel. Winfield v. Roper

292 S.W.3d 909, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 384, 2009 WL 2762454
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedSeptember 1, 2009
DocketNo. SC 88942
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 292 S.W.3d 909 (State ex rel. Winfield v. Roper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Winfield v. Roper, 292 S.W.3d 909, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 384, 2009 WL 2762454 (Mo. 2009).

Opinion

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. IN HABEAS CORPUS

PER CURIAM.

John Winfield was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. His convictions were affirmed on appeal, State v. Winfield, 5 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. banc 1999), and he was denied post-conviction relief, Winfield v. State, 93 S.W.3d 732 (Mo. banc 2002).

Winfield now seeks a writ of habeas corpus. He claims that during the jury’s penalty deliberations it had a split or deadlocked vote on the issue of the sentence; that this impasse was reported to the judge or bailiff; and that, without counsel being consulted or made aware of the split or deadlocked vote, the jury was directed to continue deliberating. Winfield fails to prove the allegation. The petition is denied.

Facts

Winfield was charged with and convicted of two counts of first degree murder, two [910]*910counts of first degree assault and four counts of armed criminal action in connection with a disagreement with his former girlfriend. State v. Winfield at 508-10. Following appointment to represent Win-field in connection with clemency proceedings, Winfield’s counsel began an investigation concerning his case. Interviews with jurors persuaded counsel that the jury was not unanimous as to the penalty to impose, that the jury was instructed to continue deliberations notwithstanding its divided vote, and that these proceedings did not appear in the trial court record and occurred without Winfield’s trial counsel’s knowledge or participation. The respondent disputed the factual allegations.

This Court appointed a master to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to Winfield’s factual allegations.1 The master, after hearing testimony from the trial judge, all the trial jurors, the bailiff, and others, filed a report concluding:

[T]he jury did not advise the trial judge or bailiff of a split between death and life imprisonment (or that the jury was “hung” or “deadlocked” on the alternatives), that neither the trial judge nor the bailiff ordered the jury to continue their deliberations and, in turn, no such instruction was given.

Standard of review

The habeas corpus petitioner has the burden of proof to show that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 73 S.W.3d 623, 624 (Mo. banc 2002). Where the master has the opportunity to view and judge the credibility of witnesses, the findings and conclusions of the master are accorded the weight and deference given to trial courts in court-tried cases. State ex rel. Busch by Whitson v. Busch, 776 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo. banc 1989).2

Discussion

Winfield acknowledges that 10 years after the trial recollections of the witnesses may differ and may be imprecise. The record supports this assessment.

As initially framed, Winfield alleged that a note was sent to the trial judge indicating that the jury was deadlocked and that the judge returned a direction that the jury continue deliberating. The record before the master and at trial fails to show that this occurred.

The judge, bailiff and jury foreperson all categorically deny any such occurrence. The evidence indicates the foreperson was required to sign all notes to the judge. Three notes matching this requirement are contained in the trial record, but there is no note concerning the jury’s deadlock. The foreperson did not recall any such note. The judge had no recollection of the note and indicated she would have preserved any such note in the record.

Those testifying for Winfield were less definite in their testimony. One witness testified there was a communication about the issue but could not remember how the communication occurred. A second witness testified to sending a note but thought the jury had only voted for the death penalty with respect to one victim when, in fact, it voted for the death penal[911]*911ty with respect to two victims. A third witness recalled a note, but could not recall if a response came back.3 Winfield re-frames the issue somewhat in his brief to emphasize that the evidence supports his allegation that the bailiff made a remark that instructed the jury to continue deliberating. But, again, the evidence is conflicting. Weighing evidence is not simply a matter of quantitative analysis but is primarily a qualitative analysis. Clark v. Quality Dairy Co., 400 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Mo.1966). Winfield argues that the evidence does not explain why multiple jurors, would describe these events if they did not occur, but, of course, it is his burden to prove that the events did occur.

The record before the master does not prove even by a preponderance of the evidence that the jury was deadlocked, much less that the deadlock was communicated to the bailiff who unilaterally instructed the jury to continue to deliberate. Although, as Winfield notes, some jurors gave testimony that could, with certain inferences, support such a finding, there was substantial evidence that was qualitatively better and to the contrary. The bailiff denied the allegation, and other jurors similarly failed to recall any such directive or instruction by the bailiff.

The master’s conclusion is supported by the record. Having failed to prove his allegations, Winfield’s petition is denied.4

All concur.

APPENDIX

FIRST WITNESS

Q: Do you remember the jury sending out any kind of communication or note regarding what your vote was?

A: We — at one time we did say we couldn’t come to a complete agreement.

[[Image here]]

Was there a response to the note? <©

To continue >

Q: Who gave that response?

A: The — the—is it a bailiff that was in charge of the jurors, came back. I can’t remember if it was a note or he told us we were to continue.

Q: So he could have been reading from a note or he could have just been talking?

A: Correct.

Cross-examination

[Note: There are three victims and two death penalties.]

Q: Now, you testified that you only remember one victim in this case; is that correct?

A. Yes. Well, I mean, there was more than one victim. I just remember one death.

Q: So would it surprise you if I told you there. were actually two persons killed?

A: No, it would not.

Q: Did you return one death penalty verdict or two?

A: I don’t remember.

[Note: The state showed the witness three other notes sent to the judge and dis[912]*912cussed the method of sending notes to the judge.]

Q: Now, did the bailiff ever give you any instruction when he answered those three notes, oral instruction?

A: I don’t recall.

SECOND WITNESS

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
292 S.W.3d 909, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 384, 2009 WL 2762454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-winfield-v-roper-mo-2009.