State Ex Rel. Smith v. Joynt

127 S.W.2d 708, 344 Mo. 686, 1939 Mo. LEXIS 629
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedMay 2, 1939
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 127 S.W.2d 708 (State Ex Rel. Smith v. Joynt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Smith v. Joynt, 127 S.W.2d 708, 344 Mo. 686, 1939 Mo. LEXIS 629 (Mo. 1939).

Opinion

*689 GANTT, J.

This came to me on reassignment. Original action in prohibition. Respondent, Hon. John W. Joynt, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City .of St. Louis, filed motions to .strike relators’ brief and abstract from the record as in violation of certain rules of this court. We find the brief and abstract-to be in substantial compliance with said rules, and the motions are overruled., - ...

Our provisional rule challenged the validity of the judgment and orders entered by' respondent judge -in the case of Robert M. Boyles v. Max H. Doyne et al., pending in said court, Respondent *690 Paul Dillon was appointed receiver in said case. Relator C. E. Smith was not a party to the Boyles ease. Even so, he is a proper party as relator in this original action. [State ex rel. v. Calhoun, 226 S. W. 329.]

In due course respondent judge made return to our provisional rule. The return did not deny a single allegation of the petition for the rule. The facts alleged in the return are the same as the facts alleged in the petition for the rule. Relators filed no reply to the return. It was unnecessary. The parties agreed on the facts. In this situation respondent judge filed a motion to quash the rule. The motion is in the nature of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It follows that the admitted facts are alleged in both the petition for our rule and the return filed by respondent judge.

The Boyles case was ruled by respondent judge on plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both the petition for our rule and the return allege' all of the pleadings in the circuit court. The defendants in said case are Max H. Doyne, Martin C. Beck, Samuel B. May, Milton H. Kinsey, Ralph H. Saettele and Frank R. Nohl. The last three defendants confessed plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and for that reason will be considered plaintiffs in the Boyles ease.

The petition in said case alleged that on January 1, 1928, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a partnership to conduct, in the City of St. Louis, a consulting and constructing engineering business under the name of C. E. Smith & Go.; that on October 15, 1935, the partnership was dissolved by the resignation of Boyles, and that a receiver should be appointed and the business liquidated. It will be noted that the petition alleged no facts but merely alleged a conclusion that the business was a partnership.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings admitted all the facts well pleaded in the answer of defendants Doyne, Beck and May. Furthermore, said facts must be considered a part of the petition in determining the question of whether or not the facts show, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs and defendants were partners in conducting the eohsulting 'and constructing engineering business. [State ex rel. v. Allen, 85 S. W. (2d) 455, l. c. 460.] It should be here stated that the plaintiffs contend that the relationship was that of partnership or joint adventure. The defendants contend that the relationship was that of employer and employee:

Thus it appears that the only question for determination is whether or not the petition in the Boyles case stated a cause of action. In other words, did the petition, including the admitted, facts in defendants’ answer, state a cause of action authorizing a receivership and liquidation of the business as a-partnership.or joint adventure?

The respondent judge' ruled that the plaintiffs and defendants were either partners or joint adventurers, and accordingly entered *691 judgment. Defendants’ motion to vacate and set aside said judgment is pending in said court. The material parts of the answer of defendants Doyne, Beck and May follow:

“Come now Max H. Doyne, Martin C. Beck and Samuel B. May, and for answer to plaintiff’s petition filed herein, deny each and every allegation therein contained.

“Further answering these defendants specifically deny that they entered into any association in the nature of a partnership with the plaintiff or with anyone else for the purpose of carrying on, in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, a consulting and constructing engineering business, under the firm name and style of C. E. Smith & Company, or under any other or similiar name, and specifically deny that they now operate and carry on or that they have in the past operated or carried on the business of C. E. Smith & Company as a partnership with plaintiff or with anyone else.

“Further answering, these defendants state that on or about the 20th day of December, 1927, they entered into an agreement with C. E. Smith whereby they agreed to conduct the business then belonging to C. E. Smith, and operated by him under the name of C. E. Smith & Company, to the best of their ability, under the terms and conditions set forth in a letter from C; E. Smith addressed to these defendants and plaintiff and remaining defendants herein and B. F. Thomas, Jr., all of whom were then employees of C. E. Smith, doing business under the name of C. E. Smith & Company, which letter was in words and figures as follows:

“ ‘December 20, 1927

“‘Messrs:

“ ‘M.’H. Doyne,

“ ‘S. B. May,

“ ‘M. C. Beck,

“ ‘B. F. Thomas, Jr.

“ ‘R. M. Boyles,

“ ‘M. M. Kinsey,

“ ‘F. R. Nohl,

“ ‘R. L. Saetfele-

“ ‘Employees of C. E. Smith & Company,

“ ‘St. Louis, Mo..

“ ‘ Gentlemen:

“ ‘Effective after December 31, 1927, on account of my taking on new business in the" east, my consulting engineering business, heretofore conducted "by "me as an individual, will be conducted for me by M. H. Doyne, "S. B. May and M. C. "Beck as a Board of Control, with M. H. Doyné as Chairman of the Board and Manager of the business.

“ ‘After Decémber 31, 1927," the only" business in this office in which I-will have "any "share of the financial profits or. deficits shall be the .design and supervision of construction of the. South Approach to the Municipal Bridge.

*692 “ ‘All other business shall be conducted for the benefit of my employees and assistants as set forth hereafter.

“ ‘After December 31, 1927, the salaries of all employees in the office working on specific jobs shall be divided between the South Approach on the one hand, and all other business on the other, and the overhead expenses that cannot be directly allocated to either shall be divided in proportion to the payroll on the Southern Approach and the payroll on all other work.

“ ‘All payments received for work on the South Approach will be credited to me and I will pay all salaries and expenses and a proportionate share of the office overhead expenses chargeable to the Southern Approach.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State Ex Rel. City of Mansfield v. Crain
301 S.W.2d 415 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1957)
Hunter v. Delta Realty Co.
169 S.W.2d 936 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1943)
State Ex Rel. Massman Construction Co. v. Buzard
145 S.W.2d 355 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1940)
Doyne v. Saettele
112 F.2d 155 (Eighth Circuit, 1940)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
127 S.W.2d 708, 344 Mo. 686, 1939 Mo. LEXIS 629, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-smith-v-joynt-mo-1939.