[Cite as State ex rel. Speweik v. Stierwalt, 2023-Ohio-1470.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio, ex rel. Keri L. Speweik Court of Appeals No. WD-23-017
Relator
v.
John P. Stierwalt, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Respondents Decided: May 3, 2023
*****
Lisa M. Snyder, for Relator.
Karin L. Coble, for Respondent, John P. Stierwalt.
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and James A. Hoppenjans, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondents, Hon. Matthew L. Reger, Michelle Christie, and Wood County Court of Common Pleas.
DUHART, J.
{¶ 1} Relator, Keri Speweik, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of
prohibition on April 3, 2023, against respondents, John Stierwalt, the Honorable Matthew Reger, Michelle Christie, Esquire, and the Wood County Court of Common Pleas. In the
writ of habeas corpus, relator requests possession of her children, and in the writ of
prohibition, relator seeks to restrain certain respondents from exercising jurisdiction
regarding temporary orders over the custody of her minor children. Relator submits that
the issuance of a writ in prohibition will remedy the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction,
and the writ of habeas corpus will return the children to relator. For the reasons that
follow, we dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of prohibition.
Background
{¶ 2} In her petition, relator alleges the following.
{¶ 3} Relator and respondent Stierwalt were married and are the parents of two
children. A divorce action was filed in the Wood County Common Pleas Court. On
August 11, 2020, a final decree of divorce was issued wherein relator was named the
legal custodian of the children; relator had exclusive possession of the children, subject to
respondent Stierwalt’s restricted right of supervised companionship.
{¶ 4} Respondent Reger is the Wood County Common Pleas judge assigned to the
matter, and respondent Christie is the Wood County Common Pleas Domestic Relations
magistrate assigned to the matter.
{¶ 5} On March 16, 2021, respondent Stierwalt filed a motion to modify parenting
time, in which no change of circumstance was alleged, pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).
{¶ 6} On January 13, 2023, respondent Stierwalt filed a motion for emergency
2. hearing which recited the status quo and alleged no emergency. On March 17, 2023, an
evidentiary hearing was held on the motion, and on March 23, 2023, respondent Christie
issued a magistrate’s order. The order included findings of fact and conclusions of law
and changed the possession of the children from relator to respondent Stierwalt.
{¶ 7} On March 28, 2023, relator filed an objection to the magistrate’s
order/motion to set aside the order in which she “raised the procedural deficiencies of
issuing as an ‘Order’ a decision which does more than regulate the proceedings and is
dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.” Also on that day, relator filed an emergency
motion for stay. At the time relator filed her petition, these motions had not been ruled
upon by the trial court.
Law
Writ of Prohibition
{¶ 8} The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior tribunals and
courts from exceeding their jurisdiction. State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70,
73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). A writ of prohibition is an “‘extraordinary remedy which is
customarily granted with caution and restraint, and is issued only in cases of necessity
arising from the inadequacy of other remedies.’” (Citation omitted.) Id.
{¶ 9} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish three
elements: “(1) the [court or officer] is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power,
(2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause
3. injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists.” State ex
rel. Henry v. McMonagle, 87 Ohio St.3d 543, 544, 721 N.E.2d 1051 (2000).
{¶ 10} A prohibition action may be dismissed sua sponte and without notice if the
court finds the petition is frivolous or it is obvious that the allegations in the petition are
not legally sufficient. State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-
6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
{¶ 11} R.C. 2725.01 provides that “[w]hoever is * * * entitled to the custody of
another, of which custody such person is unlawfully deprived, may prosecute a writ of
habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such * * *.”
{¶ 12} Habeas corpus is not available in a child-custody action “when there is an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Lee v. Weir, 150 Ohio St.3d 110, 2016-
Ohio-8104, 79 N.E.3d 529, ¶ 9, quoting In re G.T.B., 128 Ohio St.3d 502, 2011-Ohio-
1789, 947 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 8. An exception to the general rule permits jurisdictional claims
to be raised in a habeas corpus action. Ross v. Saros, 99 Ohio St.3d 412, 2003-Ohio-
4128, 792 N.E.2d 1126, ¶ 13.
Child Custody
{¶ 13} R.C. 3105.65(B) provides “[t]he court has full power to enforce its decree
and retains jurisdiction to modify all matters pertaining to the allocation of parental rights
and responsibilities for the care of the children, to the designation of a residential parent
4. and legal custodian of the children, to child support, to parenting time of parents with the
children * * *.” See also Loetz v. Loetz, 63 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 406 N.E.2d 1093 (1980).
Analysis and Conclusion
{¶ 14} The basis of relator’s petition is that respondent Stierwalt did not allege a
change of circumstance in his motion to modify parenting time, therefore respondents
Reger and Christie of the Wood County Common Pleas Court were without jurisdiction
to modify the existing child custody orders.
{¶ 15} Upon review, relator alleged in her petition that Wood County Common
Pleas Court issued a final decree of divorce, naming her the legal custodian of the
children. Respondent Stierwalt then filed a motion to modify parenting time and a
motion for emergency hearing, a hearing was held and a magistrate’s order was issued.
{¶ 16} Based on these allegations, we find that respondents Reger and Christie of
the Wood County Common Pleas Court have exercised judicial power. We further find
since the Wood County Common Pleas Court rendered the original divorce decree
involving relator and respondent Stierwalt, that court retains continuing jurisdiction over
matters relating to the custody, care, and support of relator and respondent Stierwalt’s
minor children. We therefore find that respondents Reger and Christie of the Wood
County Common Pleas Court, in exercising their judicial power, did not patently and
5. unambiguously lack jurisdiction to modify the existing child custody arrangement and
award temporary custody of the children to respondent Stierwalt. See R.C. 3105.65(B).
{¶ 17} We conclude the Wood County Common Pleas Court clearly possessed
jurisdiction to determine whether to modify the custody of the children and award
temporary custody to respondent Stierwalt, and relator has an adequate remedy at law as
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[Cite as State ex rel. Speweik v. Stierwalt, 2023-Ohio-1470.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio, ex rel. Keri L. Speweik Court of Appeals No. WD-23-017
Relator
v.
John P. Stierwalt, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Respondents Decided: May 3, 2023
*****
Lisa M. Snyder, for Relator.
Karin L. Coble, for Respondent, John P. Stierwalt.
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and James A. Hoppenjans, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondents, Hon. Matthew L. Reger, Michelle Christie, and Wood County Court of Common Pleas.
DUHART, J.
{¶ 1} Relator, Keri Speweik, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of
prohibition on April 3, 2023, against respondents, John Stierwalt, the Honorable Matthew Reger, Michelle Christie, Esquire, and the Wood County Court of Common Pleas. In the
writ of habeas corpus, relator requests possession of her children, and in the writ of
prohibition, relator seeks to restrain certain respondents from exercising jurisdiction
regarding temporary orders over the custody of her minor children. Relator submits that
the issuance of a writ in prohibition will remedy the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction,
and the writ of habeas corpus will return the children to relator. For the reasons that
follow, we dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of prohibition.
Background
{¶ 2} In her petition, relator alleges the following.
{¶ 3} Relator and respondent Stierwalt were married and are the parents of two
children. A divorce action was filed in the Wood County Common Pleas Court. On
August 11, 2020, a final decree of divorce was issued wherein relator was named the
legal custodian of the children; relator had exclusive possession of the children, subject to
respondent Stierwalt’s restricted right of supervised companionship.
{¶ 4} Respondent Reger is the Wood County Common Pleas judge assigned to the
matter, and respondent Christie is the Wood County Common Pleas Domestic Relations
magistrate assigned to the matter.
{¶ 5} On March 16, 2021, respondent Stierwalt filed a motion to modify parenting
time, in which no change of circumstance was alleged, pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a).
{¶ 6} On January 13, 2023, respondent Stierwalt filed a motion for emergency
2. hearing which recited the status quo and alleged no emergency. On March 17, 2023, an
evidentiary hearing was held on the motion, and on March 23, 2023, respondent Christie
issued a magistrate’s order. The order included findings of fact and conclusions of law
and changed the possession of the children from relator to respondent Stierwalt.
{¶ 7} On March 28, 2023, relator filed an objection to the magistrate’s
order/motion to set aside the order in which she “raised the procedural deficiencies of
issuing as an ‘Order’ a decision which does more than regulate the proceedings and is
dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.” Also on that day, relator filed an emergency
motion for stay. At the time relator filed her petition, these motions had not been ruled
upon by the trial court.
Law
Writ of Prohibition
{¶ 8} The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior tribunals and
courts from exceeding their jurisdiction. State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70,
73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). A writ of prohibition is an “‘extraordinary remedy which is
customarily granted with caution and restraint, and is issued only in cases of necessity
arising from the inadequacy of other remedies.’” (Citation omitted.) Id.
{¶ 9} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish three
elements: “(1) the [court or officer] is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power,
(2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause
3. injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists.” State ex
rel. Henry v. McMonagle, 87 Ohio St.3d 543, 544, 721 N.E.2d 1051 (2000).
{¶ 10} A prohibition action may be dismissed sua sponte and without notice if the
court finds the petition is frivolous or it is obvious that the allegations in the petition are
not legally sufficient. State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-
6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
{¶ 11} R.C. 2725.01 provides that “[w]hoever is * * * entitled to the custody of
another, of which custody such person is unlawfully deprived, may prosecute a writ of
habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such * * *.”
{¶ 12} Habeas corpus is not available in a child-custody action “when there is an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Lee v. Weir, 150 Ohio St.3d 110, 2016-
Ohio-8104, 79 N.E.3d 529, ¶ 9, quoting In re G.T.B., 128 Ohio St.3d 502, 2011-Ohio-
1789, 947 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 8. An exception to the general rule permits jurisdictional claims
to be raised in a habeas corpus action. Ross v. Saros, 99 Ohio St.3d 412, 2003-Ohio-
4128, 792 N.E.2d 1126, ¶ 13.
Child Custody
{¶ 13} R.C. 3105.65(B) provides “[t]he court has full power to enforce its decree
and retains jurisdiction to modify all matters pertaining to the allocation of parental rights
and responsibilities for the care of the children, to the designation of a residential parent
4. and legal custodian of the children, to child support, to parenting time of parents with the
children * * *.” See also Loetz v. Loetz, 63 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 406 N.E.2d 1093 (1980).
Analysis and Conclusion
{¶ 14} The basis of relator’s petition is that respondent Stierwalt did not allege a
change of circumstance in his motion to modify parenting time, therefore respondents
Reger and Christie of the Wood County Common Pleas Court were without jurisdiction
to modify the existing child custody orders.
{¶ 15} Upon review, relator alleged in her petition that Wood County Common
Pleas Court issued a final decree of divorce, naming her the legal custodian of the
children. Respondent Stierwalt then filed a motion to modify parenting time and a
motion for emergency hearing, a hearing was held and a magistrate’s order was issued.
{¶ 16} Based on these allegations, we find that respondents Reger and Christie of
the Wood County Common Pleas Court have exercised judicial power. We further find
since the Wood County Common Pleas Court rendered the original divorce decree
involving relator and respondent Stierwalt, that court retains continuing jurisdiction over
matters relating to the custody, care, and support of relator and respondent Stierwalt’s
minor children. We therefore find that respondents Reger and Christie of the Wood
County Common Pleas Court, in exercising their judicial power, did not patently and
5. unambiguously lack jurisdiction to modify the existing child custody arrangement and
award temporary custody of the children to respondent Stierwalt. See R.C. 3105.65(B).
{¶ 17} We conclude the Wood County Common Pleas Court clearly possessed
jurisdiction to determine whether to modify the custody of the children and award
temporary custody to respondent Stierwalt, and relator has an adequate remedy at law as
she can appeal any adverse judgment. As such, we find relator has not satisfied all of the
elements necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue, and we sua sponte dismiss her
petition for writ of prohibition, as the allegations in the petition are not legally sufficient.
{¶ 18} As noted above, a writ of habeas corpus will not issue if the relator has an
adequate remedy at law. Upon review of relator’s petition, we observe that she did not
allege that she lacks an adequate remedy at law. Rather, relator alleged that she filed an
objection to the magistrate’s order/motion to set aside the order. Thus, we find relator
had, and has used, an adequate remedy at law to challenge the magistrate’s order by
objecting to the magistrate’s order and moving to set the order aside. Relator may then
appeal any adverse judgment issued by the Wood County Common Pleas Court.
{¶ 19} Because we conclude that relator has an adequate remedy available to her
in the ordinary course of law, we deny her request for a writ of habeas corpus.
{¶ 20} Accordingly, relator’s petition is dismissed on its face at relator’s costs.
{¶ 21} It is so ordered.
6. {¶ 22} To the Clerk of Court: The clerk is hereby directed to immediately serve
upon all parties a copy of this dismissal of relator’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and writ of prohibition in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B).
Petition dismissed, writs denied.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, P.J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
7.