State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts.
Opinion
[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 96 Ohio St.3d 379.]
THE STATE EX REL. SHEMO ET AL. v. CITY OF MAYFIELD HEIGHTS ET AL.
[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 2002-Ohio-4905.]
Motion for reconsideration granted in part and judgment modified in part.
(No. 2001-1325—Submitted June 4, 2002—Decided October 2, 2002.)
IN MANDAMUS.
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Per Curiam.
{¶1} On April 10, 2002, we granted a writ of mandamus to relators, coowners as trustees of land located in the city of Mayfield Heights, Ohio, to compel respondents, the city and its mayor, city council, and planning commission, to commence appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of the city’s temporary taking of relators’ property. State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 765 N.E.2d 345. We held that relators established a compensable taking of their property because the city’s application of U-1(1) and U-2-A singlefamily residential zoning classifications to their property was unconstitutional in that the application of these classifications did not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Id. at 64, 765 N.E.2d 345. We further held that relators had established the period of the compensable taking as being from March 19, 1992, the date they claimed as the beginning date of the taking, i.e., when they first filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the application of U-1(1) zoning, until April 2001, when the U-2-A zoning classification was invalidated. Id. at 69, 765 N.E.2d 345.
{¶2} On April 22, 2002, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
{¶3} On April 23, 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002), 535
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517. In Tahoe-Sierra, the court held that moratoriums, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin did not constitute a compensable taking although the moratoriums temporarily deprived affected landowners of all economically viable use of their property.
{¶4} On April 29, 2002, relators filed a brief in opposition to respondents’
motion for reconsideration.
Motion for Reconsideration
{¶5} We have used our reconsideration authority under S.Ct.Prac.R. XI to “ ‘correct decisions which, upon reflection, are deemed to have been made in error.’ ” Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 541, 697 N.E.2d 181, quoting State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council (1995), 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 662 N.E.2d 339. For the following reasons, we grant respondents’ motion in part and shorten the period in which a compensable taking was found, but otherwise deny the motion.
Compensation for Application of Invalid Zoning Ordinance
{¶6} Respondents raise three claims in support of reconsideration. In their first claim, they assert that Shemo sub silentio overruled established Ohio law, i.e., Superior Uptown, Inc. v. Cleveland (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 36, 68 O.O.2d 21, 313 N.E.2d 820. In Superior Uptown, at the syllabus, we held, “A cause of action for money damages can not be maintained against a municipality for losses sustained as the result of the adoption of a rezoning ordinance which is subsequently declared invalid.”
{¶7} Respondents’ claim lacks merit. Shemo does not overrule Superior Uptown. Superior Uptown involved a direct action for money damages against a municipality and was based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity. By contrast, this case involves a mandamus claim to compel public authorities to institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property was alleged and ultimately proven by relators.
January Term, 2002
Takings Analysis
{¶8} Respondents next contend that reconsideration is warranted because we did not apply in our takings determination the analysis set forth in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York (1978), 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631. In Penn Cent., the United States Supreme Court held that, in general, the determination of whether a land-use regulation constitutes a compensable taking is an ad hoc, factual inquiry that depends upon several factors, including the economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. Id. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631; see, also, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001), 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592. For the following reasons, respondents’ contention does not warrant reconsideration.
{¶9} First, respondents’ attempted reargument of this contention is not authorized by our Rules of Practice. “A motion for reconsideration shall be confined strictly to the grounds urged for reconsideration [and] shall not constitute a reargument of the case * * *.” S.Ct.Prac.R. XI(2)(A). Respondents previously asserted the applicability of the Penn Cent. inquiry in their merit brief.
{¶10} Second, it is not evident that the Penn Cent./Palazzolo analysis applies to this case, in which the land-use regulations at issue were held to be unconstitutional as applied to the property, i.e., the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning classifications did not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 64, 765 N.E.2d 345. Neither Penn Cent. nor Palazzolo involved a claim that the applicable legislation did not substantially advance legitimate state interests. And in Penn Cent., the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the landowners did not contest that New York City’s objective in enacting the challenged landmark-preservation legislation was a permissible governmental goal or that the restrictions imposed on their land were appropriate means to secure that objective. Id., 438 U.S. at 129, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶11} Third, even assuming that the Penn Cent./Palazzolo analysis applies, a finding of a compensable taking is still warranted. Restricting relators’ land to residential use on property that was held to be unsuitable for residential use had an obvious adverse economic impact on relators, which necessarily interfered with their reasonable investment-backed expectations when they requested that the property be rezoned for retail development. Further, the city’s application of residential classifications to their property did not substantially advance any legitimate health, safety, or welfare concern of Mayfield Heights. Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 64, 765 N.E.2d 345; cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles (1989), 210 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1372, 258 Cal.Rptr. 893, where a California appellate court, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, held that there was no compensable regulatory taking, while observing that “[t]he complaint does not allege * * * that it was unreasonable for the County to conclude these limitations would contribute substantially to the public safety.” In addition, the duration of the challenged restrictions was much lengthier here than the challenged restrictions in Tahoe-Sierra, which totaled 32 months. Id. at ___, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (“the duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claims”).
{¶12} Therefore, respondents’ reliance on Penn Cent. and Palazzolo in support of reconsideration is misplaced.
Tahoe-Sierra
{¶13} Respondents’ reconsideration motion could not rely on Tahoe-Sierra because that case was decided one day after their motion. The court therefore sua sponte considers whether Tahoe-Sierra requires a modification of our decision in Shemo. Upon consideration, Tahoe-Sierra does not warrant vacation of our April 10 judgment.
January Term, 2002
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