State ex rel. Shutt v. Shutt

92 So. 865, 152 La. 218, 1922 La. LEXIS 2876
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 22, 1922
DocketNo. 24335
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 92 So. 865 (State ex rel. Shutt v. Shutt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Shutt v. Shutt, 92 So. 865, 152 La. 218, 1922 La. LEXIS 2876 (La. 1922).

Opinion

PROVOSTS', C. J.

The father and mother of defendant are relators in this habeas corpus proceeding, the object of which is to recover possession of defendant’s 8- year old son. They allege that the child was given to them permanently by defendant in infancy, and that he has remained with them ever since; < that 13 days before the filing of this suit defendant secured possession of the child on the pretense of desiring to buy him [219]*219some clothes; that defendant and the mother of the child have been divorced, and that defendant recently remarried, and is not in a position to give the child proper care.

Two days after the case had been closed and taken under advisement the relators filed the following motion:

“Now into court come Mrs. Maggie Shutt and Gus Shutt, relators herein, and move and pray the court to reopen this case for further evidence.
“They show that, since the trial hereof, the names of material and important witnesses have been ascertained, who will swear that respondent lived in open adultery with his alleged present wife prior to his purported divorce from his former wife and illegal second marriage; that such conduct of respondent and the woman with whom he is now living, to w.hom he is not married, is and was a matter of common knowledge in the city of Shreveport, which conduct renders respondent totally unfit to have the custody, care and control of his minor son, William Shutt, Jr.
“Wherefore they pray that this motion be sustained, that accordingly the case be reopened, and, after due proceedings had, for judgment as originally prayed for.”

Along with this motion the relators filed another motion, asking to be allowed to withdraw the allegation made in their petition that defendant was divorced from the mother of the child, as having been made “inadvertently and erroneously,” and pleading the nullity of said divorce for want of citation.

Over the protest of defendant, the court allowed these motions to be filed, and fixed the case for trial.

On September 27, 1920, two days before the day fixed for the trial, the relators filed an amended petition renewing the allegations contained in the said two motions.

Defendant objected to these new pleadings upon every conceivable grbund; but in vain. He then filed his answer to the supplemental petition, and at the same time filed the following motion for a continuance:

“Now into court through his undersigned counsel comes W. J. Shutt, defendant in the above-entitled and numbered suit, and respectfully shows that he is unable to go to trial thereon at this time, and he asks for a continuance of the same, for the following reasons :
“He shows that, in order to accomplish their purpose, the relators .have assailed his moral character, have charged him with the gravest, or one of the gravest, moral crimes that can be committed, have cast moral obliquity upon-him and his wife, by the charge that ,he and his said wife lived in open adultery before their recent marriage.
“That these charges of the said relators are of such a grievous nature, and in the manner in which they were brought make his said wife a party to this suit, whether she has been done so by direct pleadings or not. 'That, at any rate, these charges make his said wife an-important and material witness for him, respondent, as well as herself, in his defense. That she is now seriously ill, threatened with, if her case has not already been declared and' pronounced, typhoid fever, which makes it impossible for her to appear in court and testify in the case. That by her as a witness he expects to refute the slanderous charge of adultery made against him, and his said wife. That he-cannot prove the very facts by any other-witness. That the said witness has been duly summoned according to law, and in all respects the law of summons has been complied with, and that she is within the jurisdiction of' this court.
“He shows that, without the testimony of this witness, his said -wife, he not only cannot obtain a fair trial; his case cannot be properly-presented to the court, and common justice cannot be secured; cannot be obtained in fact; that his very rights, .his superior rights that are his in both morals and the law, will be trampled on without the testimony of this-witness, and a great and cruel and outrageous wrong will be perpetrated; and he asks for a continuance until such a time as the said witness can be brought into court to testify.
“Wherefore respondent mover prays that .his-motion for a continuance be granted, and this-case be continued till such time as the said witness is able to appear in court to give her testimony so vital to this respondent, the cause of justice, and to herself.

Counsel for relators admitted that the-defendant’s wife, if present, “would refuse the immoral charges imputed to respondent as set up in the motion for a continuance”;, and thereupon the court denied the motion. [221]*221for a continuance, and ordered the trial to' I be proceeded with. To this ruling defendant duly excepted.

The word “refuse” should, we assume, he refute.

This malting of a new departure by relators was very evidently for mending their hold, they realizing that they had failed to make out a case.

The alleged inability of defendant to take proper care of the child had not been even attempted to be shown, and his alleged agreement to give up the child permanently had been denied positively by him, and testified to only by the grandmother, and, even then only in a more or less argumentative way, and would not have been good ground even if positively established, since the parental authority cannot be bargained away. With reference to the custody and care of the child theretofore, the evidence showed that the mother of the child was an invalid, living for -a while next door to the grandparents, and that whenever she, in her spells of illness, was unable to take care of the child, the child would be taken care of by the grandparents, and that this happened at intervals until the child was about 4 years old, when, the condition of the mother becoming more or less chronic, the child remained with the grandparents and their grown daughter continuously until defendant, as alleged, took possession of him a few days before the filing of this suit.

The law of the case may be stated to be as follows: „

“Art. 216. A child remains under the authority of his father and mother until .his majority or emancipation.
“In case of difference between the parents, the authority of the father prevails.”
“Art. 2327. Neither can husband and wife derogate by their matrimonial agreement from the rights resulting from the power of the husband over the person of his wife and children, or which belong to the husband as the head of the family.”
“Mather entitled to custody of children, even though she left child in care of paternal grandmother for several years, and child shows more affection for latter than mother. State ex rel. Kearney v. Steel et al., 121 La. 215.”
“The father is the master of. the family. His authority as to its civil force is founded on nature, and the care which it is presumed he will have for their education.

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Related

State Ex Rel. Castille v. Cooke
164 So. 153 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1935)
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103 So. 101 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1925)

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Bluebook (online)
92 So. 865, 152 La. 218, 1922 La. LEXIS 2876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-shutt-v-shutt-la-1922.