State ex rel. St. Louis Regional Health Care Corp. v. Wamser

735 S.W.2d 741, 1987 Mo. App. LEXIS 4473
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 28, 1987
DocketNos. 51985, 51986
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 735 S.W.2d 741 (State ex rel. St. Louis Regional Health Care Corp. v. Wamser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. St. Louis Regional Health Care Corp. v. Wamser, 735 S.W.2d 741, 1987 Mo. App. LEXIS 4473 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

SMITH, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from a permanent writ of prohibition issued against the St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners precluding it from certifying to the Board of Aldermen the sufficiency of petitions of initiative concerning a “Proposition 1.” The Committee of Petitioners intervened as respondents below and the City of St. Louis intervened as relators. Both Regional Health Care and the City have filed briefs here; only the Committee has filed a brief challenging the order of the trial court. We affirm.

In September 1985, the Board of Aider-men of the City passed Ordinance 59532, and it was signed by the mayor. That ordinance authorized the City to enter into [742]*742a contract with Regional for Regional to provide health care services to citizens of St. Louis. This was to replace the previous delivery of such services directly by the City. The ordinance contained an emergency clause making it immediately effective. The contract was entered into shortly after the ordinance was signed by the mayor. Subsequent thereto Regional purchased a hospital at 5535 Delmar and has operated that hospital pursuant to the contract along with several clinics leased from the City. On February 28, 1986, the Committee of Petitioners submitted to the Election Board two petitions delineated as Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. These were signed by a number of registered voters of the City. On March 14, 1986, the Election Board determined that an inadequate number of signatures under the City Charter had been obtained to require certification to the Board of Aldermen. A supplemental period of time was granted to obtain the requisite signatures. Additional signatures were obtained within that time and the Election Board found 11,945 valid signatures on Proposition 1 and 12,066 on Proposition 2. The Election Board determined that 11,659 signatures were necessary to meet the five percent initiative requirement of the City Charter. It announced its intention to certify the propositions to the Board of Aldermen. Regional then sought a writ of prohibition against the Election Board to prevent such certification and following a hearing a permanent writ issued preventing certification of proposition l.1 The trial court filed an opinion setting forth its reasons for issuance of the writ. The opinion set forth a multitude of grounds. We need deal with only one.

At the outset we can state that Proposition 1 is at best confusing. We have attached it as an appendix to this opinion. By its language it appears to call for an election to determine whether an election should be held. The second election would be to determine whether the ordinance set forth in Proposition 1 is to be passed. Whether this double election was in fact intended by the Committee or was simply the result of bad draftsmanship or misunderstanding of the charter provisions is intriguing but unnecessary of resolution. Proposition 1 is not an initiative at all, but rather a referendum and as such fails to comply with either the time limitations or the requisite signatures provisions of the charter.

The Charter of the City of St. Louis sets out with considerable precision the differences and procedures for initiative and referendum. Charter, Art. V and VI. In Sec. 1 of article V the following appears:

“The people shall have power, at their option, to propose ordinances, including ordinances proposing amendments to this charter, and to adopt same at the polls, with the same effect as if adopted by the board of aldermen and approved by the mayor, such power being known as the initiative. It shall be exercised as hereinafter provided, subject to the provisions of this charter. (Emphasis supplied).

The subsequent provision of that Article requires that the petition be signed by five per cent of the registered voters. No time limit is provided for the obtaining of the required signatures.

Sec. 1, Article VI provides:
“The people shall have power, at their option, to approve or reject at the polls any ordinance (except it be an emergency measure as defined in Sec. 20 of Article IV), such power being known as the referendum and to be invoked and exercised as herein provided.” (Emphasis supplied).

The subsequent section provides the procedure to be followed in a referendum. It requires that within 30 days of the approval by the mayor of an ordinance (not an emergency measure) a petition must be filed with the Election Board containing signatures of two per cent of the registered voters. This thirty day provision matches the charter provisions for the ef[743]*743fective date of non-emergency ordinances. If that initial time frame is met the ordinance does not take effect. The Election Board has ten days thereafter to determine if in fact the requisite signatures have been obtained. If not, the ordinance immediately goes into effect. If so, then an additional period of thirty days is allowed to obtain sufficient additional signatures to equal seven per cent of the registered voters. If those signatures are not obtained the ordinance takes effect. If the requisite number are obtained then the matter is submitted to the Board of Aldermen for reconsideration of the ordinance and upon failure of the Board to reject the ordinance the ordinance is submitted to the people.

As can be seen the procedures recognize the essential differences between initiative and referendum. The former is the proposal of legislation by the public. The latter is the overturning of legislation enacted by the representatives of the people. The former has no need for time limits and warrants a lesser initial support to justify submission to the voters. The latter requires strict time limits so as not to unduly delay the effectiveness of duly enacted legislation, and warrants a greater showing of initial support. The two are not, by their

very nature, interchangeable. The City charter provisions are roughly comparable to the scheme established by the Missouri Constitution. Mo. Const. Art. Ill, Secs. 49-53.

We turn to the proposition before us. It clearly meets neither the time constraints of Article VI nor the signature requirements of that Article. The ordinance proposed to be adopted pursuant to Proposition 1 provides that: “Ordinance # 59532 of the City of St. Louis enacted on September 19,1985 is hereby repealed, and a new ordinance is hereby proposed in lieu thereof_” (Emphasis supplied). It is impossible to conclude that the proposition seeks anything other than a rejection by the voters of Ordinance 59532. It is by charter definition a referendum. As such it did not meet the requirements of the Charter. State ex rel. Klayman v. Baine, 622 S.W.2d 757 (Mo.App.1981). The Election Board lacked the authority to certify the proposition to the Board of Aldermen and prohibition was the proper remedy to prevent its doing so.

Judgment affirmed.

DOWD and REINHARD, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

PROPOSITION #1

WARNING

It is a felony for anyone to sign any initiative or referendum petition with any name other than his or her own, or to knowingly sign his or her name more than once for the measure, or to sign such petition when he or she is not a legal voter.

TO THE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI:

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Bluebook (online)
735 S.W.2d 741, 1987 Mo. App. LEXIS 4473, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-st-louis-regional-health-care-corp-v-wamser-moctapp-1987.