State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Board of Education

647 P.2d 329, 231 Kan. 579, 1982 Kan. LEXIS 291
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJune 30, 1982
Docket54,518
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 647 P.2d 329 (State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Board of Education, 647 P.2d 329, 231 Kan. 579, 1982 Kan. LEXIS 291 (kan 1982).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Fromme, J.:

This is an original action in mandamus brought by the State of Kansas on relation of the attorney general asking this court to issue an order or writ to compel the Board of Education of Unified School District No. 428, Barton County, Kansas, to provide the students of that district with bus transportation. We are asked to hold that the Board must “provide or furnish transportation” by owning and operating its own vehicles or by contracting with a public or private carrier to transport the students.

*580 In response to the petition, the Board argues that the present statutes relating to the transportation of students authorize the Board to “provide or furnish transportation” either by transporting the students by bus or by providing for reimbursement of those persons who furnish transportation in privately owned automobiles.

The facts leading to the present action are not in dispute and in summary are substantially as follows:

The Board of Education of Unified School District No. 428 (the Board) on unification accepted the territory of a separate school district known as Bissell’s Point located in the northeastern portions of the county and of the unified district. Prior to unification the Bissell’s Point School District operated a bus system. Other districts in the area of the unified district No. 428 did not. Following unification this practice continued. Bus service was provided only in the area formerly in the Bissell’s Point School District.

In June, 1981, the Board, which is the respondent herein, voted to discontinue bus service to pupils residing in that portion of the district known as the Bissell’s Point area, effective with the beginning of the 1982-83 school year.

The Board notified the parents and guardians of pupils who would be affected by this action that the Board would contract with them for the transportation of their children at a reasonable rate per mile. During the fall of 1981, the Board distributed a questionaire to parents and guardians of pupils in the Bissell’s Point area who were eligible to receive either bus transportation or mileage reimbursement. Results of this questionnaire showed that over two-thirds of those responding favored mileage reimbursement over bussing.

In the fall of 1981, the Board requested a legal opinion from the Attorney General as to the extent of its duty in providing or furnishing transportation under the applicable statutes. The Attorney General issued a formal opinion advising the Board it had an affirmative duty to provide bus transportation, and could not employ mileage reimbursement contracts except under limited special circumstances.

The Board sought and obtained an estimate of the amount of original outlay it would take to establish bus transportation in the district. The business manager of the district estimated the cost to *581 be $350,000.00 to $500,000.00. The Board reaffirmed its earlier decision to end bus service in the Bissell’s Point area and to substitute mileage reimbursement contracts for the entire unified district. The present action by the Attorney General followed.

The petitioner and the respondent Board have filed separate memoranda of arguments and authorities. In addition the petitioner has filed a response to respondent’s memorandum.

Because of the press of time on school district budget questions and other critical factors which are concerned in any decision of this court, we have considered the arguments and authorities cited by both parties, and have decided that oral arguments are not necessary. A decision in this matter must rest in large part on a construction of certain statutes which govern the transportation of students by school districts.

The definitions section, K.S.A. 72-8301(c), states:

“(c) The words ‘provide or furnish transportation in addition to their ordinary meaning shall mean and include the right of a school district to: (1) Purchase, operate and maintain school buses and other motor vehicles; (2) contract, lease or hire school buses and other motor vehicles for the transportation of pupils, students and school personnel; (3) purchase, operate and maintain buses other than school buses for the transportation of pupils, students or school personnel to or from school-related functions or activities; (4) contract, lease or hire buses other than school buses for the transportation of pupils, students and school personnel if said buses are owned and operated by a public common carrier of passengers under a certificate of convenience and necessity granted by the state corporation commission or the interstate commerce commission and are operating within the authority granted to said public common carrier; and (5) reimburse persons who furnish transportation to pupils, students or school personnel in privately owned motor vehicles.” Emphasis supplied.

K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 72-8302 relating to the transportation of students in pertinent part reads:

“(a) The board of education of any school district may provide or furnish transportation for pupils to or from any school of the school district. Every school district shall provide or furnish transportation for every pupil who resides in the school district and who attends any of grades kindergarten through twelve at a school of the school district subject to the conditions specified in provision (2) and to any one of the following conditions:
“(1) (A) The residence of the pupil is inside or outside the corporate limits of a city, the school building attended is outside the corporate limits of a city and the school building attended is more than 2 xh miles by the usually traveled road from the residence of the pupil, or
“(B) the residence of the pupil is outside the corporate limits of a city, the school building attended is inside the corporate limits of a city and the school attended is more than 2 x/% miles by the usually traveled road from the residence of the pupil, or
*582 “(C) the residence of the pupil is inside the corporate limits of one city, the school building attended is inside the corporate limits of a different city and the school building attended is more than 2 ¥2 miles by the usually traveled road from the residence of the pupil.” Emphasis supplied.

K.S.A. 72-8303 authorizes the boards of education to prescribe the routes over which transportation of its students is to be provided on a daily basis.

The sharpest conflict between the parties seems to arise from their differing construction of K.S.A. 72-8304 which states:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
647 P.2d 329, 231 Kan. 579, 1982 Kan. LEXIS 291, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-stephan-v-board-of-education-kan-1982.