State Ex Rel. Van Winkle v. Boyer

271 P. 46, 127 Or. 91, 1928 Ore. LEXIS 290
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 11, 1928
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 271 P. 46 (State Ex Rel. Van Winkle v. Boyer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Van Winkle v. Boyer, 271 P. 46, 127 Or. 91, 1928 Ore. LEXIS 290 (Or. 1928).

Opinion

COSHOW, J.

It is very earnestly and persuasively urged by the able counsel for defendants and interveners that the nominees of the convention for President and Vice-President and for presidential electors are indispensable parties to the case. This presents a very interesting question. No authority directly supporting the argument of defendants and interveners is cited. The court is of the opinion .that while the candidates may be proper parties they are not indispensable parties. This is not an election contest. There are no rival candidates of the Progressive party involved. The sole question presented is the legality of the nominations made by said convention. The nominees might possibly profit by having the word “Progressive” printed on the ballots after their names but they are not interested in the sense that the issues presented by the pleadings *95 in the instant case cannot be fully determined -without their presence. The nominees of the convention are the regular nominees of the Democratic party. Presumedly all the nominees are registered members of that party. For that reason they could not under the laws of Oregon become active candidates of the Progressive party for the nomination. In order for any person to become the official candidate of a .party at a primary election he must be a registered member of that party: Or. L., §§3944, 3969. For .that reason the Democratic nominees do not have such an interest in the nomination tendered them by said convention as to make them indispensable parties to this proceeding. Having been nominated by the Democratic party at the regular primary election the candidates could accept the nomination of all other parties which might tender the nomination to them: O’r. L., §3925. “No person who is not an elector shall be qualified to join in nominating any candidate. No elector shall be qualified to join in a certificate of nomination made by individual electors in nominating more than one person for each office to be filled.” Or. L., § 3924. The intent and purpose of the instant proceeding is to preserve the integrity of the official ballot by eliminating the word “Progressive,” which would indicate that the candidates had received the valid nomination of the Progressive party notwithstanding a lawful convention was not held. The candidates nominated had nothing to do with the calling of the convention or its conduct. They, 'being members of the Democratic .party and having participated in the Democratic .primaries, could not lawfully participate in the con.vention of another party. For these reasons we think the nominees have no such interest in the in *96 stant suit as to make them indispensable parties. It is not necessary for us to determine in the proceeding at bar whether or not the Progressive party is alive. We do not believe that question is properly here. For that reason we decline to express any opinion about the status of the Progressive party organized in 1924.

The pending proceeding was not intended to and cannot deprive any citizen of the state from voting ■for the Democratic nominees who were indorsed by ■the convention held by the Progressives. The sole .object of the proceeding is to prevent the unlawful use of the word “Progressive” on the official ticket. The nominees therefore are not indispensable parties •to the suit. There were two cases decided by the ■Montana Supreme Court that are very similar to the case at bar. In neither of those cases were the nominees parties. From the reports of those cases it does not appear that this precise question was raised. Inasmuch as the proceedings were not intended to interfere, except possibly incidentally, with the votes for the candidates at the general election, they cannot have such an interest in the instant case as to make them indispensable parties: State v. Tooker, 18 Mont. 540 (46 Pac. 530, 34 L. R. A. 315); State v. Johnson, 18 Mont. 548 (46 Pac. 533, 34 L. R. A. 313); State v. Superior Court of Kitsap County, 70 Wash. 662 (127 Pac. 310).

We are of the opinion that the convention held by 22 persons in Portland, Oregon, September 7, 1928, was not a convention within the meaning •of that term as used in Section 3920, Or. L. All the parties to the instant proceeding agree that interveners claim the nominations to have been made at a party convention as defined by the last section of *97 Or. L. above cited. The certificate of the president and secretary of that convention is regular on its face and entitled the nominees to the benefit of the word ‘ ‘ Progressive. ” The office of the Secretary of State functioned legally in certifying the nominees of the Democratic party to the various county clerks as nominees of the Progressive party. There was nothing in the certificate of the presiding officer and the secretary of that convention to justify the Secretary of State in refusing to so certify the nominees named therein. But it is alleged in the complaint, and that allegation is supported by the testimony, that the convention was not a legal convention of the Progressive party. The testimony of the president, Mr. Coulter, is that he was a registered Democrat. The testimony of Mr. Kellaher is that he was a registered Republican and participated in the Republican primaries. The party affiliations of the ether members of that convention are not revealed. It is clear under our Primary Laws that no one is qualified to participate in a Progressive party convention for the purpose of nominating candidates, except registered Progressives. The purpose of the law regulating’ party primaries is to limit electors at primary elections or conventions to the party in-which they are registered. In this connection we reiterate that all the parties to the instant case insist that the convention held by the Progressives was a party convention. An assemblage of electors numbering not less than 100 may convene and nominate candidates. Such assemblage may be made up of all parties but the nominees of such an assemblage would not be entitled to any particular party designation, except such as that assemblage might give it. The ■name that such an assemblage might give its nomi *98 nees could- not be that of any organized party. It is not claimed that there were any more than 22 electors at that convention under investigation. We do not stress the number of attendants at the convention held September 7, 1928, as being of itself important. It is contended, and the evidence supports the contention, that no general notice or call .for delegates was given. The only notice in the record reads as follows:

“Portland, Oregon.
“Aug. 25, 1928.
<C
Í c
“Dear Sir:
“You are hereby notified that a State Convention of the Progressive Party will be held on the 7th of September, 1928, in the Central Library of Portland. Kindly see that your district is represented at this convention. Nominations for president and for vice-president, and for certain state officers will be in order at the convention.
“Yours truly,
“Progressive Party State Central Committee.

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Bluebook (online)
271 P. 46, 127 Or. 91, 1928 Ore. LEXIS 290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-van-winkle-v-boyer-or-1928.