State ex rel. Pilarczyk v. Geauga Cty.

2018 Ohio 1478
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 17, 2018
Docket17AP-174
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2018 Ohio 1478 (State ex rel. Pilarczyk v. Geauga Cty.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Pilarczyk v. Geauga Cty., 2018 Ohio 1478 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Pilarczyk v. Geauga Cty., 2018-Ohio-1478.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio ex rel. : Joshua N. Pilarczyk, : Relator, : v. No. 17AP-174 : Geauga County, Sarah Morrison, (REGULAR CALENDAR) Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers' : Compensation and The Industrial Commission of Ohio, :

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on April 17, 2018

On brief: Dworken & Bernstein Co., LPA, and Stacy M. Callen, for relator.

On brief: Susan T. Wieland, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Geauga County Prosecutor's Office, for respondent Geauga County.

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Amanda B. Brown, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION DORRIAN, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Joshua N. Pilarczyk, has filed a request for a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate the May 17, 2016 order of its staff hearing officer ("SHO") that denies his application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation, and to enter an order granting that compensation. No. 17AP-174 2 {¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate recommends this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate the May 17, 2016 order denying the application for PTD and to enter a new order adjudicating the PTD application. {¶ 3} The commission has filed the following objection to the magistrate's decision: The Magistrate erred in finding that the report of Dr. Gruenfeld fails to provide "some evidence" upon which the Industrial Commission could rely to reach its decision.

{¶ 4} As explained in the magistrate's decision, the SHO denied relator's PTD request, relying on the report of Dr. Bina Mehta regarding relator's physical conditions and the report of Dr. Kenneth Gruenfeld regarding relator's psychological conditions. The magistrate concluded Dr. Gruenfeld's report was equivocal and, therefore, it must be eliminated from evidentiary consideration and could not constitute some evidence to support the SHO's determination of relator's residual functional capacity. {¶ 5} This court has previously explained that the commission must evaluate an injured worker's residual functional capacity in adjudicating a PTD application: In determining whether relator is capable of performing sustained remunerative employment, the commission shall first consider the medical evidence and determine relator's residual functional capacity. Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(4). After consideration of the medical evidence, if the commission determines that relator is unable to return to his former position of employment, but may be able to engage in sustained remunerative employment, the commission shall then consider nonmedical and vocational factors, known as the Stephenson factors, found at Ohio Adm.Code 4121-334(B)(3). See Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(2)(b) and (c); see also State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167; State ex rel. Corona v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 587; and State ex rel. Nikoli v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-349, 2009-Ohio-243, ¶ 5-6.

State ex rel. Seitaridis v. Delta Plating, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-494, 2011-Ohio-3593, ¶ 10. See also State ex rel. Nickoli v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-349, 2009-Ohio- 243, ¶ 30 ("The commission must make a clear indication of residual functional capacity."). {¶ 6} The commission cannot rely on a medical opinion that is equivocal or internally inconsistent. State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 130 Ohio St.3d 405, 2011- No. 17AP-174 3 Ohio-6036, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp., 70 Ohio St.3d 649 (1994); State ex rel. Lopez v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 445 (1994). "Equivocation disqualifies an opinion from consideration and occurs 'when a doctor repudiates an earlier opinion, renders contradictory or uncertain opinions, or fails to clarify an ambiguous statement.' " George at ¶ 15, quoting Eberhardt at 657. The commission argues the magistrate erred by concluding Dr. Gruenfeld's report was equivocal on the issue of whether relator was capable of employment. However, having reviewed the record and the magistrate's decision, we agree with the magistrate's conclusion that Dr. Gruenfeld's response was ambiguous as to whether relator was unable to return to his former position of employment or unable to hold any position of employment. Because this ambiguity was not resolved, Dr. Gruenfeld's report could not constitute some evidence to support the commission's conclusion regarding the issue of relator's residual functional capacity. {¶ 7} Upon review of the magistrate's decision, an independent review of the record, and due consideration of the commission's objection, we find the magistrate has properly determined the pertinent facts and applied the appropriate law. We therefore overrule the commission's objection to the magistrate's decision and adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. Accordingly, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate the May 17, 2016 order of the SHO denying relator's application for PTD and, in a manner consistent with this court's decision and the magistrate's decision incorporated herein, enter a new order adjudicating the PTD application. Objection overruled; writ of mandamus granted.

TYACK, J., concurs. LUPER SCHUSTER, J., dissents.

LUPER SCHUSTER, J., dissenting. {¶ 8} Because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Dr. Gruenfeld's report is equivocal and cannot be used to constitute some evidence to support the SHO's determination of relator's residual functional capacity, I respectfully dissent. {¶ 9} In adopting the magistrate's decision, the majority concludes the commission abused its discretion when it relied on Dr. Gruenfeld's report because it deems Dr. Gruenfeld's report to be equivocal or internally inconsistent. More specifically, the majority No. 17AP-174 4 considered Dr. Gruenfeld's response to the second query in his report to be ambiguous, stating Dr. Gruenfeld failed to clarify whether his conclusion that relator's "problems with distractibility and motivation inhibit his ability to return to work at this time" applies only to relator's potential return to his former position of employment or whether it would apply to his potential return to any sustained remunerative employment. (Mag.'s Decision at ¶ 12.) {¶ 10} Unlike the majority, I would not find Dr. Gruenfeld's response to the second query in his report to be ambiguous. The question asks, specifically, whether the injured worker can return to his former position of employment. In the first sentence of his response, Dr. Gruenfeld answers this question unequivocally: relator cannot return to his former position of employment due to his mental health issues. The subsequent two sentences, when read in context of the specific question asked, explain the rationale for Dr. Gruenfeld's conclusion to the specific question asked. {¶ 11} In response to a subsequent, separate query, Dr. Gruenfeld then opines relator would be capable of performing work in a low-stress office environment. Again, I would read this response in the context of the query to which it responded, and I would not find it to be internally inconsistent with Dr. Gruenfeld's response to the second query. Thus, I would conclude these responses in Dr.

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Related

State ex rel. Pilarczyk v. Geauga Cty. (Slip Opinion)
2019 Ohio 2880 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2019)

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2018 Ohio 1478, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-pilarczyk-v-geauga-cty-ohioctapp-2018.