State ex rel. Reynolds v. McCutchin

239 N.W. 443, 206 Wis. 167, 1931 Wisc. LEXIS 176
Wisconsin Supreme Court·Decided December 8, 1931·Published

Opinion

Fritz, J.

Proceedings under sec. 87.04, Stats. 1927 (which, so far as now material, is set forth in the margin),1 were commenced before the state highway commission by a petition filed by Richland county for the construction of a new bridge on state trunk highway No. 130, across certain navigable waters known as the Wisconsin river, which at that location includes several channels and waters and water beds forming the same or connected therewith at flood stage, [169]*169all of which are largely within Richland and Sauk counties, excepting that the center line of the south or main channel of said river forms the boundary line between Richland and Sauk counties.on the north side thereof, and Iowa county on the south side thereof. At that location there had been a highway across the waters of the Wisconsin river and its bottom lands for many years prior to its final official designation as state trunk highway No. 130. As that highway proceeded northward in Iowa county it crossed a modern steel bridge, 450 feet long, over the south channel of the Wisconsin river. At the center line of that south channel, that bridge crossed the boundary line between Iowa county [170]*170on the south, and Richland and Sauk counties on the north. The portion of that bridge north of that center line of the south channel was on the north and south boundary line between Richland and Sauk counties. From the north end of that bridge, that highway extended due north for 1,865 feet over Long island, which consisted of 230 acres, and was wholly within Richland and Sauk counties. In times of flood most of that island was covered by water, although it was partly wooded. However, those 1,865 feet of roadway were on an embankment, which was about nine feet above the natural surface, and the flood waters did not reach up to that highway. At the northern end of those 1,865 feet of highway it angled off in a northwesterly direction for a few hundred yards, and then turned and continued northward in Richland county across an old and inadequate bridge over a slough, which was the north channel of the Wisconsin river.

After hearings held during the course of the proceedings before the state highway commission, that body ordered a relocation of that portion of state trunk highway No. 130 which was to the north of the north end of the 1,865 feet of roadway across Long island. In furtherance of that relocation the commission ordered a new project which is to extend due north from the north end of the 1,865 foot stretch of highway on Long island, for 1,400 feet along the boundary line of Richland and Sauk counties; and all of which is over 2,000 feet north of the north boundary of Iowa county. That new project necessitates the construction of two new bridges, 455 feet and 80 feet long, respectively, across the north channel of the Wisconsin river, and a creek, which is 553 feet north of that north channel but which eventually empties into that channel. That project also necessitates the construction of new roadway between and as approaches to those new bridges, and the total cost was estimated at $100,000. The commission concluded that the [171]*171new 1,400 feet project, together with the 1,865 feet of existing roadway to the south and the existing 450-foot bridge, both of which were found adequate and were not to be replaced or reconstructed, constituted, within the contemplation of sec. 87.04, Stats., the construction of but a single bridge across navigable waters on which Iowa county bordered; and that the proportionate special benefit of such bridge project to Iowa county was thirty-seven per cent. On that basis the commission duly certified, in accordance with sec. 87.04, Stats., that the proportion of the cost to be paid by Iowa county was eighteen and one-half per cent, or $18,500. Upon the refusal of the county board of Iowa county to provide funds for that purpose, resort was had to these mandamus proceedings.

Appellants contend that sec. 87.04, Stats., does not authorize an assessment of benefits against a county unless the improvement is within or borders upon the county. The material words on the point now in controversy are: “Whenever any county . . . shall file a petition . . . setting forth that said county desires the construction or reconstruction of a bridge . . . across any navigable waters in said county, or on which said county may border,” the state highway commission shall provide for a hearing. If the commission shall find that such work is necessary, “it shall locate the place at which the bridge should be constructed or reconstructed, and if the bridge at such location will necessarily be more than three hundred feet long, not including approaches, . . . the said bridge project shall be constructed or reconstructed at the expense of the state and counties especially benefited as hereinafter provided. The commission shall determine . . . which counties are especially benefited thereby and the proportionate special benefit of each county, shall estimate the cost of the bridge project, and shall file with the county clerk or clerks of the county or counties in or between which said bridge project is to be [172]*172constructed or reconstructed its findings, including . . . the estimated cost of construction or reconstruction, including the cost of any approaches, embankments or other necessary appurtenances, the cost of any new right of way required, the purchase or acquirement of any existing structure and such other cost as shall be a necessary portion of the bridge project.”

Although there is no express limitation in the statute as to what counties the commission may take into consideration in determining “which counties are especially benefited,” the words of the statute immediately following, and which relate to the filing of the commission’s findings, provide for such filing with the county clerks of only the counties “j,n or between' which said bridge project is to be constructed.” As there is no provision for such filing in any other counties, although they may also be especially benefited, it is evident that it was not contemplated that the commission’s determination as to special benefits was to extend to any counties other than those “in or between which” the bridge is to be constructed. In view of the legislative omission to prescribe means of notifying all counties which the commission might consider benefited, it is manifest that the legislature did not intend to confer upon the commission unlimited discretion to assess benefits against all counties which would be benefited in fact. Regardless of whether other counties may be especially benefited by such bridge project, the only statutory provision for any such filing is with the clerks of only the counties “in or between” which the bridge project is to be constructed. Those words “in or between” obviously refer to the physical location of the new bridge project. Unless the physical location of that new project is actually “in or between” the counties assessed, the highway commission is without any authority or jurisdiction to include in its assessment counties which are not so situated. As to such a county the assessment is absolutely void. That conclusion [173]

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State ex rel. Reynolds v. McCutchin, 239 N.W. 443, 206 Wis. 167, 1931 Wisc. LEXIS 176 (Wis. 1931).

239 N.W. 443 (State ex rel. Reynolds v. McCutchin) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.