[Cite as State ex rel. Shekina v. Oldfield, 2026-Ohio-432.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO EX REL. BAHTYAH AHYAHLAH SHEKINA
Relator C.A. No. 31386 v.
JUDGE JOY MALEK OLDFIELD ORIGINAL ACTION IN PROHIBITION Respondent
Dated: February 11, 2026
PER CURIAM.
{¶1} Relator, Bahtyah Ahyahlah Shekina, has petitioned this Court for a writ of
prohibition to prevent Respondent, Judge Oldfield, from exercising jurisdiction in Summit County
Criminal Case No. CR 2021-05-1878(A) (“the criminal action”). She also seeks to nullify all
orders issued in that matter and to compel Judge Oldfield to dismiss the matter with prejudice.
Judge Oldfield has moved to dismiss the petition, and Ms. Shekina has responded in opposition.
For the following reasons, we grant Judge Oldfield’s motion to dismiss.
{¶2} When this Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we must
presume that all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489,
490 (1994). A complaint can only be dismissed when, having viewed the complaint in this way,
it appears beyond doubt that the relator can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to the relief 2
requested. Goudlock v. Voorhies, 2008-Ohio-4787, ¶ 7. “‘Material incorporated in a complaint
may be considered part of the complaint for purposes of determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss.’” State ex rel. Peoples v. Schneider, 2020-Ohio-1071, ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Crabtree
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, fn. 1 (1997).
Factual Allegations in the Complaint and the Materials Incorporated Therein
{¶3} The complaint alleges that Ms. Shekina became tangentially involved in a custody
dispute between her sister and her sister’s husband. According to the complaint, the sister, her
husband, and their child lived in Chicago. The sister secured a protection order against the husband
in that city. Although the protection order named the child as a protected party, the complaint
alleges that the husband removed the child from the state and brought her to Akron. The husband
then filed an action in the Summit County Domestic Relations Court and obtained temporary
custody of the child. Following the issuance of that custody order, Ms. Shekina and her sister were
indicted as co-defendants in the criminal action for interfering with custody.
{¶4} The complaint states that Judge Oldfield was ultimately assigned to preside over
the criminal action. It alleges that she lacked jurisdiction to act because the custody order the
Domestic Relations Court issued was void, and thus, the criminal action flowing from it was
likewise void. It further alleges that Judge Oldfield lacked personal jurisdiction over Ms. Shekina
because she is a California resident. Finally, the complaint alleges that, over the course of the
criminal action, Judge Oldfield issued several false, unfair, and biased orders.
{¶5} According to the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, Ms. Shekina’s sister
ultimately resolved her charge by way of a no contest plea. The State then moved to dismiss the
indictment as to Ms. Shekina. In granting that motion, Judge Oldfield dismissed without prejudice
the indictment against Ms. Shekina. 3
Prohibition
{¶6} For a writ of prohibition to issue, a relator “must establish that (1) the trial court
has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law, and (3)
denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary
course of the law.” State ex rel. Yeager v. Lake County Court of Common Pleas, 2024-Ohio-1921,
¶ 8. “If the respondent’s lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, the relator need not
establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Kirby, 2023-Ohio-782, ¶ 9. Accord State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 393
(1997). “[I]n such cases, mandamus or prohibition will lie to prevent the unauthorized exercise of
jurisdiction in the future and to provide relief from prior judicial actions taken without
jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Reynolds at ¶ 9. Prohibition will generally lie only for an absence of
subject-matter jurisdiction. State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4542, ¶ 11.
{¶7} The complaint alleges that Judge Oldfield, sitting as a judge of the general division
of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the
domestic relations court order that formed the basis of the criminal case pending before Judge
Oldfield was void and lacked personal jurisdiction because Ms. Shekina was a California resident.
We first consider the claimed lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶8} The complaint alleges that Judge Oldfield lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because the order on which the indictment was based was void. That allegation does not establish
that Judge Oldfield or the common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. A common pleas
court has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases like Ms. Shekina’s case. State ex rel. Martre
v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4542, ¶ 14. As in Martre, “what [Ms. Shekina] attempts to cast as a
jurisdictional defect is merely a challenge to Judge [Oldfield’s] exercise of that jurisdiction.” Id. 4
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, alleged defects in an indictment do not deprive a trial
court of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Allah-U-Akbar v. Schroeder, 2025-Ohio-5003, ¶ 21. Therefore,
the complaint fails to allege facts regarding subject-matter jurisdiction that would support granting
a writ of prohibition.
{¶9} Finally, Ms. Shekina seeks the writ of prohibition because Judge Oldfield allegedly
lacked personal jurisdiction. This Court has recognized, however, that a “lack of personal
jurisdiction falls outside the scope of a writ of prohibition . . . ” because, as noted above, a writ of
prohibition only tests and determines the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. Sanders v.
Summit Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 2023-Ohio-3613, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Eaton
Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1988). Accordingly, the alleged lack of personal
jurisdiction cannot be the basis for a writ of prohibition.
Conclusion
{¶10} Presuming all of the facts in the complaint as true, it appears beyond doubt that Ms.
Shekina can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to a writ of prohibition. Judge Oldfield’s
motion to dismiss is granted, and this case is dismissed.
{¶11} Costs of this action are taxed to Ms. Shekina. The clerk of courts is hereby directed
to serve upon all parties not in default notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.
See Civ.R. 58(B).
JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT
SUTTON, J. CONCUR. 5
CARR, J. CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{¶12} While I agree this case ought to be dismissed, I would dismiss on other grounds.
When an actual controversy no longer exists before this Court, we must dismiss a case as moot.
State ex rel. Grendell v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2022-Ohio-2833, ¶ 9. A case is moot when,
without any fault of the respondent, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this Court to
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State ex rel. Shekina v. Oldfield, 2026-Ohio-432.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO EX REL. BAHTYAH AHYAHLAH SHEKINA
Relator C.A. No. 31386 v.
JUDGE JOY MALEK OLDFIELD ORIGINAL ACTION IN PROHIBITION Respondent
Dated: February 11, 2026
PER CURIAM.
{¶1} Relator, Bahtyah Ahyahlah Shekina, has petitioned this Court for a writ of
prohibition to prevent Respondent, Judge Oldfield, from exercising jurisdiction in Summit County
Criminal Case No. CR 2021-05-1878(A) (“the criminal action”). She also seeks to nullify all
orders issued in that matter and to compel Judge Oldfield to dismiss the matter with prejudice.
Judge Oldfield has moved to dismiss the petition, and Ms. Shekina has responded in opposition.
For the following reasons, we grant Judge Oldfield’s motion to dismiss.
{¶2} When this Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we must
presume that all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489,
490 (1994). A complaint can only be dismissed when, having viewed the complaint in this way,
it appears beyond doubt that the relator can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to the relief 2
requested. Goudlock v. Voorhies, 2008-Ohio-4787, ¶ 7. “‘Material incorporated in a complaint
may be considered part of the complaint for purposes of determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss.’” State ex rel. Peoples v. Schneider, 2020-Ohio-1071, ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Crabtree
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, fn. 1 (1997).
Factual Allegations in the Complaint and the Materials Incorporated Therein
{¶3} The complaint alleges that Ms. Shekina became tangentially involved in a custody
dispute between her sister and her sister’s husband. According to the complaint, the sister, her
husband, and their child lived in Chicago. The sister secured a protection order against the husband
in that city. Although the protection order named the child as a protected party, the complaint
alleges that the husband removed the child from the state and brought her to Akron. The husband
then filed an action in the Summit County Domestic Relations Court and obtained temporary
custody of the child. Following the issuance of that custody order, Ms. Shekina and her sister were
indicted as co-defendants in the criminal action for interfering with custody.
{¶4} The complaint states that Judge Oldfield was ultimately assigned to preside over
the criminal action. It alleges that she lacked jurisdiction to act because the custody order the
Domestic Relations Court issued was void, and thus, the criminal action flowing from it was
likewise void. It further alleges that Judge Oldfield lacked personal jurisdiction over Ms. Shekina
because she is a California resident. Finally, the complaint alleges that, over the course of the
criminal action, Judge Oldfield issued several false, unfair, and biased orders.
{¶5} According to the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, Ms. Shekina’s sister
ultimately resolved her charge by way of a no contest plea. The State then moved to dismiss the
indictment as to Ms. Shekina. In granting that motion, Judge Oldfield dismissed without prejudice
the indictment against Ms. Shekina. 3
Prohibition
{¶6} For a writ of prohibition to issue, a relator “must establish that (1) the trial court
has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law, and (3)
denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary
course of the law.” State ex rel. Yeager v. Lake County Court of Common Pleas, 2024-Ohio-1921,
¶ 8. “If the respondent’s lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, the relator need not
establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Kirby, 2023-Ohio-782, ¶ 9. Accord State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 393
(1997). “[I]n such cases, mandamus or prohibition will lie to prevent the unauthorized exercise of
jurisdiction in the future and to provide relief from prior judicial actions taken without
jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Reynolds at ¶ 9. Prohibition will generally lie only for an absence of
subject-matter jurisdiction. State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4542, ¶ 11.
{¶7} The complaint alleges that Judge Oldfield, sitting as a judge of the general division
of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the
domestic relations court order that formed the basis of the criminal case pending before Judge
Oldfield was void and lacked personal jurisdiction because Ms. Shekina was a California resident.
We first consider the claimed lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶8} The complaint alleges that Judge Oldfield lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because the order on which the indictment was based was void. That allegation does not establish
that Judge Oldfield or the common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. A common pleas
court has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases like Ms. Shekina’s case. State ex rel. Martre
v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4542, ¶ 14. As in Martre, “what [Ms. Shekina] attempts to cast as a
jurisdictional defect is merely a challenge to Judge [Oldfield’s] exercise of that jurisdiction.” Id. 4
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, alleged defects in an indictment do not deprive a trial
court of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Allah-U-Akbar v. Schroeder, 2025-Ohio-5003, ¶ 21. Therefore,
the complaint fails to allege facts regarding subject-matter jurisdiction that would support granting
a writ of prohibition.
{¶9} Finally, Ms. Shekina seeks the writ of prohibition because Judge Oldfield allegedly
lacked personal jurisdiction. This Court has recognized, however, that a “lack of personal
jurisdiction falls outside the scope of a writ of prohibition . . . ” because, as noted above, a writ of
prohibition only tests and determines the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. Sanders v.
Summit Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 2023-Ohio-3613, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Eaton
Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1988). Accordingly, the alleged lack of personal
jurisdiction cannot be the basis for a writ of prohibition.
Conclusion
{¶10} Presuming all of the facts in the complaint as true, it appears beyond doubt that Ms.
Shekina can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to a writ of prohibition. Judge Oldfield’s
motion to dismiss is granted, and this case is dismissed.
{¶11} Costs of this action are taxed to Ms. Shekina. The clerk of courts is hereby directed
to serve upon all parties not in default notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.
See Civ.R. 58(B).
JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT
SUTTON, J. CONCUR. 5
CARR, J. CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{¶12} While I agree this case ought to be dismissed, I would dismiss on other grounds.
When an actual controversy no longer exists before this Court, we must dismiss a case as moot.
State ex rel. Grendell v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2022-Ohio-2833, ¶ 9. A case is moot when,
without any fault of the respondent, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this Court to
grant any relief to the relator. State ex rel. Wood v. Rocky River, 2021-Ohio-3313, ¶ 13. “When
this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a moot question, we do not reach the issue of
whether the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” State ex rel. Sirafi
v. Oldfield, 2025-Ohio-2761, ¶ 5.
{¶13} Ms. Shekina seeks a writ of prohibition, in part, to prevent Judge Oldfield from
exercising jurisdiction in the criminal action and to nullify the orders she issued therein. There is
no dispute, however, that Judge Oldfield dismissed the indictment against Ms. Shekina at the
request of the State. When an indictment is dismissed, the defendant is “‘placed in the same
position [she] was in prior to the State’s filing of criminal charges.’” City of Hudson/State v.
Harger, 2012-Ohio-2604, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Williams, 2011-Ohio-6412, ¶ 11 (9th
Dist.). Because Ms. Shekina’s indictment has been dismissed and there is no pending criminal
action against her, any order preventing Judge Oldfield from exercising jurisdiction in that case or
nullifying the orders issued therein would be superfluous. The dismissal of the indictment has
rendered those aspects of the complaint moot. See State ex rel. Sirafi v. Oldfield, 2025-Ohio-2761,
¶ 3-6 (9th Dist.).
{¶14} To the extent Ms. Shekina seeks to compel Judge Oldfield to issue a new order
dismissing the criminal action with prejudice, I would conclude that Judge Oldfield’s jurisdiction
terminated once she issued a final judgment of dismissal. See State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 6
2005-Ohio-4382, ¶ 14. Ms. Shekina has not suggested that the judgment was void or contained a
clerical error such that Judge Oldfield would have jurisdiction to take further action on it. See
State ex rel. Conomy v. Rohrer, 2025-Ohio-5296, ¶ 34. Once Judge Oldfield dismissed the
criminal case, she no longer had jurisdiction to issue a new or amended judgment entry. See id. at
¶ 35 (trial judge did not retain jurisdiction to change judgment entry from a dismissal without
prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice).
{¶15} Because I would dismiss Ms. Shekina’s petition as moot, I concur in judgment only.
APPEARANCES:
BAHTYAH AHYAHLAH SHEKINA, Pro Se, Relator.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JOHN CHRISTOPHER REECE, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondent.