State ex rel. Spriggs v. Indus. Comm.

2019 Ohio 2015
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 23, 2019
Docket17AP-519
StatusPublished

This text of 2019 Ohio 2015 (State ex rel. Spriggs v. Indus. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Spriggs v. Indus. Comm., 2019 Ohio 2015 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Spriggs v. Indus. Comm., 2019-Ohio-2015.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

The State ex rel. Brandon M. Spriggs, :

Relator, :

v. : No. 17AP-519

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on May 23, 2019

Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co. L.P.A., Jerald A. Schneiberg, and Scott J. Pullar, for relator.

[Dave Yost], Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

McGRATH, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Brandon M. Spriggs, filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("the commission"), to vacate its order which denied a total loss of use of the right fourth finger and ordering the commission to find that he is entitled to a total loss of use award for that finger. {¶ 2} This matter was referred to a magistrate of this court pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued the appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, determined that the commission's finding was supported by some evidence in the record and, as a result, recommended that this court deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus. For the following reasons, we overrule relator's objections and deny the requested writ. No. 17AP-519 2

{¶ 3} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a determination of the commission, the relator must show a clear legal right to the relief sought and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a writ of mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. Elliott v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76 (1986). However, where the record contains some evidence to support the commission's findings, there has been no abuse of discretion and mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co., 29 Ohio St.3d 56 (1987). {¶ 4} Relator sustained a work-related injury to his right hand. Subsequently, he filed a C-86 motion seeking a total loss of use of his right fourth finger. Relator's request and appeals were denied and relator filed this mandamus action. {¶ 5} Relator has filed objections1 to the magistrate's findings, arguing that the magistrate erred in affirming the commission's determination, as the evidence relied upon does not sufficiently address his inability to use his right fourth finger because it fails to set forth the practical purpose served by the limited hand grasping activities. Relator contends that there was no competent medical evidence upon which the commission could have relied on to deny the motion seeking loss of use. {¶ 6} In this case, the magistrate determined that because there is some evidence in the record to support the commission's denial of relator's application for a total loss of use award, he is not entitled to mandamus relief. The magistrate found that the February 19, 2016 report of Teresa Kay Larsen, D.O., constitutes some evidence supporting the commission's denial. Relator argues that Dr. Larsen's report is not some evidence to support the commission's denial of his application because that report does not sufficiently address his inability to use his right fourth finger. {¶ 7} R.C. 4123.57(B) authorizes compensation to a claimant for the total loss of a body part. A claimant may qualify for a total loss of use award even if the body part retains some residual function. State ex rel. Varney v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 181,

1 Although titled as "objections," in essence, relator has one objection to the magistrate's decision. No. 17AP-519 3

2014-Ohio-5510, ¶ 16, citing State ex rel. Alcoa Bldg. Prods. v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 341, 2004-Ohio-3166. In order to qualify for a loss of use award, the "claimant must demonstrate with medical evidence a total loss of use of the body part at issue for all practical purposes." Id., citing Alcoa. {¶ 8} Dr. Larsen conducted an independent medical exam and recorded the following observations during the physical examination: Examination of the right hand reveals amputation of the third digit at the distal proximal phalanx. Examination of the fourth digit reveals mild joint thickening at the PIP joint without swelling and a 4.5 cm zig zag surgical scar along the volar finger from the proximal phalanx to the distal middle phlanx. There is mild tenderness along the scar. Range of motion of the MCP joint reveals full flexion to 90 degrees and full extension to 20 degrees. The PIP joint has limited extension to 30 degrees less than neutral with ability to flex to 75 degrees, and the DIP joint has limited extension to 20 degrees with ability to flex to 65 degrees. Motor strength reveals good flexor muscle activation within this range of motion. Sensation is intact to light touch throughout the fourth finger. The thumb is able to easily approximate the fourth digit tip. The nail has a normal appearance. He appears comfortable while sitting, standing, and walking in the office today.

{¶ 9} Dr. Larsen concluded: Based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, it is my opinion that the allowed injury has not resulted in total permanent loss of use of one-third, two-thirds or the entire right fourth finger. Examination of the right fourth finger today reveals that there is permanent partial impairment in range of motion at the DIP joint and PIP joints. While there are flexion contractures noted which limit extension, there is only mildly limited flexion with a residual 45 degrees of motion from flexion to extension at each of the DIP and PIP joints, allowing for some functional although impaired use of the finger in flexion for assistance in hand grasping activities. The MCP joint has full normal range of motion with no impairment.

{¶ 10} There was a subsequent follow-up report from Dr. Nguyen where Dr. Nguyen expressed his professional opinion that relator sustained injuries that resulted in No. 17AP-519 4

a total loss of use of his fourth finger. Dr. Nguyen explained that Dr. Larsen's examination had occurred one day after relator had treatment at Dr. Nguyen's office, and Dr. Nguyen expected that relator would perform better the day after treatment. However, given that relator had been receiving active rehabilitation treatment and was still experiencing pain, swelling and lack of range of motion, Dr. Nguyen felt relator had a total loss of use of his right fourth finger. {¶ 11} Despite the conflicting doctor reports, we agree with the magistrate's finding that Dr. Larsen's report constitutes some evidence. Relator contends that Dr. Larsen's report is medically deficient because she does not explain how "some functional although impaired use of the finger in flexion for assistance in hand grasping activities" constitutes a practical purpose. Relator argues that explaining the practical purpose of any residual functionality is a required part of the medical opinion. {¶ 12} The magistrate rejected this argument finding that Dr. Larsen did provide a sufficient medical opinion. The magistrate found that Dr. Larsen's opinion that relator could independently move his fourth finger is significant because it affects the ability to make a fist and grasp objects because if that finger cannot move, it adversely affects the ability of the remaining fingers to grasp.

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Related

State ex rel. Varney v. Indus. Comm. (Slip Opinion)
2014 Ohio 5510 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2014)
Curran v. Walter E. Knipe & Sons, Inc.
138 A.2d 251 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1958)
State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Commission
228 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1967)
State ex rel. Gassmann v. Industrial Commission
322 N.E.2d 660 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1975)
State ex rel. Walker v. Industrial Commission
390 N.E.2d 1190 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1979)
State ex rel. Teece v. Industrial Commission
429 N.E.2d 433 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1981)
State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle
451 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1983)
State ex rel. Elliott v. Industrial Commission
497 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1986)
State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co.
505 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1987)
State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co.
658 N.E.2d 1055 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
2019 Ohio 2015, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-spriggs-v-indus-comm-ohioctapp-2019.