State ex rel. Owen v. Donald

157 N.W. 794, 162 Wis. 609, 1916 Wisc. LEXIS 195
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 157 N.W. 794 (State ex rel. Owen v. Donald) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 157 N.W. 794, 162 Wis. 609, 1916 Wisc. LEXIS 195 (Wis. 1916).

Opinion

The following report of the special referee, Judge Samuel D. Hastings, appointed by the court in the above entitled action (see 160 Wis. 21, 156) was filed October 7, 1915, and is here printed by order of the court:

Repobt oe Special Reeeeee.

By the judgment of the court in the above entitled action, it was referred to the undersigned, as special referee, for an accounting. The order is that

“There shall be an accounting ... of all dealings with the trust fund lands of the date of ch. 367, Laws 1897, and so long prior thereto as practicable, not earlier than the de-[610]*610cisión under ch. 537, Laws 1865, — and of lands acquired under the forestry legislation since 1897, except those donated to the state for forestry purposes or acquired by proceeds of the. latter, and an accounting of all proceeds of such trust lands and income thereof and income which such proceeds would have earned had the same been devoted to the trust to which they belonged, such accounting to include all moneys paid into the forestry fund or general fund, derived from trust fund lands or lands purchased therewith and income from such proceeds, and a partition shall be made of the entire property so found equitably and legally to belong to the constitutional trusts, including any indebtedness from the general fund; giving due credit for all proper disbursements chargeable to such trust funds,' — so that each of the constitutional trusts will have its equitable and legal portion of the trust fund property with identity established as to lands and other assets, as near as may be, after the manner of the decision under ch. 537, Laws 1865. Such accounting shall include all matters not specifically mentioned so far as necessary to cover the field discussed in the opinion and carry out the intent thereof, guided by such opinion.”

The proceeding in which this order was made is conceded to be without precedent. The action as originally commenced terminated by the decision of the court that the relator had no cause of action. His claim called the court’s attention to the fact that the legislature, and public officials pursuant to its direction, had been dealing in an unconstitutional manner with funds appropriated by the constitution to specified purposes, with the result of diverting from said purposes part of said funds. Upon its own motion the court caused to be made matter of record facts showing the general character of such unconstitutional dealing with such funds; by its process restrained the public officials from further dealing with the property of said funds; decided definitely certain questions as to the constitutional power of the legislature to deal with them; and proposes, by its final judgment, to determine the status of all the remaining property which was originally devoted to such purposes, and how much of the [611]*611■other property of the state should he taken and devoted to said purposes in place of that wrongfully used. The order imposés upon the referee the duty of ascertaining, within certain specified limits, the dealings of the legislature and officials with said funds, the duty of deciding questions arising out of facts discovered, not definitely met by the decision because not definitely presented by the facts before the court. It leaves it for the referee to decide how far certain lines of investigation are practicable, and how far “the accounting shall include all matters not' specifically mentioned, so far as necessary to carry out the intent of the court, as expressed in their opinion.”

The scope of the order makes it proper, if not necessary, to state somewhat in detail my construction of it and some of the questions that the facts have presented and my solution of them.

The order calls for an accounting and partition of property.

The accounting is not between two or more different persons or corporations, each owning separate interests in property to be partitioned, or between parties mutually indebted to each other.

The accounting is between different funds all belonging to the same party — the state.

Technically a fund consists of money or its equivalent, as distinguished from land or other kinds of property from which it is derived. Art. X of the constitution uses the term in that sense. But the legislature has used the term as including lands from which the money is derived, and I have used it with that meaning in this report by referring to .certain lands and property rights as belonging to certain funds.

The state keeps account of the moneys coming into the hands of its treasurer under the heads of different funds, theoretically treating each fund as if it were a separate purse [612]*612or pocket into which all moneys received for the several different nses or purposes were respectively placed.

The funds with which this report deals are designated by the statutes and officials as (1) university fund; (2) agricultural college fund; (3) school fund; (4) normal school fund; (5) drainage fund; (6) forest reserve fund; (7) general fund; and when all the property going into a fund is to be kept intact as a permanent principal, only the income to be spent, the income is treated as a separate fund and a separate account kept of it, as the “university fund” income account; the “school fund” income account.

The constitution creates tw-o funds. Art. X. The only one continued by the statute just as created, and named, is the “university fund.” It consists .of the proceeds of all lands granted to the state for a university. The other is the school fund. The constitutional “school fund” consists of certain specified moneys and the proceeds of all lands granted to the state for educational purposes — except for a university — and all moneys derived from grahts not specifying any purpose for which it is made. The agricultural college grant and the swamp land grants were made after the constitution was adopted, and all moneys derived from them for school purposes are part of the constitutional school fund. But the legislature has subdivided this fund by calling that part of it derived from the agricultural college grant “agricultural college fund;” and that portion of it derived from the swamp land grant “normal school fund,” leaving the remainder to be known as the “school fund.” But these subdivisions retain the characteristics and protection of the constitutional funds.

The drainage fund differs from the educational funds in that it is not a permanent fund with an income which is all that can be spent. The entire proceeds of the property from which it is derived is to be spent, and it is not a fund created or protected by the constitution. This distinction is recognized in the court’s opinion by referring to the “drainage fund” and the “constitutional trust funds.”

[613]*613The “general fund” is that in which the state keeps all its funds not belonging to one of said constitutional funds or some other fund which the legislature has created in which to keep part of the state’s funds which the legislature has appropriated to a particular purpose and over which it has control unrestrained by any constitutional provision or grant creating a trust. Such is the character of the forest reserve fund so far as it consists of funds provided by the state, as distinguished from lands and moneys granted to the state to be used only for forestry purposes and to be returned to the donor or grantor if not so used.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
157 N.W. 794, 162 Wis. 609, 1916 Wisc. LEXIS 195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-owen-v-donald-wis-1916.