State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commissioners v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad

79 N.W. 510, 76 Minn. 469, 1899 Minn. LEXIS 628
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJune 9, 1899
DocketNos. 11,581—(23)
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 79 N.W. 510 (State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commissioners v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commissioners v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad, 79 N.W. 510, 76 Minn. 469, 1899 Minn. LEXIS 628 (Mich. 1899).

Opinions

MITCHELL, X

The railroad and warehouse commissioners, upon the petition of numerous citizens, and after a hearing at which the railway company appeared and opposed the granting of the petition, made an order requiring the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company to build and maintain at Emmons, a small, unincorporated village on the line of its road, a station house for the convenience of the public, the outside measurement of which should be 16 feet by 44 feet, and which should contain a waiting room, of the width of the building, and at least 18 feet long, and suitably lighted and heated, for the accommodation of the traveling public, with suitable platforms for the purpose aforesaid, and that the same should thereafter be maintained as a regular station house of the company. The railway company having refused to comply with the order, the state, on the relation of the commissioners, applied to the district court [473]*473for a writ of mandamus to compel it to do so. The railway company appeared' and answered to the alternative writ of mandamus. Upon the trial the only evidence introduced by the state was the findings of the railroad and warehouse commissioners. The railway company introduced no evidence. The court found, as a conclusion of law, that the relators were entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling the railway company forthwith to comply with the order of the commissioners, and from the judgment entered accordingly it appealed to this court.

It becomes important, at the outset, to determine whether this action, and the order sought to be enforced by it, are based upon the provisions of Laws 1897, c. 94, or upon the powers granted to the railroad and warehouse commissioners by the general railroad and warehouse commission act (G. S. 1894, c. 6, tit. 9), and particularly section 388. This depends upon the construction to be given to the word “village,” as used in the act of 1897. That act provides

“That all railroad corporations or companies operating any railroads in this state shall * * * provide at all villages and boroughs on their respective roads, depots with suitable waiting rooms for the protection and accommodation of all passengers patronizing such roads, and a freight room for the storage and protection of freight. * * * Such railroad corporations or companies shall at all such depots or stations stop their trains regularly as at other stations to receive and discharge passengers, and, for at least one half hour before the arrival, and one half hour after the arrival, of any passenger train, cause their respective depots or waiting rooms to be open for the reception of passengers; said depots to be kept well lighted and warmed for the space of time aforesaid.”

While the word “village” is often used to apply to any small assemblage of houses for dwelling or business, or both, in the country, whether incorporated or unincorporated, yet we are satisfied that the word, as used in this statute, applies exclusively to incorporated villages. In the first place, the maxim, “Noscitur a sociis,” applies. The word “village” is used in connection with the word “borough,” which is never applied to any place except an incorporated municipality. See title “Borough,” 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.). We have several boroughs created by special charter in the early history of the territory and state, the name having been evidently bor[474]*474rowed from some'of the eastern, middle, or border states, such as Pennsylvania, where it is in common use. In the second place, the duties imposed on railroad companies by this act are mandatory, apply to all villages, and are imposed by the legislature itself, and not left to the discretion of the railroad and warehouse commissioners, according as they may or may not determine that public necessity or convenience requires a passenger or freight station to-be provided at a particular village. Hence, if the word “village,” in this act, is to be given its general popular meaning, as contended for by counsel for the relators, it would be the absolute duty of a railroad company to provide and maintain such a station at every little hamlet along its line, without regard to its size- or the amount of its business, and without regard to its proximity to other stations, or to the necessities or convenience of the public. It is not to be lightly assumed that the legislature intended to impose any such onerous and unreasonable duties upon railroad companies. Indeed, it is more than doubtful whether any such act could be upheld as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.

If the statute is limited to incorporated villages, the duties imposed are still sufficiently onerous, yet they could be said to have some reference to public convenience; for, to authorize the incorporation of a village, there must be at least 175 inhabitants in a compact or contiguous tract of territory, urban or semiurban, and not strictly rural in its character. Cl. S. 1894, § 1200; State v. Minnetonka Village, 57 Minn. 526, 59 N. W. 972. And, lastly, if the statute is construed as applying to all villages, in the popular sense, whether incorporated or unincorporated, there is no definite rule by which to determine to what place this mandatory duty of providing a depot and station applies. Who is to determine whether a given place has ceased to be strictly rural, and has become so far urban or semiurban in its character as to be entitled to be called a village, even in the general and popular meaning of that word? The railroad and warehouse commissioners themselves are evidently of opinion that the statute applies only to incorporated villages, and we have no doubt that in this they are correct.

2. But there is no doubt of the pow;er of the commissioners, under the general railroad and warehouse commission act, to require a [475]*475railroad company to provide a suitable depot and passenger waiting room at any place, incorporated or unincorporated, where public necessity or convenience reasonably requires it to be done. But this power is neither absolute nor arbitrary. The facts must be such, having regard to the interests, not only of the particular locality, but also of the public at large and of the railroad company itself, as to justify the commissioners, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion and judgment, in ordering the railway company to provide a depot and passenger station at the place in question. Counsel for the relators admit this. The only evidence being the report of the commissioners themselves, we must refer to it to ascertain whether the facts therein stated reasonably justified their order requiring the railroad company to provide and maintain a depot and station at Emmons. The statute provides that,

“Upon the trial of said cause [before the court, as in this case, to enforce the order of the commissioners] the findings of fact of said commission as set forth in its report shall be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated.” G. S. 1894, § 399.

The power of the legislature to establish this rule of evidence is so well settled that we deem it unnecessary to occupy time in argument, or the citation of authorities, in support of the proposition. It will be noted that it is the facts found by the commissioners, and not the conclusions which they draw from those facts, which are made prima facie evidence.

The facts found by the commissioners are, in substance, as follows:

First. That Emmons is on the line of the appellant’s road, near the Iowa line, and has a population of about one hundred.

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Bluebook (online)
79 N.W. 510, 76 Minn. 469, 1899 Minn. LEXIS 628, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-railroad-warehouse-commissioners-v-minneapolis-st-louis-minn-1899.