MILLER, Justice:
We granted this original proceeding for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus in order to delineate the proper procedure for review of and for obtaining an evidentiary record of the proceedings held before a family law master in a divorce case which is appealed to the circuit court. The rela
tor asserts that the failure of the Circuit Court of Putnam County to correct certain procedural problems in such a case constituted an abuse of its authority.
This issue arose when the respondent wife petitioned for review of a family law master’s recommended order regarding custody of the parties’ minor daughter by filing exceptions with the circuit court on November 7, 1990. The exceptions were filed within the ten-day period prescribed by W.Va.Code, 48A-4-7(a) (1990).
We note that this section provides the right to an extension of the ten-day filing period upon application to the circuit court.
The relator husband did not file an answer in opposition to the petition for review as permitted by W.Va.Code, 48A-4-9 (1990).
However, on December 11, 1990, he filed a notice advising the wife that a hearing had been set before the respondent judge for December 21,1990. This hearing was canceled by the judge. After several postponements, hearings were conducted before the circuit court on April 24, 1991, and August 1, 1991.
At the April 24, 1991 hearing, the husband produced a witness, Jeffrey L. Harlow, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, whose earlier testimony before the family law master had purportedly favored the husband. Dr. Harlow had continued to have contact with the child, and his position before the respondent judge was in favor of the family law master’s recommended order granting custody to the husband.
The husband had made continued complaints about the lack of a transcript of the proceedings before the family law master, and he renewed this complaint at the April 24, 1991 hearing. The wife, through her attorney, filed a transcript with the circuit judge on April 30, 1991, but its accuracy is challenged by the husband. The husband’s chief complaints are the delay in hearing the petition for review, the lack of a transcript, and the judge’s failure to take affirmative action on these matters. He seeks to compel the respondent judge to enter an order consistent with the family law master’s recommended order.
I.
With regard to the delay in hearing the petition for review, the family law master statute does provide some procedural guidelines. First, as we have already noted, W.Va.Code, 48A-4-7(a), requires the filing of the petition for review within ten days after service of the family law master’s recommended order on the parties.
We spoke to this matter in Syllabus Point 3 of
Segal v. Beard,
181 W.Va. 92, 380 S.E.2d 444 (1989):
“The ten-day period for filing a petition for review of a family law master’s recommended [order],
W.Va.Code,
48A-4-7(a) [1986], is tolled until an aggrieved party is served with notice of the filing of the recommended [order]. The family law master must serve notice of the filing of the recommended [order].”
This rule is now codified in W.Va.Code, 48A-4-4a (1990), which prescribes the form of the notice which accompanies the family law master’s recommended order. The notice is designed to advise the parties of their appeal rights. W.Va.Code, 48A-4-4a also provides that once the family law master signs the recommended order, there is no need to obtain the signatures of the parties or their attorneys indicating that they have inspected or approved it.
The contents of the petition for review are controlled by W.Va.Code, 48A-4-8 (1990). The statute’s focus is on the family law master’s recommended order. The petition must identify the “errors complained of with reasonable certainty,” and “[p]arts of the master’s report not excepted to are admitted to be correct[.]”
Once a petition for review of a family law master’s recommended order is filed with the circuit court, under W.Va.Code, 48A-4-7(a), the petitioner has the burden of scheduling a hearing.
An answer in opposition to the petition for review is expressly authorized under W.Va.Code, 48A-4-9, but its purpose is limited to “disclosing any matter or ground why the recommended order of the master should not be modified[.]”
The party opposing the petition for review may also assign error by filing a cross-petition for review in a timely fashion under W.Va. Code, 48A-4-7(b) (1990).
Prom this, we conclude that if the party filing a petition for review delays in setting the matter for hearing before the circuit court, the other party may have it set for hearing. The parties may submit the case on the record and may expressly waive a hearing before the circuit judge. The judge may also advise the parties, after reviewing the record, that a hearing is not necessary. In such a case, the petition can be decided based on the pleadings and the record from the family law master’s proceedings without further delay. We further conclude that a hearing on a petition for review before a circuit judge can be set by either party or by the judge, subject to the time constraints contained in W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10 (1990). It should be noted that under W.Va.Code, 48A-4-5 (1990), the family law master is not empowered to enter a final divorce order, this being the prerogative of the circuit court.
Under W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10(a), a circuit court can review the family law master’s recommended order immediately if no petition for review has been timely filed or if the parties have expressly waived the right to file a petition for review. Otherwise, the circuit court must wait until the time periods for filing a petition for review and an answer have expired, unless there has been an express waiver of the answer.
The clerk of the court must verify the lack of an answer to the petition for review or the existence of any extension of time or cross-petition. This will inform the court that the case is ready for disposition.
Thus, W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10(a), provides for minimum time periods that must expire before a circuit court may act on a petition for review of a family law master’s decision and recommended order. W.Va. Code, 48A-4-10(e), provides for a ten-day period to act on the petition for review once it has been properly submitted to the circuit court.
We do not interpret the ten-day period to be controlling in those complex cases where hearings must be held by the circuit judge to refine and more fully develop the issues in order to make a proper ruling on a petition for review.
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MILLER, Justice:
We granted this original proceeding for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus in order to delineate the proper procedure for review of and for obtaining an evidentiary record of the proceedings held before a family law master in a divorce case which is appealed to the circuit court. The rela
tor asserts that the failure of the Circuit Court of Putnam County to correct certain procedural problems in such a case constituted an abuse of its authority.
This issue arose when the respondent wife petitioned for review of a family law master’s recommended order regarding custody of the parties’ minor daughter by filing exceptions with the circuit court on November 7, 1990. The exceptions were filed within the ten-day period prescribed by W.Va.Code, 48A-4-7(a) (1990).
We note that this section provides the right to an extension of the ten-day filing period upon application to the circuit court.
The relator husband did not file an answer in opposition to the petition for review as permitted by W.Va.Code, 48A-4-9 (1990).
However, on December 11, 1990, he filed a notice advising the wife that a hearing had been set before the respondent judge for December 21,1990. This hearing was canceled by the judge. After several postponements, hearings were conducted before the circuit court on April 24, 1991, and August 1, 1991.
At the April 24, 1991 hearing, the husband produced a witness, Jeffrey L. Harlow, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, whose earlier testimony before the family law master had purportedly favored the husband. Dr. Harlow had continued to have contact with the child, and his position before the respondent judge was in favor of the family law master’s recommended order granting custody to the husband.
The husband had made continued complaints about the lack of a transcript of the proceedings before the family law master, and he renewed this complaint at the April 24, 1991 hearing. The wife, through her attorney, filed a transcript with the circuit judge on April 30, 1991, but its accuracy is challenged by the husband. The husband’s chief complaints are the delay in hearing the petition for review, the lack of a transcript, and the judge’s failure to take affirmative action on these matters. He seeks to compel the respondent judge to enter an order consistent with the family law master’s recommended order.
I.
With regard to the delay in hearing the petition for review, the family law master statute does provide some procedural guidelines. First, as we have already noted, W.Va.Code, 48A-4-7(a), requires the filing of the petition for review within ten days after service of the family law master’s recommended order on the parties.
We spoke to this matter in Syllabus Point 3 of
Segal v. Beard,
181 W.Va. 92, 380 S.E.2d 444 (1989):
“The ten-day period for filing a petition for review of a family law master’s recommended [order],
W.Va.Code,
48A-4-7(a) [1986], is tolled until an aggrieved party is served with notice of the filing of the recommended [order]. The family law master must serve notice of the filing of the recommended [order].”
This rule is now codified in W.Va.Code, 48A-4-4a (1990), which prescribes the form of the notice which accompanies the family law master’s recommended order. The notice is designed to advise the parties of their appeal rights. W.Va.Code, 48A-4-4a also provides that once the family law master signs the recommended order, there is no need to obtain the signatures of the parties or their attorneys indicating that they have inspected or approved it.
The contents of the petition for review are controlled by W.Va.Code, 48A-4-8 (1990). The statute’s focus is on the family law master’s recommended order. The petition must identify the “errors complained of with reasonable certainty,” and “[p]arts of the master’s report not excepted to are admitted to be correct[.]”
Once a petition for review of a family law master’s recommended order is filed with the circuit court, under W.Va.Code, 48A-4-7(a), the petitioner has the burden of scheduling a hearing.
An answer in opposition to the petition for review is expressly authorized under W.Va.Code, 48A-4-9, but its purpose is limited to “disclosing any matter or ground why the recommended order of the master should not be modified[.]”
The party opposing the petition for review may also assign error by filing a cross-petition for review in a timely fashion under W.Va. Code, 48A-4-7(b) (1990).
Prom this, we conclude that if the party filing a petition for review delays in setting the matter for hearing before the circuit court, the other party may have it set for hearing. The parties may submit the case on the record and may expressly waive a hearing before the circuit judge. The judge may also advise the parties, after reviewing the record, that a hearing is not necessary. In such a case, the petition can be decided based on the pleadings and the record from the family law master’s proceedings without further delay. We further conclude that a hearing on a petition for review before a circuit judge can be set by either party or by the judge, subject to the time constraints contained in W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10 (1990). It should be noted that under W.Va.Code, 48A-4-5 (1990), the family law master is not empowered to enter a final divorce order, this being the prerogative of the circuit court.
Under W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10(a), a circuit court can review the family law master’s recommended order immediately if no petition for review has been timely filed or if the parties have expressly waived the right to file a petition for review. Otherwise, the circuit court must wait until the time periods for filing a petition for review and an answer have expired, unless there has been an express waiver of the answer.
The clerk of the court must verify the lack of an answer to the petition for review or the existence of any extension of time or cross-petition. This will inform the court that the case is ready for disposition.
Thus, W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10(a), provides for minimum time periods that must expire before a circuit court may act on a petition for review of a family law master’s decision and recommended order. W.Va. Code, 48A-4-10(e), provides for a ten-day period to act on the petition for review once it has been properly submitted to the circuit court.
We do not interpret the ten-day period to be controlling in those complex cases where hearings must be held by the circuit judge to refine and more fully develop the issues in order to make a proper ruling on a petition for review.
In this case, the husband promptly applied to have the wife’s petition for review heard by the circuit court. There was some delay in securing the hearing, but the record does not disclose the reasons for the several postponements. Part of the delay was allegedly due to the lack of an adequate record from the tapes recorded at the family law master hearings. We address this problem in the next section.
II.
The husband claims that the wife was dilatory in providing the circuit court with a transcript of the proceedings before the family law master. The wife claims that the quality of the audio tape recordings was so poor that complete transcription was not possible. The legislature has provided in W.Va.Code, 48A-4-2(e) (1990), that “[h]earings before a [family law] master shall be recorded electronically.” This section further provides that upon the request of either party, “a duplicate copy of the tape” shall be provided. This section goes on to provide that “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the court, the preparation of a transcript and the payment of the cost thereof shall be the responsibility of the party requesting the transcript.”
In summary, W.Va.Code, 48A-4-2(e), provides that hearings before a family law master shall be electronically recorded and requires the master, on request by either party, to provide a duplicate copy of the tape. In addition, this section permits a circuit judge to order a transcript of that portion of the tape recording which is the subject of review. If a party wishes a transcript of the tape recording, it is that party’s responsibility to procure and pay for it.
In furtherance of these provisions, we conclude that in the event that the circuit court orders a transcript of the tape recording, it shall be transcribed by a transcription service or by the court reporter. The cost shall be borne by one or both parties, unless indigent, as the court deems appropriate. Where a party secures a transcript of the tape recording for use on review, it must be verified by the transcriber as true and accurate, and a copy must be sent to the opposing party.
Moreover, W.Va.Code, 48A-4-2(f) (1990), states that the record of the proceedings before the family law master shall consist of “[t]he recording of the hearing or the transcript of testimony, as the case may be, and the exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding[.]”
The clear import of this language is that the tape recording is the evidentiary record of the family law master’s hearing unless one of the parties elects to obtain a transcript. Finally, we emphasize that neither W.Va.Code, 48A-4-2(e), nor any other provision of W.Va.Code, 48A-4-1,
et seq.,
mandates that a transcript of the hearings before the family law master must be obtained in order to pursue a petition for review.
It must be remembered that the circuit court does not act
de novo,
but reviews the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the family law master. In those cases where there is no contest over the recommended order, there is obviously no need for an elaborate review or an eviden-tiary record.
Where a petition for review is filed, a party may utilize the procedure outlined in Rule 4A(c) of the West Virginia Rules of
Appellate Procedure for making an eviden-tiary record.
This provision authorizes the petitioner, in lieu of a transcript of the testimony, to “set out in the petition a statement of facts pertinent to the issues he raises. The petition shall include a certificate by the petitioner’s attorney that the facts alleged are faithfully represented[.]”
Rule 4A(b) requires that a copy of the petition be served on the opposing party to enable such party to file a response. The same procedure exists with respect to the filing of a petition for review, W.Va. Code, 48A-4-8, and the filing of an answer in opposition, W.Va.Code, 48A-4-9.
Under this procedure, the petition and response may be sufficient for the circuit court to determine factually the merits of the petition for review. If not, the court may utilize the tape recordings and may, by order, obtain a transcript of the relevant portion of the tape recording as outlined earlier.
In this case, the assertion is made that the tape recordings were not sufficiently audible to provide a relevant factual review. The merits of this claim were not addressed by the circuit court. We, therefore, have no finding that the tape recording was, in fact, inaudible. However, there are several procedures that can be followed where a claim of inaudibility is made.
First, the judge must resolve whether the tape, or a portion thereof, is inaudible and, at the same time, determine whether this is crucial to a resolution of the petition for appeal. If the judge finds that the tape is inaudible and further finds that the inaudibility affects the court’s ability to dispose of the petition for review, the matter may be resolved by reference to W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10(d). This section provides that where the court finds that “a [family law] master’s recommended order is deficient as to matters which might be affected by evidence not considered or inadequately developed,” the circuit court “may recommit the recommended order to the [family law] master, with instructions ..., or the circuit court may proceed to take such evidence without recommitting the matter.”
Thus, it is clear that under W.Va. Code, 48A-4-10(d), a circuit court may recommit a recommended order which is deficient as to matters which might be affected by evidence not considered or inadequately developed in the family law master’s recommended order. However, the circuit court must, by order, instruct the family law master as to the deficiencies in the record. We see no reason why a similar procedure cannot be followed where there is an evidentiary deficiency because of an inaudible tape recording. In this event, the order should instruct the family law master as to the portions of the tape recording
which are inaudible and as to the evidence which needs to be retaken. This procedure accords with the provisions of W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10(d), which permits a circuit court to recommit a case to the family law master with instructions indicating the court’s opinion as to what shall he done upon the recommitment. Obviously, a copy of the order should he sent to the family law master and to the parties so that they may be apprised of the circuit court’s instructions on recommitment.
In the alternative, the circuit court may elect to use the provisions of Rule 80(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides the use of a statement of evidence in lieu of a transcript.
This device allows the court which has heard the case to approve or amend the statement of evidence. In the context of this case, this would be the family law master. Thus, a circuit judge who finds the recording inaudible, may, after consulting with the parties as to the feasibility of such a statement of evidence, order supplementation of the record under Rule 80(e). The judge may refer settlement and approval of the statement of evidence to the family law master unless the judge feels such referral is unnecessary.
Consequently, we conclude that where a circuit court finds that all or portions of the audio tape taken at the family law master’s hearing are inaudible and that the inaudible portions are essential to the resolution of the petition for review, the circuit court may utilize the provisions of W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10(d), or of Rule 80(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain the missing evidence.
Finally, we stress that one of the chief purposes of the legislative adoption of the family law master system was to expedite divorce, alimony, and child support procedures.
See
W.Va.Code, 48A-4-11 (1990). The provisions outlined in this opinion are designed to assist this endeavor. Counsel participating in this system are urged to cooperate in achieving this goal by refraining from needless technicalities. Family law masters and circuit courts can provide vital aid in the prompt scheduling of hearings and the rendering of opinions.
III.
In this case, we are unable to conclude from the limited record that the respondent judge’s failure to enter an order in accordance with the recommended order of the family law master warrants granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. Our traditional rule in prohibition was stated in Syllabus Point 2 of
State ex rel. Winter v. MacQueen,
161 W.Va. 30, 239 S.E.2d 660 (1977):
“Prohibition will lie to prohibit a judge from exceeding his legitimate powers.”
See also State ex rel. Moomau v. Hamilton,
184 W.Va. 251, 400 S.E.2d 259 (1990);
State ex rel. King v. MacQueen,
182 W.Va.
162, 386 S.E.2d 819 (1986);
State ex rel. Arnold v. Egnor,
166 W.Va. 411, 275 S.E.2d 15 (1981). We do, however, issue a moulded writ of mandamus directing the respondent judge to set this matter for a further hearing as promptly as possible.
Writ of prohibition denied, and moulded writ of mandamus granted.