State ex rel. Punch v. Kortjohn

150 S.W. 1060, 246 Mo. 34, 1912 Mo. LEXIS 166
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedNovember 26, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 150 S.W. 1060 (State ex rel. Punch v. Kortjohn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Punch v. Kortjohn, 150 S.W. 1060, 246 Mo. 34, 1912 Mo. LEXIS 166 (Mo. 1912).

Opinion

GRAVES, J.

Relators Punch and Wilson are members of the “Progressive Party,” a political organization born since the Republican National Con[36]*36vention in June, 1912. Of matters of current public history we can take judicial notice. Respondents are the members of the board of election commissioners of the city of St. Louis. By three several’routes the relators sought to Nave the respondents place their names upon the official ballots to be used in the general election of November 5, 1912. The office to which they aspire is State Representative from the Sixth district in the city of St. Louis. They presented to respondents (1) a petition duly signed and executed by the required number of qualified voters in their district; (2) a certificate of nomination to such office by a convention of said party in said district; and (3) a certificate of nomination by the committee of such party in said district. Notwithstanding the fact that they knocked at these three several doors, the respondents, as a body, were in doubt as to whether either should be opened, and by a vote of two and two, all were thereby left closed, and relators denied a place upon the official ballots. Relators being not content with this ruling, application was made to this court invoking our writ of mandamus to compel the respondents, through one door or the other, or all, to place their names upon such ballots. Being willing that the matters might be heard, our alternative writ was issued, to which .return was made by respondents Blodgett and Kortjohn in the form of a demurrer. Respondents Jamison and Spencer filed a separate return in which they admit the facts stated by relators, and say that they voted to receive relators’ petition and other evidence of nomination and to place their names upon the official ballot, and that they are still willing that, the same be done. To their return is attached a certified copy of the record of proceedings before the board of election commissioners which shows that they acted as in their return stated. In this state of the record the question becomes one purely of law, and must be disposed of as such. Facts thus admitted by the respective returns will be [37]*37noted under the proper point in the course of the opinion.

I. The questions presented compel a thorough view of onr primary laws as well as some previous laws as to nominations. Respondents Kortjohn and Blodgett contend that under onr Primary Act of 1909', no person can he a candidate for any office of the character here involved and have his name on the official ballot, unless such person is nominated at the biennial primary, for the year in which he expects to run for such office. Of course they make no such claim as to offices especially excepted in this Primary Act of 1909, nor to persons nominated to fill vacancies after such primary, hut as to an office of the class to which the office here in question belongs, such is their contention. They argue that the Act of 1909 operated to repeal other methods of nominating candidates for public office. To this contention we do not fully agree.

Eespondents (and when we use the term respondents here we refer to respondents Kortjohn and Blod-gett) rely upon section 5855, Revised Statutes 1909, which reads:

“Hereafter all candidates for elective offices shall be nominated by a primary election held in accordance with this article. This article shall not apply to special elections to fill vacancies, nor to county superintendents of schools, to.city officers not elected at a general state election, to town, village, or school district officers.”

This section comes to the body of our laws from the Act of 1909. [Laws 1909, p. 481.] In 1889 (Laws 1889, p. 105) under the head of elections, there was passed an act entitled, “An Act to provide for the printing and distributing of the ballots in elections for public officers at public expense, and to regulate elections of public officers,” the second section of which reads:

[38]*38“Sec. 2. Any convention of delegates or primary election as hereinafter defined, held for the purpose of making nominations to public office, and also electors to the number hereinafter specified, may nominate candidates for public offices to be filled by election within the state. Such nomination shall he made by filing a certificate of nomination, executed with the formalities prescribed for the execution of an instrument affecting real estate.”

This section has remained upon the statute books ever since and is now Sec. 5833, R. S. 1909. "When passed in 1889, this section was the one which defined and pointed out the sources of nominations. They were three in number, i. e., (1) a convention of delegates, (2) a primary election, and (3) a petition by electors. In the early case of Atkeson v. Lay, 115 Mo. 538, this court held that such electors might designate a party name, and under that name have their candidates’ names printed. Thus the door was opened for the formation of a new party by any considerable portion of the electorate of the State. This remained the fixed policy of the law until 1909, and is the fixed policy of the law now, unless such policy has been changed by the Act of 1909 or previous intervening acts. In determining the legislative intent it is proper to consider the public history of the times. It will be noted that in this Act of 1889 the primary system is recognized as one of the methods of naming candidates. About that time and even prior thereto public sentiment was divided as to the better method of making party nominations. The convention system had its advocates and the primary system had its advocates. As between the two the fight proceeded, but from neither side was there evinced a disposition to bar any independent candidates named by the electors or the formation of new parties by the electorate of the State. The absorbing topic was, shall the convention system survive, or shall it be displaced entirely [39]*39by the primary system? Our political and legislative history bespeak these facts. The whole fire was centered upon this matter in so far as party nominations are concerned. There was no public thought of preventing the formation of new parties, nor of preventing an individual, backed by a required quota of electors from running upon a ticket to himself. So that we say that all the legislative acts following the Act of 1889 must be construed with reference to the spirit of the times surrounding them. The matter thus discussed was the method to be used by political parties in making their nominations. The Act of 1889 recognized two methods for existing political parties to make their nominations, to-wit, by a convention of delegates or by a party primary. It also recognized a method for a new party ticket and for an independent or nonpartisan ticket, as we construed it in Atkeson v. Lay, supra. Although there was more or less a continuous fight from 1889 oh, for the selection of candidates by party primaries rather than by party conventions, material legislative results did not come to light until the legislative session of 1907, at which time a bill was passed entitled, “An Act to provide for party nominations by direct vote.” [Laws 1907, p. 263.] The first section of that act is the same as the first section of the succeeding Act of 1909, and is now Sec. 5855, R. S. 1909, upon which respondents rely.

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Bluebook (online)
150 S.W. 1060, 246 Mo. 34, 1912 Mo. LEXIS 166, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-punch-v-kortjohn-mo-1912.