State ex rel. Wenatchee-Beebe Orchard Co. v. Superior Court for Chelan County

359 P.2d 146, 57 Wash. 2d 662, 1961 Wash. LEXIS 419
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 2, 1961
DocketNo. 35654
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 359 P.2d 146 (State ex rel. Wenatchee-Beebe Orchard Co. v. Superior Court for Chelan County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Wenatchee-Beebe Orchard Co. v. Superior Court for Chelan County, 359 P.2d 146, 57 Wash. 2d 662, 1961 Wash. LEXIS 419 (Wash. 1961).

Opinion

Donworth, J.

— This matter is before us pursuant to a write of certiorari, issued by the chief justice upon the application of the relator, to review an order entered by the Superior Court of Chelan County adjudicating that [663]*663the use for which the state of Washington seeks to acquire, by condemnation, a certain portion of relator’s land is a public use.

In order to understand the problem involved, it is necessary to describe the geographical location of relator’s property in some detail.

The state proposes to improve secondary state highway No. 10D by the construction of a bridge across the Columbia River near Chelan station. The legislature has authorized this highway to provide a connection between primary state highway No. 2 (near Orondo), which is on the east side of the river, and primary state highway No. 10 which is on the west side. The connection between No. 10D and No. 10, according to the legislative plan, is ultimately to be made at or near Azwell.

The relator, a Delaware corporation, owns land on each side of the river near the location of the proposed state bridge. It owns a private bridge (called the Beebe Bridge) which crosses the river just south of the location of the new state bridge.

We are concerned in this case only with that part of the relator’s property located on the west bank of the river where relator is operating a large apple orchard. At this point, the state seeks to condemn 4.33 acres for the western approach to the bridge. This approach fans out in two directions as one proceeds westerly from the bridge. One “leg” follows the left center line of the proposed roadway marked “temporary connection,” which leads traffic into Chelan station; the other “leg” follows the center line marked “ultimate alignment,” and branches off to the right from the left center line, and proceeds about one thousand feet to a point on the map marked “End of Project.” It is the condemnation of this latter “leg” which is challenged in this proceeding.

The relator in its brief, after setting forth four assignments of error, states the problem before us as follows:

“The sole and only question for review by this court then is — whether or not the area of Relator’s lands shown [664]*664on Exhibit 1 as ‘ultimate alignment’ may be now taken for public use under the record and facts in this case?”

Relator’s contention is that there can be no taking of its land within the ultimate alignment boundaries because the location of the highway between that point and Azwell (located on highway No. 10) has not yet been determined by the highway commission or the director of highways. It is further argued that no showing has been made that the state will use this specific parcel for highway purposes within a reasonable time. For these reasons, the actions of the highway commission and the director in condemning it are claimed to be arbitrary, capricious, and constructively fraudulent. The state, on the other hand, contends that relator’s land sought to be taken in this proceeding is presently necessary for public use.

The only witness who testified at the hearing as an expert regarding the necessity for acquiring the ultimate alignment leg of the project was James Parkhill, resident engineer for the highway department in the Wenatchee area. His district included Chelan station and all adjacent territory which is involved in this proceeding. Each party refers to different portions of his testimony which each claims support its own position in the controversy.

Before considering the resident engineer’s testimony, it is well to have in mind certain statutory provisions which are pertinent to this case.

RCW 47.20.400 (as last amended by Laws of 1959, chapter 319, § 18, p. 1530) describes the route of this secondary state highway (No. 10D) as follows:

“Secondary state highway No. 10B; beginning at a wye junction with primary state highway No. 10 in the vicinity east of Chelan, thence in a southerly direction crossing the Columbia river in the vicinity of Chelan Station to a junction with primary state highway No. 2 in the vicinity of Orondo; also beginning at a junction with primary state highway No. 10 in the vicinity south of Azwell, thence southerly to a junction with secondary state highway No. 10D in the vicinity of Chelan Station.”

[665]*665The latitude granted by the legislature to the director of highways in making a definite location of an authorized highway is stated in RCW 47.28.010 in the following language:

“Whenever the general route of a state highway is designated as running to or by way of certain designated points, without specifying the particular route to be followed, the director shall determine the most feasible route to be followed by the highway to or by way of the designated points, and may select and adopt as a part of the highway, the whole or any part of any existing public highway previously designated as a county road, primary road, or secondary road or at any time classified as a county road. The director need not select and adopt the entire routes for the state highways at one time, but may select parts of the routes from time to time as he deems advisable. When a state highway is designated as passing by way of a certain point, this shall not require the director to cause the highway to pass through or touch such point but such designation is directional only and may be complied with by location in the general vicinity. The director may construct as a part of a state highway as designated and in addition to any portion meeting the limits of a city or town, a bypass section either through or around the city or town.”

By RCW 47.12.010, the director is empowered to acquire, by condemnation, any property and property rights necessary for the construction, protection, and maintenance of state highways. This section includes the following provision:

“ . . . Condemnation actions shall be brought in the name of the state as provided for acquiring property for the public uses of the state, and in such actions selection of the property and property rights by the director is conclusive that they are necessary for the purposes sought, in the absence of bad faith, or arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent action. . . . ”

The decision in this case depends on an evaluation of the testimony of the state’s engineer, Mr. Parkhill, viewed in the light of the above-quoted statutory provisions. There is no conflict in testimony here because there was no other witness who testified on the pivotal issue. (Relator’s only witness testified as to the nature of the land taken and the pres[666]*666ent use to which it was being put.) There are no formal findings of fact separate from the recitals in the court’s order of public use.

Under these circumstances, portions of Mr. Parkhill’s testimony regarding the prospect of the state’s locating and constructing a highway between the end of the ultimate alignment leg (near Chelan station) and Azwell (which is on primary state highway No. 10) must be set forth.

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Bluebook (online)
359 P.2d 146, 57 Wash. 2d 662, 1961 Wash. LEXIS 419, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-wenatchee-beebe-orchard-co-v-superior-court-for-chelan-wash-1961.