State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co.

300 S.E.2d 395, 61 N.C. App. 42, 51 P.U.R.4th 457, 1983 N.C. App. LEXIS 2559
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedMarch 1, 1983
DocketNo. 8210UC706
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 300 S.E.2d 395 (State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co., 300 S.E.2d 395, 61 N.C. App. 42, 51 P.U.R.4th 457, 1983 N.C. App. LEXIS 2559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

JOHNSON, Judge.

DEFENDANT’S APPEAL

In our recent decision in Utilities Commission and The New Telephone Co. v. Central Telephone Co., --- N.C. App. ---, --- S.E. 2d --- (No. 8210UC372, filed 18 January 1983), we held that the Commission had properly included the revenues and expenses from yellow page advertising in computing Central Telephone Company’s gross revenues and expenses on three grounds: (1) that the furnishing of classified advertising by a telephone company is an essential part of the service it provides; (2) that there was an insufficient demonstration of competition for advertising revenue in the evidence presented; and (3) that this Court’s judgment should not be substituted for the Commission’s where the Commission’s order is supported by a reasonable construction of the evidence. For the same reasons set forth in that opinion, we affirm in the present case the Commission’s inclusion of revenues and expenses from yellow page advertising in the gross revenues and expenses of CT&T.

INTERVENOR’S APPEAL

JDITC is an investment tax credit which was enacted by Congress in 1971 to stimulate employment by encouraging investment in new plants and equipment. I.R.C. §§ 38 and 46. It allows a taxpayer to reduce its tax liability to the Internal Revenue Service by a percentage of the cost of eligible property purchased during the tax year. To preserve the benefit of the credit for public utilities, Section 46(f)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code restricts the amount of the benefit generated by JDITC which a regulatory agency may require a utility to pass to its ratepayers in the form of reduced rates. Consequently, although JDITC reduces a utility’s actual tax liability to the Internal Revenue Service, it does not so reduce its tax liability for ratemaking purposes. As a result, JDITC generates capital for utilities. CT&T and the Public Staff disagreed as to the treatment of this capital for ratemaking purposes.

In determining the issue, the Commission found and concluded as follows:

[45]*45Findings of Fact
10. That the reasonable level of test year intrastate operating revenue deductions after accounting, pro forma, end-of-period, after-period, and supplemental adjustments is $189,878,168 . . .
Evidence and Conclusions For Finding of Fact No. 10
Although the issues raised herein by the Public Staff concerning the proper rate-making treatment of JDITC may appear somewhat complex upon initial consideration, the Commission believes that, in reality, the issues are rather simple and straightforward. Simply stated, the Public Staff has treated JDITC as if this investment tax credit has been contributed by each component of the Company’s capital structure in the same ratio as those components bear to the whole. Therefore, the methodology advocated herein by the Public Staff treats a portion of JDITC as if it were capital supplied by creditors, a portion as if it were capital supplied by preferred stockholders, and the remainder as if it were advanced by the common stockholders. On this basis, the amount of JDITC attributed to the creditors or debt holders multiplied by the embedded cost of debt results in an amount of hypothetical interest expense related to JDITC. This hypothetical interest expense is then used as a deduction in determining the Company’s test year level of income tax expense for ratemaking purposes.
In contrast to the methodology advocated by the Public Staff, the Company’s position is that all effects of JDITC should be excluded from the determination of interest expense to be used in developing the level of the Company income tax expense included in the cost of service. Hence, the methodology used by the Company attributes JDITC entirely to the common shareholders. This treatment is specifically mandated and prescribed by Section 1.46-6 of the Internal Revenue Code of Federal Regulations.
The Commission concludes that under Section 1.46-6 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Commission clearly may only treat JDITC as though it were capital contributed by the [46]*46common shareholders. Therefore, in computing the Company’s tax liability, no imputed interest expense may lawfully be calculated on any portion of JDITC. Rather, JDITC must be treated as capital supplied by common shareholders and must be given a return no less than the overall cost of capital determined to be appropriate by this Commission. In this regard, the Commission strongly believes that the treatment of JDITC proposed by the Company is fair and reasonable and the only treatment which is permissible under Section 1.46-6 of the Internal Revenue Code.

The issue on appeal, as stated by the Public Staff in its brief, “is whether the Commission erred as a matter of law in concluding that Section 46(f)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code requires that all effects of JDITC should be excluded from the determination of interest expense.”

G.S. 62-94 sets forth the standard of judicial review of orders of the Utilities Commission and includes the following:

(b) So far as necessary to the decision and where presented, the court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and applicability of the terms of any Commission action. The court . . . may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because the Commission’s findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(4) Affected by other errors of law. . .
(e) Upon any appeal, the rates fixed or any rule, regulation, finding, determination, or order made by the Commission under the provisions of this Chapter shall be prima facie just and reasonable.

In this appeal, we are called upon to interpret the applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code to determine whether the Commission’s order is affected by errors of law. We conclude that the order is not so affected.

Section 46(f)(2) of Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that JDITC will be disallowed with regard to public utility property in the following two circumstances:

[47]*47(A) Cost of service reduction. — If the taxpayer’s cost of service for ratemaking purposes or in its regulated books of account is reduced by more than a ratable portion of the credit allowable by section 38 (determined without regard to this subsection), or
(B) Rate base reduction. — If the base to which the taxpayer’s rate of return for ratemaking purposes is applied is reduced by reason of any portion of the credit allowable by section 38 (determined without regard to this subsection).

The term “ratable portion” is explained in Section 46(f)(6):

For purposes of determining . . . ratable portions under paragraph (2)(A), the period of time used in computing depreciation expense for purposes of reflecting operating results in the taxpayer’s regulated books of account shall be used.

The following example of “ratable portion” appears in Section 1.46-6(g)(2) of the Treasury Regulations:

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Bluebook (online)
300 S.E.2d 395, 61 N.C. App. 42, 51 P.U.R.4th 457, 1983 N.C. App. LEXIS 2559, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-utilities-commission-v-carolina-telephone-telegraph-co-ncctapp-1983.