State ex rel. Webber v. Blue Ash Care Ctr.

2018 Ohio 978
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 15, 2018
Docket16AP-676
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 Ohio 978 (State ex rel. Webber v. Blue Ash Care Ctr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Webber v. Blue Ash Care Ctr., 2018 Ohio 978 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Webber v. Blue Ash Care Ctr., 2018-Ohio-978.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

The State ex rel. Veronica E. Webber, :

Relator, : No. 16AP-676 v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Blue Ash Care Center et al., :

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 15, 2018

On brief: Lisa M. Clark, for relator.

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Amanda B. Brown, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. {¶ 1} Relator Veronica E. Webber initiated this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order denying her application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation and to enter an order finding that she is entitled to that compensation. {¶ 2} This matter was referred to a magistrate of this court pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued the appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate determined that Webber has not demonstrated that the commission abused its discretion No. 16AP-676 2

in denying her application for PTD compensation. Thus, the magistrate recommends this court deny Webber's request for a writ of mandamus. {¶ 3} Webber has filed objections to the magistrate's decision. First, she challenges the magistrate's determination that the commission did not abuse its discretion in relying on psychologist Dr. Kenneth Manges' report as a basis to deny her request for PTD compensation. Second, she contends the magistrate erroneously found that the commission did not abuse its discretion in considering the non-medical factors in connection with denying her request for PTD compensation. The arguments Webber presents in support of these objections are essentially the same arguments that were presented to and rejected by the magistrate. {¶ 4} According to Webber, Dr. Manges' report contains a deficiency that precludes it from constituting some evidence upon which the commission could rely to deny her request for PTD compensation. On an occupational activity assessment form, attached to his narrative report, Dr. Manges opined that Webber "is capable of work with the limitation(s)/modification(s) noted below." (Nov. 14, 2016 Joint Stipulation of Evidence at 20952-A24.) In the space provided on the form, Dr. Manges handwrote: "minimal contact with public, difficulties speaking with supervisor, flexibility in time to allow for a slower pace and allow for short, simple tasks." Webber argues that Dr. Manges' statement regarding her limitations was vague and ambiguous, necessarily requiring the commission to speculate as to the true nature of those limitations. We disagree. While Webber may have preferred more exacting language, Dr. Manges' statement articulates work limitations with reasonable precision. Thus, we agree with the magistrate's rejection of Webber's argument that Dr. Manges' report was so flawed that the commission committed an abuse of discretion by relying on it to deny her PTD compensation. {¶ 5} Webber also argues the commission did not adequately consider all of the limitations set forth by Dr. Manges, and, even if it did consider all of the limitations, it did not explain why it did not accept all of them. In particular, Webber asserts that the commission ignored or rejected Dr. Manges' opinion that she would require flexibility in time to allow for a slower pace. She bases this assertion on the fact that the commission's order does not expressly refer to Dr. Manges' statement that Webber must have "flexibility in time to allow for a slower pace." Webber asserts that this limitation arguably would No. 16AP-676 3

interfere with her ability to perform sustained remunerative work. Webber reasons that the commission's failure to either consider this limitation or explain why the limitation finding was rejected fatally flawed the commission's order. {¶ 6} However, the commission's omission of an express reference to that limitation in its order denying PTD compensation does not mean the commission did not consider it or that it rejected that finding. The commission expressly found that Webber retains the functional capacity to perform sustained remunerative employment when the impairments arising out of the allowed conditions are considered. Thus, it viewed that limitation as not constituting a barrier to Webber performing sustained remunerative employment. We therefore agree with the magistrate's finding that the fact that the commission did not expressly reference this limitation in its order denying Webber's request for PTD compensation did not fatally flaw the commission's reliance on Dr. Manges' report and the attached assessment. {¶ 7} Lastly, we reject Webber's argument that the commission improperly addressed non-medical factors relating to her ability to work. Generally, in determining a claimant's ability to do any sustained remunerative employment, the commission must consider not only medical impairments but also the claimant's age, education, work record and other relevant non-medical factors. State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167 (1987). Thus, a claimant's medical capacity to work is not dispositive if the claimant's non-medical factors foreclose employability. State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm, 68 Ohio St.3d 315 (1994). Webber asserts that, based on Dr. Manges' assessment that she is limited to "short, simple tasks," her industrial injury limits her to "unskilled work," which requires "little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of time." Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(3)(c)(i). Webber argues that the commission abused its discretion in finding her age, education, and work history all to be vocational assets that enhance her ability to obtain and perform sustained remunerative employment. She contends that each of these factors is either inconsequential or irrelevant to her reemployment prospects. {¶ 8} However, as the magistrate explained, even assuming Webber's residual functional capacity limits her to unskilled labor, these non-medical factors are relevant to her ability to acquire and learn to do an unskilled job. While unskilled work only requires No. 16AP-676 4

the performance of simple duties, such work may require some, albeit minimal, vocational preparation and judgment. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the commission to view Webber's non-medical factors as positive vocational assets even assuming she is only capable of unskilled work. {¶ 9} For these reasons, and the reasons expressed in the magistrate's decision, we find that Webber's objections lack merit. {¶ 10} Following our independent review of the record pursuant to Civ.R. 53, we find the magistrate correctly determined that Webber is not entitled to the requested writ of mandamus. The magistrate properly applied the pertinent law to the salient facts. Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. We therefore overrule Webber's objections to the magistrate's decision and deny her request for a writ of mandamus. Objections overruled; writ of mandamus denied.

SADLER and DORRIAN, JJ., concur. No. 16AP-676 5

APPENDIX

Relator, :

v. : No. 16AP-676

Blue Ash Care Center, et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION NUNC PRO TUNC1

Rendered on September 18, 2017

Lisa M. Clark, for relator.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Amanda B.

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Related

State ex rel. Watkins v. St. Clare Retirement Community
2016 Ohio 3136 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2016)
State ex rel. Stephenson v. Industrial Commission
509 N.E.2d 946 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1987)
State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm
626 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)

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2018 Ohio 978, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-webber-v-blue-ash-care-ctr-ohioctapp-2018.