State ex rel. Wayne Dalton Corp. v. Indus. Comm.

2017 Ohio 7736
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 21, 2017
Docket16AP-423
StatusPublished

This text of 2017 Ohio 7736 (State ex rel. Wayne Dalton Corp. v. Indus. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Wayne Dalton Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2017 Ohio 7736 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Wayne Dalton Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2017-Ohio-7736.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Wayne Dalton Corporation, :

Relator, :

v. : No. 16AP-423

Industrial Commission of Ohio : (REGULAR CALENDAR) and Candie Simon, : Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on September 21, 2017

On brief: Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Edward D. Murray, and Aletha M. Carver, for relator.

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Amanda B. Brown, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

On brief: Brian, Zwick, Marchisio, Stone & Associates, and Richard F. Brian, for respondent Candie Simon.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION DORRIAN, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Wayne Dalton Corporation, filed an original action which asks this court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate the order of its staff hearing officer ("SHO"), which granted to respondent Candie Simon ("claimant") an award of permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation beginning April 6, 2015, and ordering the commission to find that she is not entitled to that compensation. No. 16AP-423 2

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. {¶ 3} The magistrate recommended this court deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus. Specifically, the magistrate found: (1) the August 11, 2014 and April 6, 2015 reports of Dr. Mark Cecil provide some evidence on which the commission relied to support the finding that the allowed conditions alone preclude all sustained remunerative employment, and (2) the report of Dr. Nicholas Varrati provides some evidence on which the commission relied to support the finding that the allowed conditions alone preclude all sustained remunerative employment. {¶ 4} Relator has filed the following three objections to the magistrate's decision: [I.] The Magistrate erred in finding that Dr. Cecil's August 11, 2014, opinion was not equivocal and contradictory and concluding that Dr. Cecil's opinions constituted some evidence to be relied upon to support a finding of PTD benefits.

[II.] The Magistrate erred in finding Respondent Simon incapable of engaging in sustained remunerative employment based on the medical evidence and circumstances in the case.

[III.] The Magistrate erred in finding that Dr. [Varrati's] report could be relied upon to support a finding of PTD.

{¶ 5} The arguments presented in relator's three objections are not new and are essentially a reiteration of the same arguments previously made to and addressed by the magistrate. After a careful and independent review, for the reasons stated in the magistrate's decision, we do not find merit to relator's first, second, and third objections. {¶ 6} In its first two objections, relator challenges the August 11, 2014 medical report of Dr. Cecil and argues the magistrate erred in concluding that the report was not equivocal and was not contradicted by the August 8, 2014 report of Dr. Cecil. Ultimately, relator argues that the magistrate erroneously found that these reports constituted some evidence upon which the commission could rely to support its finding of PTD. {¶ 7} The Supreme Court of Ohio has observed that "[e]quivocation disqualifies an opinion from consideration and occurs 'when a doctor repudiates an earlier opinion, No. 16AP-423 3

renders contradictory or uncertain opinions, or fails to clarify an ambiguous statement.' " State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 130 Ohio St.3d 405, 2011-Ohio-6036, ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp., 70 Ohio St.3d 649, 657 (1994). A medical report can be so internally inconsistent that it cannot be some evidence on which the commission can rely. State ex rel. Lopez v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 445 (1994); State ex rel. Taylor v. Indus. Comm., 71 Ohio St.3d 582 (1995). However, a court will not second-guess a doctor's medical expertise to support a claim of internal inconsistency. State ex rel. Young v. Indus. Comm., 79 Ohio St.3d 484 (1997). {¶ 8} In addition, as noted by the magistrate, this court recently observed in State ex rel. Sheller-Chiles v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-245, 2014-Ohio-313, and State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-855, 2015-Ohio-4038, that this court's prior precedent has established that a work capacity of four or more hours per day constituted sustained remunerative employment. {¶ 9} The magistrate found, based on this court's prior precedent, that Dr. Cecil's statement in the August 8, 2014 C-140 that claimant can work two hours per day and five days per week was not a statement that claimant is capable of sustained remunerative employment. He further found that the C-140 report is consistent with Dr. Cecil's opinion in his August 11, 2014 report that claimant is "permanently and totally disabled from sustained remunerative activity." (Appended Mag. Dec. at ¶ 26.) We agree. Dr. Cecil's August 11, 2014 report is not equivocal or ambiguous and does constitute some evidence on which the SHO could rely to find claimant permanently and totally disabled. {¶ 10} Furthermore, in the June 17, 2015 order, the SHO relied "on the reports of Dr. Varrati and Cecil." (Appended Mag. Dec. at ¶ 42.) The SHO extensively discussed Dr. Cecil's treatment record of April 6, 2015 noting Dr. Cecil's finding therein that claimant "continues to experience intractable thoracolumbar pain which is difficult to control" and Dr. Cecil's continuing conclusion that claimant is permanently and totally disabled. (Appended Mag. Dec. at ¶ 42.) The SHO also ordered that PTD compensation commence effective April 6, 2015. Presumably, the SHO's reliance on the "reports" of Dr. Cecil included his April 6, 2015 treatment record. The magistrate found Dr. Cecil's April 6, 2015 report provided some evidence on which the commission relied to support the finding that the allowed conditions alone preclude all sustained remunerative No. 16AP-423 4

employment. Yet, relator did not object to the magistrate's finding regarding the April 6, 2015 report. Relator only challenges the August 11, 2014 report. Nevertheless, we agree with the magistrate that this is also some evidence on which the SHO could rely. {¶ 11} Thus, we overrule the first and second objections. {¶ 12} In its third objection, relator argues that Dr. Varrati's report did not include a complete or an accurate medical history. Relator asserts Dr. Varrati's report of his February 5, 2015 exam was deficient because he relied on the history provided to him by claimant, her subjective complaints, and her reports of self-function. Relator complains that claimant did not inform Dr. Varrati that: (1) she had been released to return to work by her physician of record, (2) she had been offered a job by relator, and (3) she had been actively engaged in a vocational rehabilitation program and job search. Relator further argues that the information which claimant did provide to Dr. Varrati was false and misleading as demonstrated by the surveillance and testimonial evidence provided at the hearing. {¶ 13} The magistrate found that relator failed to pursue its remedy pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-09(A)(8) of seeking leave from the commission to take Dr. Varrati's deposition or submit interrogatories to Dr. Varrati regarding his examination of claimant on February 5, 2015, and regarding the surveillance evidence and other evidence of record at the time of his examination of claimant.

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Related

State Ex Rel. George v. Industrial Commission
2011 Ohio 6036 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2011)
State ex rel. Sheller-Chiles v. Indus. Comm.
2014 Ohio 313 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2014)
State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon
2015 Ohio 4038 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2015)
State Ex Rel. Speelman v. Industrial Commission
598 N.E.2d 192 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1992)
State ex rel. Teece v. Industrial Commission
429 N.E.2d 433 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1981)
State ex rel. Rouch v. Eagle Tool & Machine Co.
498 N.E.2d 464 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1986)
State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc.
508 N.E.2d 936 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1987)
State ex rel. Pavis v. General Motors Corp.
65 Ohio St. 3d 30 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1992)
State ex rel. Lopez v. Industrial Commission
633 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp.
640 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Taylor v. Industrial Commission
645 N.E.2d 1249 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1995)
State ex rel. Bell v. Industrial Commission
651 N.E.2d 989 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1995)
State ex rel. Lawson v. Forge
104 Ohio St. 3d 39 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2004)
State ex rel. Bell v. Indus. Comm.
1995 Ohio 121 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1995)
State ex rel. Toth v. Indus. Comm.
1997 Ohio 108 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State ex rel. Young v. Indus. Comm.
1997 Ohio 162 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State ex rel. Midmark Corp. v. Indus. Comm.
1997 Ohio 247 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
2017 Ohio 7736, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-wayne-dalton-corp-v-indus-comm-ohioctapp-2017.