OPINION
LEWIS, Judge.
This is an appeal by defendants1,Joseph G. Walker, Laleta Shipper, and Allen Barry, duly elected members of the Wilson County Board of Education, from the judgment of the trial court that defendants be ousted from office instanter.
Appellant Shipper took office 1 September 1986 and appellants Walker and Barry took office 1 September 1988.
Members of the Wilson County School Board are required to have a high school education. They receive only token, compensation for their time and services. The School Board’s chief responsibility is to make policies for the school system, as a body representative of the public.
Wilson County has an elected full-time superintendent who oversees the day to day operation of the school system and manages its finances. In addition, the superintendent has a full-time staff to assist the superintendent in administering and managing all aspects of the operations of the school system.
School systems are audited each year by the State Comptroller’s Office. The audits for the fiscal year 1988-89 and fiscal year 1989-90 revealed that the Wilson County School System had incurred a budget deficit of approximately two million dollars. The state auditors revealed several clerical and accounting mistakes that contributed to the deficit, including an overestimation of the average daily attendance by the superintendent’s office, resulting in an overestimation of state funds for the school system; an increase in health insurance claims and clerical errors on payroll deductions for family coverage for employees; [754]*754and an improper accounting entry by the superintendent’s office which made the books of the school system appear to show $800,000.00 more money than the system actually had.
The results of the audits for the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school years revealing these deficits were not available until the summer of 1990.
On 31 January 1991, the Wilson County Grand Jury, after having reviewed investigatory material from the State Comptroller of the Treasury and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, concluded that there were a number of serious problems with the Wilson County School System. The Grand Jury concluded that there was no criminal culpability on anyone’s part, but that there had been a failure of management and supervision in the system. The Grand Jury requested the District Attorney to initiate ouster proceedings against school officials still in office.
On 15 February 1991, the District Attorney caused to be filed on behalf of the State of Tennessee on relation of the District Attorney, a complaint for ouster pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 8-47-101, et seq., naming appellants as defendants.
Trial was held before a jury on 27 March — 9 April, 1991, in the Wilson County Criminal Court. Following the jury findings as to questions of fact submitted to it, the trial court entered judgment that the appellants be ousted from office.
Tennessee Code Annotated 8-47-101 provides as follows:
8-47-101. Officers subject to removal — Grounds.—Every person holding any office of trust or profit, under and by virtue of any of the laws of the state, either state, county, or municipal, except such officers as are by the constitution removable only and exclusively by methods other than those provided in this chapter, who shall knowingly or willfully misconduct himself in office, or who shall knowingly or willfully neglect to perform any duty enjoined upon such officer or by any of the laws of the state, or who shall in any public place be in a state of intoxication produced by strong drink voluntarily taken, or who shall engage in any form of gambling, or who shall commit any act constituting a violation of any penal statute involving moral turpitude, shall forfeit his office and shall be ousted from such office in the manner hereinafter provided.
Each of the defendants testified that as members of the Wilson County School Board they were satisfied to leave the finances of the school system to the Superintendent of Schools. They also insist that their “good faith” in the carrying out of their duties as school board members should be a complete defense to the ouster proceedings. They insist that “good faith” is defined as an absence of an intention to violate the law. In relying on this defense, defendants cite and rely on State ex rel. Estep v. Peters, 815 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn.1991). We are of the opinion that State ex rel. Estep v. Peters is inapposite to the facts of this case.
Estep addressed the question of whether a county superintendent of schools who knowingly and willfully misapplied public funds without an intent to benefit personally may be ousted from office for this conduct under Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 8-47-101.
In Estep, the county superintendent, in order to cope with a deficit in the school system’s budget, diverted federal funds designated for certain programs, bond proceeds for capital improvements, and contributions from an education employee benefit trust to the school’s general purpose fund. Estep, 815 S.W.2d at 162. Nothing in the record shows that the superintendent in any way benefitted personally from the transfer. The superintendent’s “misapplication of federal funds could have subjected him to federal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C., Section 666(a)” even though the superintendent had no intent to benefit personally from the misapplication. 815 S.W.2d at 163. The Supreme Court upheld the Chancellor’s judgment of ouster based on knowing or willful misconduct under Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 8-47-101, finding that the ouster was fully sup[755]*755ported by the findings of the jury that the defendant “knowingly or willingly misapplied public funds and failed to make required financial reports to the Claiborne County Commission.” Id. at 166. Unlike Estep, the issue in this case is whether the defendants “knowingly or willfully” neglected to perform their duties as school board members.
In order to remove an official from office for neglect, the neglect must have occurred “knowingly and willfully.” Tenn.Code Ann., § 8-47-101. Neglect is generally defined as
to omit, fail, or forebear to do a thing that can be done, or that is required to be done, but it may also import an absence of care or attention in the doing or omission of a given act. And it may mean a designed refusal, indifference, or unwillingness to perform one's duty....
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Failure to perform or discharge a duty, covering positive official misdoing or official misconduct as well as negligence.
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.) p. 1032 (1990).
Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2-2032 sets forth the powers and duties of [757]*757the local school board. The Board acts as a deliberative body and is charged with broad general policy-making powers. The Board sets teachers’ salaries, approves contracts, hires and fires teachers and other emplqy-ees, adopts and enforces minimum standards and policies and develops evaluation plans for employees.
Subsection 49-2-203(a)(ll) provides that the Board shall:
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OPINION
LEWIS, Judge.
This is an appeal by defendants1,Joseph G. Walker, Laleta Shipper, and Allen Barry, duly elected members of the Wilson County Board of Education, from the judgment of the trial court that defendants be ousted from office instanter.
Appellant Shipper took office 1 September 1986 and appellants Walker and Barry took office 1 September 1988.
Members of the Wilson County School Board are required to have a high school education. They receive only token, compensation for their time and services. The School Board’s chief responsibility is to make policies for the school system, as a body representative of the public.
Wilson County has an elected full-time superintendent who oversees the day to day operation of the school system and manages its finances. In addition, the superintendent has a full-time staff to assist the superintendent in administering and managing all aspects of the operations of the school system.
School systems are audited each year by the State Comptroller’s Office. The audits for the fiscal year 1988-89 and fiscal year 1989-90 revealed that the Wilson County School System had incurred a budget deficit of approximately two million dollars. The state auditors revealed several clerical and accounting mistakes that contributed to the deficit, including an overestimation of the average daily attendance by the superintendent’s office, resulting in an overestimation of state funds for the school system; an increase in health insurance claims and clerical errors on payroll deductions for family coverage for employees; [754]*754and an improper accounting entry by the superintendent’s office which made the books of the school system appear to show $800,000.00 more money than the system actually had.
The results of the audits for the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school years revealing these deficits were not available until the summer of 1990.
On 31 January 1991, the Wilson County Grand Jury, after having reviewed investigatory material from the State Comptroller of the Treasury and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, concluded that there were a number of serious problems with the Wilson County School System. The Grand Jury concluded that there was no criminal culpability on anyone’s part, but that there had been a failure of management and supervision in the system. The Grand Jury requested the District Attorney to initiate ouster proceedings against school officials still in office.
On 15 February 1991, the District Attorney caused to be filed on behalf of the State of Tennessee on relation of the District Attorney, a complaint for ouster pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 8-47-101, et seq., naming appellants as defendants.
Trial was held before a jury on 27 March — 9 April, 1991, in the Wilson County Criminal Court. Following the jury findings as to questions of fact submitted to it, the trial court entered judgment that the appellants be ousted from office.
Tennessee Code Annotated 8-47-101 provides as follows:
8-47-101. Officers subject to removal — Grounds.—Every person holding any office of trust or profit, under and by virtue of any of the laws of the state, either state, county, or municipal, except such officers as are by the constitution removable only and exclusively by methods other than those provided in this chapter, who shall knowingly or willfully misconduct himself in office, or who shall knowingly or willfully neglect to perform any duty enjoined upon such officer or by any of the laws of the state, or who shall in any public place be in a state of intoxication produced by strong drink voluntarily taken, or who shall engage in any form of gambling, or who shall commit any act constituting a violation of any penal statute involving moral turpitude, shall forfeit his office and shall be ousted from such office in the manner hereinafter provided.
Each of the defendants testified that as members of the Wilson County School Board they were satisfied to leave the finances of the school system to the Superintendent of Schools. They also insist that their “good faith” in the carrying out of their duties as school board members should be a complete defense to the ouster proceedings. They insist that “good faith” is defined as an absence of an intention to violate the law. In relying on this defense, defendants cite and rely on State ex rel. Estep v. Peters, 815 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn.1991). We are of the opinion that State ex rel. Estep v. Peters is inapposite to the facts of this case.
Estep addressed the question of whether a county superintendent of schools who knowingly and willfully misapplied public funds without an intent to benefit personally may be ousted from office for this conduct under Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 8-47-101.
In Estep, the county superintendent, in order to cope with a deficit in the school system’s budget, diverted federal funds designated for certain programs, bond proceeds for capital improvements, and contributions from an education employee benefit trust to the school’s general purpose fund. Estep, 815 S.W.2d at 162. Nothing in the record shows that the superintendent in any way benefitted personally from the transfer. The superintendent’s “misapplication of federal funds could have subjected him to federal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C., Section 666(a)” even though the superintendent had no intent to benefit personally from the misapplication. 815 S.W.2d at 163. The Supreme Court upheld the Chancellor’s judgment of ouster based on knowing or willful misconduct under Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 8-47-101, finding that the ouster was fully sup[755]*755ported by the findings of the jury that the defendant “knowingly or willingly misapplied public funds and failed to make required financial reports to the Claiborne County Commission.” Id. at 166. Unlike Estep, the issue in this case is whether the defendants “knowingly or willfully” neglected to perform their duties as school board members.
In order to remove an official from office for neglect, the neglect must have occurred “knowingly and willfully.” Tenn.Code Ann., § 8-47-101. Neglect is generally defined as
to omit, fail, or forebear to do a thing that can be done, or that is required to be done, but it may also import an absence of care or attention in the doing or omission of a given act. And it may mean a designed refusal, indifference, or unwillingness to perform one's duty....
[[Image here]]
Failure to perform or discharge a duty, covering positive official misdoing or official misconduct as well as negligence.
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.) p. 1032 (1990).
Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2-2032 sets forth the powers and duties of [757]*757the local school board. The Board acts as a deliberative body and is charged with broad general policy-making powers. The Board sets teachers’ salaries, approves contracts, hires and fires teachers and other emplqy-ees, adopts and enforces minimum standards and policies and develops evaluation plans for employees.
Subsection 49-2-203(a)(ll) provides that the Board shall:
Require the superintendent and chairman of the local board to prepare a budget on forms furnished by the commissioner of education, and when the budget has been approved by the local board, to submit it to the appropriate local legislative body. No LEA [local education agency] shall submit a budget to the local legislative body that directly or indirectly supplants or proposes to use state funds to supplant any local current operation funds, excluding capital outlay and debt service. The provisions of the preceding sentence shall not apply to a newly created LEA in any county where the county and city schools are being combined for a period of three (3) years after [758]*758the creation of such LEA. The county board of education shall submit its budget to the county legislative body no later than forty-five (45) days prior to the July term or forty-five (45) days prior to the actual date the budget is to be adopted by the county legislative body if such adoption is scheduled prior to July 1.
No other part of Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2-203, enumerating the powers and duties of the local boards of education expressly discusses the financing of local schools. There is no evidence in the record that the Wilson County School Board adopted unbalanced budgets in any of the applicable' years. In each of the years in question the local legislative body approved the budget adopted by the school board. The school board has no power of taxation or power to appropriate funds for the operation of schools.
Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2-204, provides that a school board member who votes to create debts beyond the income provided in the school budget for any school year or who misappropriates funds is guilty of a misdemeanor and “shall forfeit his office.” We find nothing in the record which shows that the prosecution even attempted to establish that any board member violated Section 49-2-204. We find not even a scintilla of evidence in the record that any of the defendants were guilty of any criminal wrongdoing. The grand jury convened by the District Attorney concluded that no criminal wrongdoing was present.
Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2-206(b)(4), provides that an executive committee made up of the chairman of the school board and the superintendent shall examine accounts and determine that the approved budget is not exceeded. The entire board does not have this duty.
The only other relevant statute cited to us, or that we are able to find, concerning school finances is Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2-301. This statute defines the duties of the school superintendent. The superintendent of schools is required by Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2-301, to meet certain standards of professional training, specifically including “school finance,” in order to obtain a superintendent’s certificate. Tenn.Code Ann., § 49-2-301(a)(2)(B)(iii). We find nothing in the statutes which require financial training for school board members. Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-2-301(f) provides in pertinent part that:
It is the duty of the board of education to assign to its superintendent the duty to:
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(4) Keep in well bound books, furnished by the board and arranged according to the regulations prescribed by the commissioner of education, a detailed and accurate account of all receipts and disbursement of the public school funds;
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(7) Have general supervision of all schools, ...;
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(18) Report ... the attendance;
(19) Make a written report, quarterly, to the appropriate local legislative body, for the board of education, of all receipts and expenditures of the public school funds, which accounts shall contain full information concerning the conditions, progress, and needs of the schools of the school system and which shall be audited by the appropriate fiscal officer and local legislative body;
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(21) Report to the local legislative body and the commissioner of education, whenever it shall appear to him that any portion of the school fund has been, or is in danger of being, misappropriated or in any way illegally disposed of or not collected;
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(23) Prepare, annually, a budget for the schools in his school system, to submit the same to the board of education for its approval and to present it to the county or other appropriate local legislative body for adoption as provided for by charter or private legislative act.
(24) Give his full time and attention to the duties of his position; ....
[759]*759We are of the opinion that pursuant to the foregoing statute, the school board is required to assign all significant financial management duties to the superintendent. When and if the school system’s finances are endangered, the superintendent is to report to the local legislative body, in this case the Wilson County Commission and the Commissioner of Education. Nothing in the statute requires the superintendent to report to the school board.
The school board must rely on the financial information prepared, compiled, maintained, and presented by the superintendent’s office. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49~2-301(f)(19), the quarterly financial reports are to be prepared by the superintendent and these reports are to be audited by the appropriate fiscal officer and the local legislative body. To the extent that the prosecution’s case was built on the superintendent’s inaccurate quarterly reports, the prosecution was charging the defendants with violating duties expressly imposed on the superintendent of schools and the local legislative body, not on the school board.
In this instance the school board assigned the financial management of the schools to the superintendent of schools, exactly what was required of it by law. Defendants were charged with neglecting duties that did not belong to them. The duties belong to the elected superintendent of schools. Tenn.Code Ann., § 49-2-301.
A reading of this record shows that the prosecution’s theory was based on the premise that the school board holds a position superior to the superintendent and is responsible for any mistakes that the superintendent or his staff may make. The District Attorney General, in his deposition, admitted that all the financial errors which caused the budget deficit were made in the superintendent’s office.
The office of school board member is a “not for profit” office. Boswell v. Powell, 163 Tenn. 445, 447, 43 S.W.2d 495 (1931). The duties of the school board are imposed on the entire board and not on individual members. Fine v. Stuart, 48 S.W. 371, 375-76 (Tenn.Ch.App.1989). Courts have been and should be extremely reluctant to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the school board where the exercise of judgment does not violate some principle of law. Mapp v. Board of Education, 203 F.Supp. 843, 851 (E.D.Tenn.1962). There is a presumption that actions of the school board are not arbitrary and capricious, but are reasonable and fair unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Mitchell v. Garrett, 510 S.W.2d 894, 898 (Tenn.1974). Issues which come before the school board are usually matters of discretion and it is contemplated that the judgment of elected lay persons will control. There is a judicial reluctance to review the actions of school boards and this reluctance is appropriate.
We are of the opinion that the evidence in this record is clear that the budget shortfall in Wilson County is not the fault of the board of education. The statutes are clear. The budget starts with the superintendent and the management of the budget throughout the year remains the responsibility of the superintendent of schools. The board cannot authorize expenditures in excess of available funds, and there is no proof in this record that the Board knowingly or willfully authorized such expenditures.
We think that a reading of this record shows that the defendants acted in good faith in carrying out their duties, and that this is a factor to be considered in determining whether defendants’ actions constitute knowing and willful neglect for the purpose of the ouster statutes. The District Attorney General testified in his deposition: “I think they (the defendants) would have if they realized what was going on, they would have done something."
Ouster suits should be brought only where the evidence of official dereliction is clear and convincing. See, e.g., McDonald v. Brooks, 215 Tenn. 535, 542, 387 S.W.2d 803, 806 (1965).
The ouster statute is a salutary one, but those administering it should guard against its overeneroachment. Shreds of [760]*760human imperfections gathered together to mold charges of official dereliction should be carefully scanned before a reputable officer is removed from office. These derelictions should amount to knowing misconduct or failure on the part of the officer if his office is to be forfeited; mere mistakes in judgment will not suffice.
Vandergriff v. State ex rel. Baker, 185 Tenn. 386, 392-93, 206 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn.1937).
The blame for the shortfall in the instant case rests on those responsible for the oversight of school finances. These are the superintendent of schools, Tenn.Code Ann., § 49-2-301(f)(21), the county commission, Tenn.Code Ann., § 49-2-301(f)(19), and the executive committee of the school board, Tenn.Code Ann., § 49-2-206(b)(4). Nothing in the statute places a responsibility for financial shortfalls on the school board as a whole or on the individual school board members.
We are of the opinion after a thorough review of this record that the defendants have not violated any of the duties assigned to them. The matters they were charged with violating are within the express duties of the superintendent of schools and not the school board. We are further of the opinion that there is no proof in this record that the defendants are guilty of any knowing or willful misconduct or knowing or willful neglect of duty as set forth in the ouster statutes.
We are therefore of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Because of our holding under this issue, we pretermit defendants’ remaining issues. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and for the collection of costs, which are assessed to plaintiff-appellee.
TODD, P.J., and CANTRELL, J., concur.