State Ex Rel. Smart Berg v. Big T

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: November 15, 1974
• Docket: 12705
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 12705

I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A OR F F OTN

STATE O M N A A Upon t h e r e l a t i o n F OTN, of C. E. SMART,

Petitioner,

CITY O B I G TIMBER, M N A A e t a l . , F OTN

Respondents,

and

BEN BERG e t a l . , Board o f T r u s t e e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 1, of Sweet Grass County, Montana

P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,

T E CITY O B I G TIMBER, M N A A e t a l e , H F OTN

Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. L e s s l e y , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record:

For A p p e l l a n t s :

Conrad B. F r e d r i c k s , County A t t o r n e y , argued, Big Timber, Montana Richard Josephson, C i t y A t t o r n e y , argued, Big Timber, Montana

For Respondents:

Thomas H. Mahan argued, Helena, Montana

Submitted: September 18, 1974

% 15 7')~ A ! Decided: %6t'1 5 1974 Filed : Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .

T h i s a p p e a l arises from t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t , Sweegrass County, f o l l o w i n g a combined t r i a l of a condem- n a t i o n a c t i o n and a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t o f mandate. Most o f t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t s w e r e a g r e e d upon and i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a p r e t r i a l order.

Both c a s e s i n v o l v e d proposed a l t e r a t i o n s t o S i x t h Avenue

i n Big Timber, Montana. The p l a t of t h a t s t r e e t shows i t t o be a n e i g h t y f o o t s t r i p o f l a n d b o r d e r e d by p r o p e r t y zoned a s resi-

dential. The p o r t i o n used f o r v e h i c u l a r t r a f f i c i s f o r t y f e e t wide, w i t h t w e n t y f o o t s t r i p s on e i t h e r s i d e c o n t a i n i n g s i d e w a l k s and

g r a s s parking areas.

Respondent C . E . Smart l i v e s on S i x t h Avenue d i r e c t l y a c r o s s from t h e Big Timber Grade S c h o o l , whose Board of T r u s t e e s

i s o n e of a p p e l l a n t s h e r e . The s t r e e t i t s e l f i s t h e p r o p e r t y of

t h e o t h e r a p p e l l a n t , t h e C i t y of Big Timber. I n e a r l y 1971, t h e Board of T r u s t e e s d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e

s c h o o l ' s playground s h o u l d be r e d e s i g n e d s o a s t o l e s s e n t h e d i s - t r a c t i o n c a u s e d by playground equipment b e i n g t o o n e a r t h e c l a s s -

room windows. The c o u r s e chosen was t o remove t h e cottonwood t r e e s which grew between t h e playground and S i x t h Avenue, t o r e l o c a t e t h e s i d e w a l k , and t o r e s u r f a c e t h e p l a y g r o u n d .

A f t e r t h e t r e e s were removed t h e s c h o o l b o a r d , w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e town c o u n c i l , r e l o c a t e d t h e s i d e w a l k moving it

n e x t t o t h e c u r b a l o n g S i x t h Avenue. It then applied t o t h e c i t y

building inspector f o r a permit t o construct an e i g h t f o o t chain- l i n k fence next t o t h e sidewalk. The i n s p e c t o r d e n i e d t h e a p p l i - c a t i o n , h o l d i n g t h e c i t y ' s zoning o r d i n a n c e p r o h i b i t e d p l a c i n g a

f e n c e c l o s e r t h a n f i v e f e e t from t h e p r o p e r t y l i n e - - t h e request here w a s f o r a position f i f t e e n f e e t outside t h e school's property

line. The town c o u n c i l approved t h a t d e c i s i o n and t h e s c h o o l

board i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 11-2707, R.C.M. 1947, a p p e a l e d t h e r u l i n g t o t h e C i t y Board of Adjustment.

T h a t Board r e f u s e d t o a l l o w t h e e r e c t i o n of t h e f e n c e where re-

q u e s t e d , b u t d i d g r a n t a v a r i a n c e p e r m i t t i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n on t h e

property l i n e , r a t h e r than t h e required f i v e f e e t i n s i d e t h a t

line. The s c h o o l board d i d n o t a p p e a l t h i s d e c i s i o n t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , a l t h o u g h i t c o u l d have under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e zoning o r d i n a n c e and s e c t i o n 11-2707, R.C.M. 1947. The s c h o o l board d i d , however, f i l e a c o m p l a i n t s e e k i n g

t o condemn t h e l a n d between i t s p r o p e r t y l i n e and t h e c u r b . Re-

q u i r e d t o defend t h e c i t y i n t h e condemnation a c t i o n , t h e town c o u n c i l a t t e m p t e d t o e f f e c t a compromise which would s a t i s f y t h e

n e e d s of b o t h p a r t i e s . A f t e r s e v e r a l m e e t i n g s between t h e town c o u n c i l and t h e s c h o o l b o a r d , i t was a g r e e d t h e c i t y would i n s t a l l t h e f e n c e , w i t h t h e c o s t of i n s t a l l a t i o n b e i n g borne by t h e s c h o o l

board. The l o c a t i o n of t h e f e n c e was t o be f o u r f e e t from t h e sidewalk (eleven f e e t o u t s i d e t h e school board's property l i n e ) .

The town c o u n c i l p a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n implementing t h i s compromise, b u t t h e l e g a l i t y o f t h e m e e t i n g a t which t h e v o t e was taken w a s challenged. However, l a t e r t h e r e s o l u t i o n was c l e a r l y

r a t i f i e d a t a l e g a l meeting. Upon l e a r n i n g o f t h e proposed a c t i o n s of t h e town c o u n c i l

and t h e s c h o o l b o a r d , r e s p o n d e n t C . E . Smart f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of mandate, s e e k i n g t o compel t h e s c h o o l board t o e r e c t a f e n c e on i t s p r o p e r t y l i n e and t o compel t h e town c o u n c i l and t h e s c h o o l board t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e zoning o r - d i n a n c e and s e c t i o n s 11-2707 and 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s s u e d a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r and a n a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t o f mandate. The p e t i t i o n was t h e n com-

b i n e d w i t h t h e condemnation a c t i o n f o r t r i a l . Motions were made to quash the petition for mandate; to dismiss the condemnation action; and, for a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties. Evidence was presented before the district court on July 20, 1973. On October 5, 1973, the district court decreed that: " * * * the relief prayed for by Petitioner, C. E. Smart, be granted; that the action of the City Council taken under the police power be nullified; that the Writ of Mandamus be granted; that a permanent restraining order be granted as to the erection of a fence any place except on school property or on the property line; that the Respondents pay Petitioner's attorneys a fee of $1,000.00."

From that judgment and decree and from the denial of motions to amend findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment, this appeal is brought. The five issues set forth in appellants' brief can be answered by a determination of the applicability of sections 11-2707 and 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, to the facts. In pertinent part, those sections provide: "11-2707. Board of adjustment.

"(8) Any person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjust- ment, or any taxpayer, or any officer, department, board, or bureau of the municipality, may present to a court of record a petition, duly verified, setting forth that such decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality. Such petition shall be presented to the court within thirty (30) days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board." "11-2801. Discontinuation of streets--procedure. The council, or county commissioners if the town be unincorporated, may discontinue a street or alley, or any part thereof, in a city or town or unincorporated town or townsites, upon the petition in writing of all owners of lots on the streets or alleys, if it can be done without detriment to the public interest; provided that where the street or alley is to be closed for school purposes, a pe- tition signed by seventy-five per cent (75%) of the lot owners on the whole street or alley to be closed, will be required; provided further that such vacation shall not affect the right of any public utility to continue to maintain its plant and equipment in any such streets or alleys." Section 11-2707, R.C.M. 1947, provides an avenue of appeal from decisions of the city Board of Adjustment. The school board did not appeal the decision here and respondent argues the failure to do so somehow precludes the school board from bringing the condemnation action. Had the decision of the city Board of Adjustment been illegal in some respect, there might be merit to respondent's contention. Here, however, the decision does have support in the city zoning ordinance, and it appears from the record the only complaint which could have been raised was that the Board abused its discretion. Montana law vests boards of adjustment with con- siderable discretion (Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534), and the school board might justifiably have concluded an appeal on that ground would be useless. Since the statute does not mandate an appeal from all adverse rulings, we certainly cannot require one here. But re- spondent argues that a condemnation action must also comply with the provisions of section 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, and approval must be secured from lot owners on the street before the land can be condemned. The fallacy of this argument is patent: the statute on its face purports to require approval only when "the council, or county commissioners" wish to close a street. The condemnation action was brought by the school board, not the city council. It is not argued that the school board lacks the statu- tory power to condemn. Chapter 99, Title 93, R.C.M. 1947, clearly gives the right of eminent domain to schools. Furthermore, zoning ordinances cannot limit the right to exercise the power of eminent domain. 1 Nichols1, The Law of Eminent Domain S1.141[6] (3d ed. However, s e c t i o n s 93-9904 and 93-9905, R.C.M. 1947,

r e q u i r e t h a t p u b l i c p r o p e r t y can be condemned o n l y i f t h e u s e

t o which it i s t o be a p p l i e d i s a more n e c e s s a r y p u b l i c u s e .

W n o t e t h e condemnation c o m p l a i n t was amended t o p r o v i d e a e

p e r p e t u a l , p u b l i c easement f o r t h e s i d e w a l k and any n e c e s s a r y

utilities. The amended c o m p l a i n t a l s o p r o v i d e d a r e v e r s i o n , i f

t h e l a n d s h o u l d c e a s e t o be used f o r s c h o o l p u r p o s e s .

I n l i g h t of t h e b e n e f i t s t o be d e r i v e d from t h e p r o t e c -

t i o n of t h e c h i l d r e n by t h e f e n c e , and c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e pub-

l i c ' s p e d e s t r i a n u s e of t h e l a n d i n q u e s t i o n i s n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y

i m p a i r e d , w e f i n d ample e v i d e n c e t h e condemnation w i l l e f f e c t a

more n e c e s s a r y p u b l i c u s e . Therefore, w e hold t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e condemnation a c t i o n .

However, t h e s c h o o l board was n o t p r e s s i n g i t s condemna-

t i o n a c t i o n a t t h e time respondent brought h i s p e t i t i o n . The

compromise r e a c h e d by t h e c i t y and t h e s c h o o l board c o n t e m p l a t e d

t h e c i t y ' s e r e c t i o n o f t h e f e n c e under i t s p o l i c e power. The

d i s t r i c t c o u r t r u l e d t h i s t o be improper.

The c i t y c o u n c i l h a s power t o " a l t e r , widen, e x t e n d , g r a d e ,

pave, o r o t h e r w i s e improve s t r e e t s , a l l e y s , a v e n u e s , s i d e w a l k s ,

* * * and v a c a t e t h e same." S e c t i o n 11-906, R.C.M. 1947. Respon-

e n t c o r r e c t l y s u g g e s t s t h a t t h i s power i s l i m i t e d i n c e r t a i n c a s e s

by s e c t i o n 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, a s h e r e t o f o r e s e t f o r t h .

? h e h i s t o r y of s e c t i o n 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, i n d i c a t e s it

i s t h e p r o d u c t of e n a c t m e n t s and amendments d a t i n g back t o 1887.

H i s t o r i c a l l y , i t c a n be d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e s e p a r a t e s e c t i o n s . The

s t a t u t e o r i g i n a l l y provided t h a t a c i t y c o u n c i l could d i s c o n t i n u e

a s t r e e t upon p e t i t i o n of a l l t h e l o t owners on t h a t s t r e e t . Sec.

429, 5 t h Div. Comp. S t a t . 1887. I n 1929, a b i l l w a s i n t r o d u c e d i n

t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o add t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e d i s c o n t i n u a n c e

must b e done " w i t h o u t d e t r i m e n t t o t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " House Bill No. 39, Twenty-first Legislative Assembly, 1929. The provision for:75% approval of street closings for school pur- poses was added by the Affairs of Cities committee before the bill was passed. House Journal, Twenty-first Session, p. 125; Sec. 1, Ch. 13, L. 1929. In 1945, the statute was again amended to include the provision that vacation of a street will not affect the rights of public utilities to maintain their equip- ment there. Sec. 1, Ch. 36, L. 1945. Our reason for including the rather lengthy history of section 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, is to demonstrate that the present statute is the amalgam of the intent of a number of legislatures. This is important when this single statute purports to deal with the "discontinuance", "closing", and "vacation" of streets. It appears that the terms were thought of by the draftsmen as being interchangeable. With this background, we turn to the facts here to deter- mine whether the erection of the proposed fence would be a dis- continuance, closing or vacation of all or part of Sixth Avenue 1947, in Big Timber, Montana. Section 11-906, R.C.M./lists a city council's powers as they relate to streets and avenues. The list

includes altering, widening, extending, and improving those streets. It also includes vacating those streets, an action which was apparently thought to be different from the others listed. The record here indicates that the installation of the fence would be an alteration and improvement of Sixth Avenue, not a vacation, closing or discontinuance of it. The effect of this construction is in accord with the decision in Doull v. Wohlschlager, 141 Mont. 354, 365, 377 P.2d 758, where this Court said : " * * * In construing a statute, courts must first resort to the ordinary rules of grammar, and in the absence of a clear contradictory i n t e n t i o n d i s c l o s e d by t h e t e x t , must g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t according t o t h o s e r u l e s , and a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n a t u r a l and most o b v i o u s i m p o r t of t h e l a n g u a g e , w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o s u b t l e and f o r c e d con- s t r u c t i o n t o l i m i t o r extend t h e i r o p e r a t i o n . "

The n a t u r a l i m p o r t of t h e l a n g u a g e "where t h e s t r e e t o r a l l e y i s t o be c l o s e d f o r s c h o o l p u r p o s e s " ( s e c t i o n 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947) d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h e p l a c i n g of a f e n c e where i t b l o c k s n e i t h e r v e h i c u l a r nor p e d e s t r i a n t r a f f i c . Were w e t o

c o n s t r u e it o t h e r w i s e , t h e c i t y would be f o r c e d t o o b t a i n l a n d - owner a p p r o v a l e v e r y t i m e t h e y wished t o p l a c e a t r a f f i c s i g n ,

s t r e e t l i g h t , o r f i r e p l u g w i t h i n t h e p l a t t e d a r e a of a s t r e e t .

The proposed e x e r c i s e of p o l i c e power was i n a c c o r d w i t h Montana law, and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n d e c r e e i n g o t h e r -

wise. For t h i s , and t h e e r r o r s p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, w e r e v e r s e

t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and remand f o r f u r t h e r a c t i o n

not inconsistent with t h i s opinion.

Justice

W e concur:

Jhstices i