State ex rel. Taylor v. Industrial Commission

639 N.E.2d 101, 70 Ohio St. 3d 445
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 28, 1994
DocketNo. 93-1464
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 639 N.E.2d 101 (State ex rel. Taylor v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 639 N.E.2d 101, 70 Ohio St. 3d 445 (Ohio 1994).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

Claimant challenges the denial of four YSSRs: Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-10(0(3) and (C)(4)(b), 4121:l-3-04(E)(l), and 4121:l-3-03(J)(l). For the reasons to follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-10 governs scaffolding. The commission denied all violations alleged thereunder after concluding that the regulation did not cover the type of equipment from which claimant fell. The commission reached the right result for the wrong reason.

The commission characterized the Mite-E-Lift as a “self-propelled elevated work platform.” A “scaffold” is “any temporary elevated work platform and its supporting structure used for supporting employees, materials or equipment.” Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-10(B)(30). In addition, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-10(H) expressly covers “self-propelled elevated work platforms.” The Mite-E-Lift, therefore, is amenable to Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-10’s requirements.

[447]*447Specifically, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1 — 3—10(C)(3) states:

“Any scaffold including accessories, such as braces, brackets, tresses, screw legs, ladders, etc., damaged or weakened from any cause shall be immediately repaired or replaced.”

State Highway Patrol investigators reported that the gate’s locking mechanism could be tripped open with minimal pressure. No one seriously disputes that the lock should have withstood greater force, and, by failing to do so, malfunctioned. However, as the appellate court properly found, a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1 — 3—10(C)(3) cannot be sustained without evidence of prior malfunction and employer awareness thereof.

There is no evidence that the gate lock in question had ever failed before. The first-time failure of the lock on the date of injury cannot support a finding of. VSSR liability. State ex rel. M.T.D. Products v. Stebbins (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 114, 72 O.O.2d 63, 330 N.E.2d 904.

So, too, there was no violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1 — 3—10(C)(4)(b), which provides:

“Standard guardrails and toe boards shall be installed on all open sides and ends of platforms more than ten feet above the ground or floor, except on needle beam scaffolds and floats.”

Appellant maintains that the Mite-E-Lift guardrails were rendered noncompliant by the faulty latch, which allowed the gate to open, thereby eliminating the rail’s protection at that point. Again, appellant’s assertion would be more persuasive, if there were proof of prior malfunction and employer knowledge thereof. Lacking such evidence, M.T.D. Products controls.

Like the regulation cited above, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-04(E)(l) also addresses guardrails:

“Standard guard railing shall be constructed as a substantial barrier, securely fastened in place and free from protruding objects * * *, to protect openings or prevent accidental contact with some object, which barrier shall consist of a top rail no less than forty-two inches above the working level, and unless the space between the top rail and working level is covered with substantial material, an intermediate rail. * * * ”

Appellant’s argument is premised on the same rationale as that used for urging an Ohio Adm.Code 4121.T-3-10(C)(4)(b) violation, and as stated above, M.T.D. Products controls.

Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-03 covers “personal protective equipment,” and its requirements “relate to the personal protective equipment listed immediately below, as required for employees on operations described in this rule in which [448]*448there is a known hazard, recognized as injurious to the health or safety of the employee.” (Emphasis added.) Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-03(A).

Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-03(J)(l) provides:

“Lifelines, safety belts and lanyards shall be provided by the employer and it shall be the responsibility of the employee to wear such equipment when engaged in securing or shifting thrustouts, inspecting or working on overhead machines that support scaffolds, or on other high rigging, on steeply pitched roofs, by employees at work on poles or steel frame construction, by employees working on all swinging scaffolds, by all employees exposed to hazards of falling when the operation being performed is more than fifteen feet above ground or above a floor or platform, and by employees required to work on stored material in silos, hoppers, tanks, and similar storage areas. Lifelines and safety belts shall be securely fastened to the structure and shall sustain a static load of no less than five thousand four hundred pounds.” (Emphasis added.)

The parties agree that an employer’s responsibility to provide safety belts, etc., is triggered by the existence of a hazard. Appellant describes the hazard as the danger of falling itself and claims that the hazard is inherent any time an employee works at a height greater than fifteen feet. Appellant asserts that if this were not so, the code would not prescribe protective gear for all employees working at such heights. We disagree.

Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-03(J)(l) does not require lanyards, etc. for every employee working at heights over fifteen feet. Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-03’s provision explaining the rule’s scope demands that there be protection on operations “in which there is a known hazard, recognized as injurious to the health or safety of the employee.” Likewise, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-03(J)(l) demands protection on operations above fifteen feet where the employee is “exposed to hazards of falling.”

Appellant’s proposal demands that this regulatory language be ignored. This conflicts with the directive that specific safety requirements be strictly construed in the employer’s favor. State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 545 N.E.2d 1216.

Conversely, there would be no need for Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-03(J)(l) to specifically identify certain tasks as requiring lanyard protection if such regulation were as broad as appellant believes. Express enumeration of, for example, high rigging work and steel frame construction would have been unnecessary since both tasks would have been covered by the fifteen-foot-height requirement in any event.

We, therefore, find that Ohio Adm.Code 4121:l-3-03(J)(l) requires the use of safety belts on operations above fifteen feet only if employees are actually at risk [449]*449of falling. We decline to adopt appellant’s assertion that since decedent indeed fell, he was obviously exposed to a hazard of falling. To do so effectively imposes a strict liability on employers in the. event of a fall, contrary to M. T.D., supra.

The platform at issue was enclosed by guardrails. The exposure to falling that existed despite this precaution — indeed the fall itself — was attributable to the gate lock’s unanticipated malfunction. To find that the employer violated Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1 — 3—03(J)(1) is to essentially penalize Martin for its inability to predict the device’s first-time failure.

Appellant points out that the Mite-E-Lift, according to its specifications sheet, was equipped with a lanyard attachment.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
639 N.E.2d 101, 70 Ohio St. 3d 445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-taylor-v-industrial-commission-ohio-1994.