State Ex Rel. Wheeler v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (10-6-2003)

2004 Ohio 840
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 6, 2003
DocketNo. 03AP-93.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2004 Ohio 840 (State Ex Rel. Wheeler v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (10-6-2003)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Wheeler v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (10-6-2003), 2004 Ohio 840 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Manuel P. Wheeler, filed this original action in mandamus. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, the matter was referred to a magistrate of this court. On October 6, 2003, the magistrate rendered his decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, wherein he recommended denial of the writ. (Attached as Appendix A.) Relator timely filed objections to the magistrate's decision, which objections are now before the court.

{¶ 2} In 1991, relator sustained two separate injuries in the course and scope of his employment with respondent, Cardinal Foods. His claims have been allowed for several physical conditions as well as for post-traumatic stress disorder. Respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("the commission") denied relator's March 7, 2002 application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation. In so doing, the commission relied upon the reports of Drs. Stanko and Greer, and commission vocational evaluator, Ms. Harris. Relator's complaint seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate its order denying his PTD application, and to enter a new order granting same.

{¶ 3} In support of his request for this extraordinary writ, relator first argues that the commission was required to evaluate the combined effects of all of relator's allowed conditions, and the commission failed to do so. He directs our attention to the fact that Dr. Stanko's report deals with relator's allowed physical conditions, while Dr. Greer's report deals with relator's allowed psychological condition. Each expert found relator has the capacity for sustained remunerative employment. Ms. Harris opined, based upon the reports of Drs. Stanko and Greer, that relator was capable of performing several different jobs. Relator argues that the commission was required to perform its own analysis of the combined effects of all of relator's allowed conditions, and, before denying PTD compensation, ensure that the jobs suggested by Ms. Harris would be compatible with the limitations corresponding to all allowed conditions, taking into account their combined effects.

{¶ 4} In his decision, the magistrate's discussion of this issue focused on a line of cases dealing with whether the commission is permitted to rely on expert reports that themselves do not include a so-called "combined effects analysis." In his first objection to the magistrate's decision, relator argues that the magistrate should have begun with the premise that the commission is required to perform its own combined effects analysis using the reports upon which it relies, and further should have concluded that the commission failed to do so in the present case, requiring issuance of a writ of mandamus.

{¶ 5} To deny PTD compensation without considering all relevant allowed conditions is an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the remedy. State ex rel. Johnson v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 339; State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus.Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 266; State ex rel. Roy v. Indus.Comm. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 259; State ex rel. Lemon v. TheW.M. Brode Co. (June 23, 1992), Franklin App. No. 91AP-1037. Furthermore, the commission's order must indicate that all the claimant's allowed conditions were considered on the question of PTD compensation. Lemon, supra, citing Johnson, supra, andState ex rel. Cupp v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 129. The magistrate did not include a discussion of these precedents in his conclusions of law; however, they are clearly relevant to relator's request for a writ of mandamus. Thus, in adopting the magistrate's conclusions of law, we add the foregoing authorities to them.

{¶ 6} We now evaluate whether, pursuant to these authorities, the commission abused its discretion by wholly failing to take into account all of relator's allowed conditions in passing upon his PTD application. Upon a careful reading of the commission's order, we find that the commission took full account of all of relator's allowed conditions, and their combined effects, in denying his PTD application. The staff hearing officer ("SHO") discussed in detail the allowed physical conditions upon which Dr. Stanko's report is based, and also provided detailed summaries of the reports of Dr. Greer and Ms. Harris. The SHO then wrote, "* * * the claimant is vocationally capable of numerous employment options in consideration of the allowed physical and psychological residual functional capacities as defined by Dr. Stanko and Greer, as well as Dr. Hard."1 The SHO noted that she had "thoroughly review[ed] all the evidence" and noted of particular significance the fact that relator worked through the year 1996, even though his claim had been allowed for post-traumatic stress disorder.

{¶ 7} We find the commission's order clearly articulates that it analyzed the combined effects of all of relator's allowed conditions. The commission then found that relator is capable of sustained remunerative employment performing specific jobs that fit within the limitations imposed upon him by both his physical and psychological allowed conditions. The evidence the commission relied upon — namely, the reports of Drs. Stanko and Greer, and Ms. Harris — constitutes some evidence upon which the commission based its decision.

{¶ 8} In relator's second objection to the magistrate's decision, he argues the magistrate erred in concluding that the commission's rejection of Helen Lewinsky's vocational report was not an abuse of its discretion. The commission's order reflects that this report was rejected because it is based in part on non-allowed conditions. Relator argues that, pursuant to our decision in State ex rel. Caraustar Indus., Inc. v. Indus.Comm., 2003-Ohio-5209, so long as an opinion contained in an expert report is based expressly on allowed conditions alone, mere reference to non-allowed conditions does not compel the exclusion of the report. We agree with the magistrate's conclusion that Lewinsky's report does not merely refer to non-allowed conditions, but is based, in part, upon them. InState ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 452, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that non-allowed conditions cannot be used to advance a claim for PTD compensation. Thus, pursuant to Waddle, the Lewinsky report was properly excluded from the commission's consideration.

{¶ 9} After an examination of the magistrate's decision, an independent review pursuant to Civ.R. 53, and due consideration of relator's objections, we overrule the objections for the foregoing reasons. We adopt the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and supplement them with our own findings and conclusions as articulated herein, and deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus.

Objections overruled; writ denied.

Lazarus, P.J., and Klatt, J., concur.

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
IN MANDAMUS
{¶ 10} In this original action, relator, Manuel P.

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2004 Ohio 840, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-wheeler-v-indus-comm-unpublished-decision-10-6-2003-ohioctapp-2003.